June 23, 2019
The European Banking Union is based on supervision as much as on regulation: it concerns the operators as much as the structures of the sector, because the operators "hold" the sector.
This is why the "regulator - supervisor" holds the operators by the supervision and is close to them.
He meets them officially and in "soft law" relations. This is all the more necessary since the distinction between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post must be nuanced, in that its application is too rigid, in that it involves a long time (first of all the rules, then to apply them, then to notice a gap between rules and behaviors, then to repair it) is not appropriate if the system aims at the prevention of systemic crises, whose source is inside the operators.
This is why the body in charge of solving the difficulties of the systemic banks for the salvation of the systeme meets the banking sector itself, to ensure that they are permanently "resolvable", so that the hypothesis of their resolution never arises. This is the challenge of this system: that it is always ready, for never be applying.
In the European Banking Union, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) is in charge of "resolve" the difficulties of European systemic banks in difficulty. It is the public body of the second pillar of the Banking Union. The first pillar is the prevention of these difficulties and the third is the guarantee of deposits. The resolution is therefore more like an Ex Post mechanism.
But in this continuum through these three pillars between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post, the SRB does not wait passively - as would a traditional judge do - that the file of the troubled bank reaches it. Like a supervisor - which brings it closer to the first public in the system (Single Supervisory Board -SSB), which supervises all the banks, it is in direct contact with all the banks, and it approaches the hypothesis of a bank in trouble by a systemic perspective: it is therefore to the entire banking system that the SRB addresses itself.
As such, it organizes meetings, where he is located: in Brussels.
To resolve in Ex Post the difficulties of a bank, it has to present a quality (a little known concept in Bankruptcy Law): "resolvability". How build it? Who build it ? In its very design and in its application, bank by bank.
For the resolution body vis-à-vis all players in the banking and financial sector, it's clear: "Working together" is crucial in building resolvability ".
In the projection that is made, it is affirmed that there can be a successful resolution only if the operator in difficulty is not deprived of access to what makes to stay it alive, that is to say the banking and financial system itself, and more specifically the "Financial Market Infrastructures", for example payment services.
Does the Single Resolution Board expect spontaneous commitments from the FMIs for such a "right of access"? In this case, as the Single Resolution Board says, this right of access corresponds to "critical functions" for a bank, the resolution situation can not justify the closure of the service.
By nature, these crucial operators are entities that report to regulators who oversee them. Who enforces - and immediately - this right of access? When one can think that it is everyone, it risks being nobody .... That is why the resolution body, relaying in this a concern of the Financial Stability Board, underlines that it is necessary to articulate the supervisors, regulators and "resolvers" between them.
To read this program, since it is a proposed program of work for the banking sector, four observations can be made:
1. We are moving more and more towards a general "intermaillage" (which will perhaps replace the absence of a global State, but it is an similar nature because it is always to public authorities that it refers and not to self-regulation);
2. But as there is no political authority to keep these guardians, the entities that articulate all these various public structures, with different functions, located in different countries, acting according to different temporalities, these are the companies themselves that internalize the concern that animates those who built the system: here the prevention of systemic risk. This is the definition of Compliance, which brings back to companies, here more clearly those those which manage the Market Infrastructures, the obligations of Compliance (here the management of systemic risk through the obligation of giving access).
3. Even without a single systemic guard, there is always a recourse. That will be the judge. There are already many, there will probably be more in a system of this type, more and more complex, the articulation of disputes is sometimes called "dialogue". And it is undoubtedly "decisions of principle" that will set the principles common to all of these particular organisms.
4. We then see the emergence of Ex Ante mechanisms for the solidity of the systems, and the solidity of the players in the systems, and then the Ex Post resolution of the difficulties of the actors according to access to the solidity of the infrastructures of these systems, which ultimately depend on judges (throughout the West) facing areas where all of this depends much less on the judge: the rest of the world.
Nov. 3, 2016
Sept. 3, 2016
The Basel Committee on banking supervision issues regularly a monitoring report on the implementation of Basel III regulatory reforms.
In August 2016, the seventh issue was published by the Committee as to be taken into account for the upcoming G20 meeting: Implementation of Basel standards. A report to G20 Leaders on implementation of the Basel III regulatory reforms.
In this report, the Committee mesures how national systems gradually implement the prudential reforms they have informally elaborated in common.
All the power derived from the Basel System stems indeed from the fact that it is concentrated; however, it still has to face a 'hard law' issue, as it is necessary to implement the reforms within the national systems in identical terms and in a constrained timeframe.
The Committee indicates in its reports that some countries still face a number of issues regarding this implementation, whether these issues arise from the rules themselves or from the transposition period that the countries are given to implement them. Those same countries tend to justify themselves by saying that banks are to blame for these issues, since they report having trouble adjusting their information system as to satisfy the new requirements.
The Committee underlines the fact that this delay occurs in some countries whereas others are already compliant creates a situation of unfair 'jurisdiction' competition between them, which is all the more concerning since these national systems host international banks: "Delayed implementation may have implications for the level playing field, and puts unnecessary pressure on jurisdictions that have implemented the standards based on the agreed timelines. A concurrent implementation of global standards is all the more important, as many jurisdictions serve as hosts to internationally active banks.".
In order to improve an effective implementation of the whole system, the Committee proposed to implement instead a calculus method that would be less complex: "These proposals would constrain banks’ use of internal models and would reduce the complexity of the regulatory framework.".
A few general observations can be drawn from this very specific Basel III issue underlined in the aforementioned report:
This last question is crucial. Those who impose the requirement may consider that the non-enforcement for technical reasons cannot be accepted!footnote-68. Here, however, maybe since it is not a formal requirement as this is all soft law, and since there is a good communication between the supervisor and the executing agent (who is, at the same time, the one that is subject to the requirement, the one who elaborated it and the one who proposes to review it as to make it less complex).
Cass. R. Sunstein's last book was entitled Simpler. French Conseil d’État (French administrative supreme court) conducts thorough work on the quality of laws and on their simplicity, both qualities that probably go hand in hand. The Basel Committee steps in the same directions...
Dec. 8, 2014
The Conseil d'État (French State Council)l issued a ruling Sept. 19, 2014, Agence pour l'enseignement français à l'étranger, which does not involve a regulated sector but is very instructive for all of them.
Indeed, the term "guidelines" is common in how each and designates certain documents prepared by the regulatory authorities. These give themselves this appellation to documents made ex ante to give operators the "outline" of the future action of the regulator. Thus, the "guidelines" would produce legal certainty while maintaining flexibility, since in the future the authority will continue to set its position on a case by case basis.
This convinced the Conseil d'État, which expressed his support for the "droit souple (soft law)" in its annual report in 2013.
Now comes the case: it was necessary that the "hard right" come bless the "soft law".
In this case, was challenged before the administrative judge an "instruction" from this Agency for French Teaching Abroad for the "consideration of the financial situation of the parents" seeking a scholarship to the child. A local agency for awarding grants had rejected a request no meeting the criteria developed in the statement. Parents have acted appeal for abuse of power. They both lost before the Cour administrative d'appel de Paris (Administrative Court of Pari) that before the Conseil d'État.
However, the Council recognizes that the Agence pour l'enseignement français à l'étranger has no regulatory power. But the judgement takes in considération that:"l'instruction en cause a énoncé, à l'intention des commissions locales, des lignes directrices, sans fixer de normes à caractère général qui se serait imposée de matière impérative à ces commissions"!footnote-8 .
Triumph of soft law!
Thus, organizations, "agencies", may take "general guidelines" here which do not contain any threshold and generating no rights, on which the commission take real decisions. These are based on the first document, but because of the "flexibility" of it, the one whose solution is affected by the particular decision does'not have the right to appeal.
All the beauty and effectiveness of "soft law". The judge, after having boasted, now offers it royal way.
Nov. 5, 2014
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Référence complète : Entretien avec Jacky Richard, rapporteur général de la secteur du rapport et des études du Conseil d'État, et Laurent Cytermann, rapporteur général adjoint, "Et si le droit souple était l'avenir du droit dur ?", Les Petites Affiches, 5 nov. 2013, p.4-8.
Les étudiants de Sciences Po peuvent lire l'article par le Drive de Sciences Po (dossier "MAFR - Régulation").
Updated: Sept. 25, 2012 (Initial publication: Oct. 7, 2011)
In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors
Thematic Report (Energy): The French energy regulator publishes its first unfavorable opinion regarding the government’s proposed natural gas tariffs for residential customers.
The Commission de Régulation de l’Energie (CRE — French energy regulator) published an opinion “regarding the draft executive order regarding the regulated tariffs for natural gas publicly distributed by GDF Suez.” This non-binding opinion was published on September 29, 2011, and claims that it is not acceptable for the Government to leave natural gas prices unchanged because these prices do not cover GDF Suez’s costs and symmetrically prevent newcomers from competing with it.
Relazione tematica (Energia): L’autorità di regolazione francese nel settore dell’energia ha reso pubblica il suo primo parere sfavorevole a proposito delle tariffe del gaz proposte dal governo per le utenze residenziali
La Commission de Régulation de l’Energie (CRE – l’autorità francese di regolazione nel settore dell’energia) ha reso pubblico un parare « riguardante la bozza di proposte di tariffe per il gaz naturale distribuito da GDF Suez ». Questo parere non vincolante è stato pubblicato il 29 settembre 2011 e afferma che non è possibile per il Governo di lasciare immutati i prezzi del gas naturale poiché questi prezzi non coprono i costi di GDF Suez e, al contempo, impedisce ai nuovi operatori di competere con tali costi.
Other translations forthcoming.
Updated: Sept. 25, 2012 (Initial publication: June 12, 2011)
II-4.8: European and North American authorities notify the ICANN, a private association in charge of the self-regulation of Internet domain names, that it must adopt more transparent “governance” and adopt public structures’ recommendations
On May 12, 2011, both Neelie Kroes, the European Commissioner for the digital agenda within the European Commission, and Larry Strickling, Assistant Commissioner for Communications and Information within the United States Department of Commerce, sent a notification to the ICANN, a private association that manages Internet domain names. First of all, they agreed with the principle of self-regulation of Internet domain names by the ICANN. But, they requested a reform of its “governance” to improve its transparency and better take into account public authorities’ recommendations.
Association - Conflict resolution - Domain name - European commission - Internet - Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers (ICANN) - Memorandum - Power - Private regulator - Regulatory Authority - Self regulation - Soft law - Transparency - United Nations (UN) *
* In The Journal of Regulation, these keywords are done by the Editor and not by the Author.
Informe bibliográfico (Internet): Autoridades europeias e norte-americanas notificaram a ICANN, uma associação privada encarregada da auto-regulação de nomes de domínio na Internet, que ela deve adotar uma governança mais transparente e também adotar as recomendações de estruturas públicas.
Em 12 de maio de 2011, tanto Neelie Kroes, o Comissário Europeu para a agenda digital dentro da Comissão Europeia, quanto Larry Strickling, Comissário Assistente para Comunicações e Informação dentro do Departamento de Comércio dos Estados Unidos da América, enviaram uma notificação para a ICANN, uma associação privada que gerencia nomes de domínio na internet. Em primeiro lugar, eles concordaram com o princípio da auto-regulação dos nomes de domínio na Internet pela ICANN. No entanto, eles solicitaram uma reforma em sua governança para melhorar sua transparência e melhor levar em consideração as recomendações de autoridades públicas.
Associação – Resolução de conflitos – Nome de domínio – Comissão Europeia – Internet - Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers (ICANN) – Memorandum – Poder – Regulação privada – Autoridade de regulação – Auto-regulação – Soft law – Transparência – Nações Unidas (ONU)*
* No Journal of Regulation, as palavras-chave são fornecidas pelo Diretor, e não pelo Autor.
Relazione bibliografica (Internet): Le autorità europee e nord americane hanno indicato che l’ICANN, una società privata che ha lo scopo di auto-regolare i nomi a dominio di internet, dovrà aumentare la trasparenza della gestione ed adottare le raccomandazioni delle strutture pubbliche
Il 12 maggio 2011, Neelie Kroes, Commissario europeo per l’agenda digitale della Commissione europea, e Larry Strickling, Commissario assistente per le comunicazioni e l’informazione del Dipartimento del Commercio degli Stati Uniti, hanno entrambi dichiarato che l’ICANN, una società privata che gestisce i nomi a dominio di Internet, deve riformare il proprio sistema di gestione migliorando la sua trasparenza e deve prendere in debita considerazione le raccomandazioni provenienti dalle autorità pubbliche.
Associazione - Autorità di regolazione - Autorità privata di regolazione - Auto-regolazione - Commissione Europea - Internet - Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers (ICANN) - Memorandum - Nazioni Unite (ONU) - Nomi di dominio - Potere - Risoluzione di controversie - Soft law - Transparenza *
* In The Journal of Regulation, le parole chiave sono responsabilità dell’Editore e non dall’Autore.
Other translations fortcoming.
Updated: Sept. 25, 2012 (Initial publication: Sept. 19, 2011)
II-3.5: Burkina Faso’s media regulator ordered an advertisement for an insecticide to be taken off the air because its health risks were hidden from the public, and requested that the media refrain from broadcasting similar advertisments in the future.
An advertisement broadcast in Burkina Faso for an insecticide did not reveal its health risks. The national media regulator published a decision on September 6, 2011 ordering that it be taken off the air and “requested” that the media refrain from broadcasting advertisements dangerous for human health and dignity.
Updated: Jan. 23, 2012 (Initial publication: Dec. 5, 2011)
Thesaurus : Doctrine
Updated: Jan. 16, 2012 (Initial publication: Oct. 7, 2011)
Updated: Jan. 4, 2012 (Initial publication: July 1, 2011)
Updated: Jan. 4, 2012 (Initial publication: May 28, 2011)
Releases : I. Isolated Articles
Two and a half years after having been established by the LME, the French Competition Authority has uncontestably acquired its “place in the sun” amongst the competition authorities of other countries, as demonstrated by multiple indicators.
Articolo: L’Autorità garante della concorrenza tra “regolazione” e politica in materia di concorrenza
Due anni e mezzo dopo l’instaurazione da parte del LME, l’Autorità francese garante della libera concorrenza ha trovato il suo posto tra le diverse autorità degli altri paesi, così come è stato dimostrato da diversi indicatori.
Artículo: La Autoridad de la competencia, entre “regulación” y política competitiva.
Después de dos años y medio de haber sido establecido por el LME, la Autoridad francesa de la competencia ha incontestablemente adquirido su “lugar bajo el sol” entre las autoridades de la competencia de otros países, como demostrado por varios indicadores.
Other translations forthcoming.
Updated: Jan. 3, 2012 (Initial publication: Jan. 2, 2012)
Updated: Jan. 2, 2012 (Initial publication: Jan. 2, 2012)
Releases : Neutrality in Systems of Economic Regulation
In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors
The debate on Net Neutrality faces a major difficulty, namely that of its legal status: does there exist a “legal principle”—meaning a rule somewhere within the entire body of law—with mandatory force that could be used to counter infrastructure operators’ discriminatory practices?
Le débat sur la neutralité du Net fait face à une difficulté majeure, à savoir son statut juridique: existe-t-il un «principe juridique», qui exprime une règle dans l’ensemble du système juridique - avec une force obligatoire qui pourrait être utilisée pour contrer les pratiques discriminatoires des opérateurs d’ infrastructure ?
El debate sobre la Neutralidad de la Red se enfrenta a una gran dificultad, primordialmente en cuanto a su estatus legal: ¿realmente existe un “principio legal” – es decir, una regla que se encuentra dentro de la disciplina del derecho – con fuerza mandataria que podría ser usado para enfrentar a las prácticas discriminatorios que practican los operadores de infraestructura?
Il dibattito sulla neutralità della rete si trova di fronte ad una difficoltà rilevante dal punto di vista del suo fondamento giuridico: esiste una norma giuridica obbligatoria – intesa come una norma legale – che possa essere utilizzata contro le pratiche discriminatorie degli operatori?
Other translations forthcoming.
Updated: Dec. 19, 2011 (Initial publication: July 5, 2011)
A recommendation concerning professional “good practices” in pharmaceutical treatments issued by the Haute Autorité de la Santé (French Healthcare Regulator) was attacked before the Council of State by an association. It was invalidated by Council of State decision on April 27, 2011 for violation of the principal of impartiality, because members of the regulator’s working group had interests in the pharmaceutical industry.
Relazione di settore (Salute): Una raccomandazione sulle “buone prassi” pubblicata dall’Autorità di regolazione in material di salute è stata annullata a ragione della sua parzialità
Una raccomandazione relativa alle “buone prassi” nei trattamenti farmaceutici resa dalla Haute Autorité de la Santé (l’autorità francese di regolazione in materia di salute) era stata contestata da un’associazione dinanzi al Consiglio di Stato. Il 27 aprile 2011, il Consiglio di Stato ha annullato tale raccomandazione in quanto resa in violazione del principio d’imparzialità, diversi membri del gruppo di lavoro nominati dall’autorità di regolazione avevano interessi personali nell’industria farmaceutica.
Informe Temático (Salud): Una recomendación concerniendo las “buenas prácticas” publicada en por el regulador francés de la salud fue invalidada por razones de parcialidad.
Una recomendación concerniendo las “buenas prácticas” en tratamientos farmacéuticos publicada por la Haute Autorité de la Santé (el Regulador francés de la salud) fue atacada frente al Consejo de Estado por una asociación. Fue invalidada por el Consejo de Estado en una decisión del 27 de abril del 2011 por violación del principio de la imparcialidad, porque miembros del grupo de trabajo del regulador tenían ciertos intereses en la industria farmacéutica.
Informe setorial (Saúde): Uma recomendação relativa a “boas práticas” publicada pelo regulador francês de saúde foi anulada por motivos de parcialidade.
Uma recomendação relativa a “boas práticas” em tratamentos farmacêuticos adotada pela Haute Autorité de la Santé (Regulador francês de saúde) foi atacada perante o Conselho de Estado por uma associação. Ela foi invalidada pela decisão do Conselho de Estado de 27 de abril de 2011 por violação do princípio da imparcialidade, pois alguns membros do grupo de trabalho do regulador tinham interesses na indústria farmacêutica.
Revogação – Ônus da prova – Conflito de interesses – Deontologia – Ex post – Boas práticas – Guia – Hard Law – Haute Autorité de la Santé (Regulador Francês da Saúde) – Imparcialidade – Independência – Legislador – Responsabilidade – Programa de tratamento médico – Obrigação – Parcialidade – Indústria farmacêutica – Recomendação – Ciência – Autoridade científica – Dados científicos – Grupo de trabalho.*
* Em The Journal of Regulation, estas palavras-chave são fornecidas pelo Editor e não pelo Autor.
Other translations forthcoming.
Updated: Oct. 7, 2011 (Initial publication: Oct. 7, 2011)
Updated: Sept. 19, 2011 (Initial publication: Sept. 16, 2011)
Thematic report (Media, Healthcare): Burkina Faso’s media regulator ordered an advertisement for an insecticide to be taken off the air because its health risks were hidden from the public, and requested that the media refrain from broadcasting similar advertisments in the future.
Updated: Sept. 15, 2011 (Initial publication: June 12, 2011)
Thematic report (Internet): European and North American authorities notify the ICANN, a private association in charge of the self-regulation of Internet domain names, that it must adopt more transparent “governance” and adopt public structures’ recommendations
Updated: Aug. 31, 2011 (Initial publication: July 4, 2011)