Nov. 4, 2021

Events : JoRC

This scientific event is  part of the 2021 colloquium cycle, organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and its Universities partners, around the general theme of Compliance Monumental Goals.

 It is organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and by the Paris Center for Law and Economics  of the Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II).

 This scientific event is placed under the scientific responsibility of Laurent Benzoni, Bruno Deffains and Marie-Anne Frison-Roche.






 📅 The colloquium will take place in the Salle du Conseil (Panthéon-Assas University) on Thursday, November 4, 2021 from 1.30pm until 6.30pm.

🎥 The colloquium will be edited on video by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance.


Presentation of the topic : 



🎤 Laurent Benzoni, professor of Economics at Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II), Tera Consultants

🎤Bruno Deffains, professor of Economics at Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II), director of the CRED

🎤 Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Law professor at Sciences Po - Paris, director of the JoRC

🎤 Antoine Gaudemet, Law professor  at Panthéon-Assas Université (Paris II), director of the Compliance Officer D.U. 

🎤 Sabine Lochmann, CEO of Vigeo Eiris, Global Director of Moody’s ESG Solutions

🎤Frédéric Marty, economist, researcher at CNRS, member of GREDEG Côte d'Azur University

🎤 Stanislas Pottier, senior advisor to the General Management, Amundi

🎤 Jean-Christophe Roda, Law professor at Lyon 3 University


The different interventions will be then transformed into contributions in the books 📕 Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance and 📘 Compliance Monumental Goals  which will be published in the Regulation & Compliance serie, jointly published by the JoRC and Dalloz for the French edition and by JoRC and Bruylant for the book in English. 


Read a detailed presentation of the colloquium below: 


Oct. 5, 2016

Events : JoRC

June 14, 2016

Breaking news

On 9 June, the SEC made an announcement on its website.

  • The Regulator itself issued the amount of the award to a whistleblower for having providing it with information. Why is that? One would usually take a lower profile when awarding this much money ($17m) to an informer… Conversely, the Regulator immediately and publicly announced it in a press release, which pretty looked like a tender offer for further denunciations. It even included a link for everyone to access the whistleblower program—which is easily funded, since the awards are charged on the fines imposed on the convicted operators thanks to the information given.


  • The reason for this is that information from whistleblowers is not merely indicative, nor a second-best option; it is central to Regulation, since it leads the Regulator to get information people within the system (i.e., insiders) deliberately chooses to ‘blow’ (in fact, not only do informers blow the whistle—they often immediately provide the Regulator with substantial information).


  • The press release includes justifications for the Regulator’s behaviour, as the SEC openly considers that rewarding whistleblowers is the most efficient way for the Regulator to open or to resolve investigations. The Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement stated indeed that “company insiders are uniquely positioned to protect investors and blow the whistle on a company’s wrongdoing by providing key information to the SEC so we can investigate the full extent of the violations”.


  • This highlights the ambivalence of insiders. Accordingly, they need to be ‘inside’ the system to be ‘knowledgeable’ and, consequently, obtain privileged information. On the one hand, should they use this information for themselves, then they would face prosecution for market abuse; on the other hand, however, if they use it to stir up the Regulator and shift its attention towards the whistle they’re blowing, then they may earn just as much money, if not more, than if they had behaved in a way that would have led them to prison.


The stage is thus set for the "business of virtue" to thrive.




Feb. 5, 2014

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Updated: Sept. 25, 2012 (Initial publication: Dec. 5, 2011)

Sectorial Analysis

Translated Summaries

In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors


The European Commission issued a reasoned opinion on November 24th, 2011, to France and the Czech Republic demanding that those countries modify their legislation in order to comply with European regulation on renewable energies. If the modifications are not implemented in the upcoming two months, the Commission will open a case before the European Court of Justice.


La Commission européenne a émis un avis motivé le 24 Novembre 2011, concernantla France et la République tchèque, exigeant que ces pays modifient leur législation afin de se conformer à la réglementation européenne sur les énergies renouvelables. Si les modifications ne sont pas mises en œuvre dans les deux prochains mois, la Commission ouvrira une procédure devant la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne


Il 24 novembre 2011, la Commissione europea ha emesso una raccomandazione con cui richiede alla Francia ed alla Repubblica Ceca di modificare le proprie legislazioni in modo tale da conformarle alla regolamentazione europea in materia di energia rinnovabile. Se le modifiche non saranno introdotte entro i prossimi due mesi, la Commissione adirà la Corte di Giustizia Europea.


Other translations forthcoming.

Updated: Jan. 4, 2012 (Initial publication: July 1, 2011)


Updated: Jan. 4, 2012 (Initial publication: May 28, 2011)

Releases : I. Isolated Articles

Translated Summaries


Two and a half years after having been established by the LME, the French Competition Authority has uncontestably acquired its “place in the sun” amongst the competition authorities of other countries, as demonstrated by multiple indicators.



Articolo: L’Autorità garante della concorrenza tra “regolazione” e politica in materia di concorrenza

Due anni e mezzo dopo l’instaurazione da parte del LME, l’Autorità francese garante della libera concorrenza ha trovato il suo posto tra le diverse autorità degli altri paesi, così come è stato dimostrato da diversi indicatori.


Artículo: La Autoridad de la competencia, entre “regulación” y política competitiva.


Después de dos años y medio de haber sido establecido por el LME, la Autoridad francesa de la competencia ha incontestablemente adquirido su “lugar bajo el sol” entre las autoridades de la competencia de otros países, como demostrado por varios indicadores.


Other translations forthcoming.

Updated: Dec. 21, 2011 (Initial publication: Dec. 13, 2011)