June 23, 2019

Breaking news

The European Banking Union is based on supervision as much as on regulation: it concerns the operators as much as the structures of the sector, because the operators "hold" the sector.

This is why the "regulator - supervisor" holds the operators by the supervision and is close to them.

He meets them officially and in "soft law" relations. This is all the more necessary since the distinction between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post must be nuanced, in that its application is too rigid, in that it involves a long time (first of all the rules, then to apply them, then to notice a gap between rules and behaviors, then to repair it) is not appropriate if the system aims at the prevention of systemic crises, whose source is inside the operators.

This is why the body in charge of solving the difficulties of the systemic banks for the salvation of the systeme meets the banking sector itself, to ensure that they are permanently "resolvable", so that the hypothesis of their resolution never arises. This is the challenge of this system: that it is always ready, for never be applying.


In the European Banking Union, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) is in charge of "resolve" the difficulties of European systemic banks in difficulty. It is the public body of the second pillar of the Banking Union. The first pillar is the prevention of these difficulties and the third is the guarantee of deposits. The resolution is therefore more like an Ex Post mechanism.

But in this continuum through these three pillars between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post, the SRB does not wait passively - as would a traditional judge do - that the file of the troubled bank reaches it. Like a supervisor - which brings it closer to the first public in the system (Single Supervisory Board -SSB), which supervises all the banks, it is in direct contact with all the banks, and it approaches the hypothesis of a bank in trouble by a systemic perspective: it is therefore to the entire banking system that the SRB addresses itself.

As such, it organizes meetings, where he is located: in Brussels.

Thus, on June 18, 2019, all banks came to discuss with the Single Resolution Board to know what it wants from the banks and for the banks, in what is called a "dialogue meeting".

To resolve in Ex Post the difficulties of a bank, it has to present a quality (a little known concept in Bankruptcy Law): "resolvability". How build it? Who build it ? In its very design and in its application, bank by bank.

For the resolution body vis-à-vis all players in the banking and financial sector, it's clear: "Working together" is crucial in building resolvability ".

In the projection that is made, it is affirmed that there can be a successful resolution only if the operator in difficulty is not deprived of access to what makes to stay it alive, that is to say the banking and financial system itself, and more specifically the "Financial Market Infrastructures", for example payment services.

Does the Single Resolution Board expect spontaneous commitments from the FMIs for such a "right of access"? In this case, as the Single Resolution Board says, this right of access corresponds to "critical functions" for a bank, the resolution situation can not justify the closure of the service.

By nature, these crucial operators are entities that report to regulators who oversee them. Who enforces - and immediately - this right of access? When one can think that it is everyone, it risks being nobody .... That is why the resolution body, relaying in this a concern of the Financial Stability Board, underlines that it is necessary to articulate the supervisors, regulators and "resolvers" between them.


To read this program, since it is a proposed program of work for the banking sector, four observations can be made:

1. We are moving more and more towards a general "intermaillage" (which will perhaps replace the absence of a global State, but it is an similar nature because it is always to public authorities that it refers and not to self-regulation);

2. But as there is no political authority to keep these guardians, the entities that articulate all these various public structures, with different functions, located in different countries, acting according to different temporalities, these are the companies themselves that internalize the concern that animates those who built the system: here the prevention of systemic risk. This is the definition of Compliance, which brings back to companies, here more clearly those those which manage the Market Infrastructures, the obligations of Compliance (here the management of systemic risk through the obligation of giving access).

3. Even without a  single systemic guard, there is always a recourse. That will be the judge. There are already many, there will probably be more in a system of this type, more and more complex, the articulation of disputes is sometimes called "dialogue". And it is undoubtedly "decisions of principle" that will set the principles common to all of these particular organisms.

4. We then see the emergence of Ex Ante mechanisms for the solidity of the systems, and the solidity of the players in the systems, and then the Ex Post resolution of the difficulties of the actors according to access to the solidity of the infrastructures of these systems, which ultimately depend on judges (throughout the West) facing areas where all of this depends much less on the judge: the rest of the world.



Feb. 5, 2014

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Updated: Sept. 10, 2012 (Initial publication: May 31, 2012)

Sectorial Analysis

Updated: July 16, 2012 (Initial publication: July 4, 2012)

Breaking news

Airports are critical infrastructure. They often receive support from the State and the European Commission has adopted specific guidelines to soften the principle of prohibition of State aid in this area. Yet it is not necessary that the regulation be the mask of a violation of competitive equality. This is why the Commission has extended and prolonged on June 27, 2012, the investigation initiated in 2007 proposed to the airport of Alghero, Italy. Indeed, the investigation revealed including infrastructure subsidies, which the Commission doubt that they are comply with EU law.

Updated: July 2, 2012 (Initial publication: June 24, 2012)

Breaking news

Usually the companies in charge of a public service established with the State of the "plan contract". In application of the "Code de l'aviation civile (Civil Aviation Code), the private company "Aéroports De Paris - ADP" (Paris Airports) establishes a "contract of regulation". This one develops "contracts of economic regulation". They must generate visibility for the company and for the customers, set ceilings for the royalty, set quality objectives, respect the just remuneration of invested capital. The new "regulation agreement" concluded between the French State and "Aéroports De Paris - ADP" (Paris Airports) covers the 2011-2015 period, presented as a period of transition towards the profitability of capital. This contract was signed in July 2010. The contract was presented to investors June 27, 2012 in its implementation, "Aéroports De Paris - ADP (Paris Airports) progressing in its profitability.

Updated: Dec. 21, 2011 (Initial publication: Dec. 5, 2011)


Updated: Dec. 12, 2011 (Initial publication: Dec. 5, 2011)

Releases : I. Isolated Articles

Translated Summaries

In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors


In order to establish a competitive energy market, the distribution infrastructure, as a monopolistic segment of energy networks, should be demonopolized. Instruments of economic regulation, which are often attributed ex ante character, are put in place to open the market and enable competitive forces. Unbundling is specific for it may also represent an ex post measure of a structural nature, exerted by competition protection authorities.



Afin d’établir un marché énergétique compétitif, l’infrastructure de distribution, en tant qu’il est un segment monopolistique des réseaux d’énergie, devrait être libéralisé. Les instruments de régulation économique, qui sont souvent attribués d’une façon ex ante, sont mises en place pour ouvrir le marché et rendent possibles les forces concurrentielles. Le dégroupage est spécifique, car il peut aussi représenter une mesure ex post de nature structurelle, exercée par les autorités de protection de la concurrence.


Per costruire un mercato concorrenziale dell’energia, le infrastrutture di distribuzione, in quanto segmento monopolistico delle reti di energia, dovrebbero essere liberalizzate. A tal fine, sono applicati dei meccanismi di regolazione economica, spesso previsti ex ante, per aprire il mercato e permettere le forze concorrenziali. L’unbundling è particolare, in quanto potrebbe anche costituire un provvedimento ex post di natura strutturale, utilizzato dalle autorità di tutela della libera concorrenza.


Other translations forthcoming.

Updated: Aug. 31, 2011 (Initial publication: June 15, 2011)


Updated: June 24, 2011 (Initial publication: June 15, 2011)

Releases : I. Isolated Articles


The role of fibre is very important towards connecting to ultra-fast broadband, one of the key action areas of the Digital Agenda. But, Europe is late in its fibre deployment, especially when compared to other advanced economies such as the United States or Japan. At the same time, however, there is still no standard for a European fibre strategy: public as well as private stakeholders are having very different approaches in local FTTx deployment sometimes leading to a waste in private and public funds and being mainly focused on dense areas. This article aims to propose an efficient model for fibre network deployment that can be applied to all European Member States. The model provides high-margin incentives for operators to install fibre network across the whole country, while maximising households’ fibre connection rate through an automatic migration scheme. In a period of weak growth and budget restrictions, the catch-up in ultra-fast broadband internet requires more than ever an efficient policy to maximise the deployment of FTTH at the lowest cost possible to the public. The proposed model serves as an ideal choice given this context.

Alternative operator - Budget - Connexion - Copper network - Cost - Digital agenda - Duplication - Effeciency - Essential facility - Europe - Fiber optic - France - Incentive - Incumbent operator - Infrastructure - Internet - Natural economic monopoly - Network - Price - Provider - Regulatory policy *

* In The Journal of Regulation, these keywords are done by the Editor and not by the Author.



Artigo: Do cobre à fibra: uma política de regulação ótima.

O papel da fibra é muito importante em conexões de banda larga de alta velocidade, uma das principais ações na área da Agenda Digital. No entanto, a Europa está atrasada no desenvolvimento da fibra, especialmente quando comparada com outras economias avançadas como Estados Unidos ou Japão. Ao mesmo tempo, porém, ainda não há um patamar para uma estratégia europeia para a fibra: detentores de haveres públicos e privados têm tido diferentes posturas no desenvolvimento de FTTx local, o que leva às vezes a um desperdício de fundos públicos e privados e sendo sobretudo registrado em áreas de densidade. Este artigo objetiva propor um modelo eficiente para o desenvolvimento da rede de fibra que possa ser aplicado para todos os Estados Membros Europeus. O modelo prevê incentivos altos para operadores para instalar redes de fibra por todo o país, enquanto maximiza a taxa de conexões domésticas de fibra através de um esquema de migração automática. Em um período de crescimento desacelerado e restrições orçamentárias, um novo impulso em banda larga de alta velocidade requer mais do que nunca uma política eficiente para maximizar o desenvolvimento de FTTH ao menor custo possível para o público. O modelo proposto serve como uma escolha ideal dado este contexto.

Operador alternativo – Orçamento – Conexão – Rede de cobre – Custo – Agenda digital – Duplicação – Eficiência – Facilidades essenciais – Europa – Fibra ótica – França – Incentivo – Operador – Infra-estrutura – Internet – Monopólio natural econômico – Rede – Preço – Provedor – Política de regulação*.

* No Journal of Regulation, as palavras-chave são fornecidas pelo Diretor, e não pelo Autor.



Articolo: Dal rame alla fibra: un’ottima politica di regolazione

Il ruolo della fibra è molto importante per la connessione ad alta velocità, una delle azioni centrali dell’agenda digitale. Tuttavia l’Europa è in netto ritardo per quando riguarda lo sviluppo della fibra, in particolare rispetto all’economia di altri paesi come gli Stati Uniti o il Giappone. Questo si capisce, però, in quanto non esiste uno standard per la strategia dell’Europa in materia di fibra: gli attori privati e pubblici del settore della fibra stanno avendo degli approcci differenti nei confronti della realizzazione dei FTTx, e tali approcci spesso si concludono in uno spreco di investimenti e si concentrano spesso su aree ad alta densità. Questo articolo si propone di trovare un modello efficace per la realizzazione di una rete a fibra in tutti gli Stati membri. Questo modello prevede degli incentivi elevati per gli operatori che installano delle reti a fibra ottica nei loro paesi, e massimizza la percentuale di connessioni a fibra ottica per nucleo familiare con un sistema di migrazione automatico. In un periodo di crescita ridotta e restrizioni di budget, lo sviluppo di connessioni a fibra ottica richiede una politica quanto mai efficace per massimizzare lo sviluppo del FTTH ai minimi costi possibili per i conti pubblici. Il modello proposto costituisce una scelta essenziale, in considerazione del contesto esistente.

Agenda digitale - Budget - Connessione - Connessioni su rame - Costi - Duplicazione - Efficienza - Europa - Fibra ottica - Fornitore - Francia - Incentivi - Infrastruttura - Infrastruttura essenziale - Internet - Monopolio economico naturale - Operatore alternativo - Operatore storico - Prezzo - Politica di regolazione - Rete *

* In The Journal of Regulation, le parole chiave sono responsabilità dell’Editore e non dall’Autore.



Artículos: Del cobre a la fibra : una política regulatoria óptima

El rol de la fibra óptica es de gran importancia en lo que concierne la conexión al ancho de banda ultrarrápida, una de las áreas claves de acción en la Agenda Digital. Sin embargo, Europa se encuentra atrasada en cuanto a su desarrollo, especialmente en comparación con otras economías avanzadas, como la de los EEUU o Japón. No obstante, todavía no existe un estándar para una estrategia europea para la red de fibra óptica; accionistas, tanto privados como públicos, han estado adoptando diferentes acercamientos a la implementación de los FTTx, lo cual suele llevar a un enfoque sobre áreas demasiado densas y al desperdicio de fondos privados y públicos. Este artículo tiene como objetivo proponer un modelo eficiente para el desarrollo de la red de fibras ópticas que podría aplicarse a todos los miembros de la Unión Europea. El modelo provee incentivos de gran margen de ganancias para operadores para la instalación de estas redes de fibras a través del país entero y al mismo tiempo maximiza la conexión rápida de fibras en todas las viviendas facilitado por el uso de un esquema de migración automática. En un periodo de crecimiento débil y restricciones presupuestarias, el “catch-up” en el Internet de banda ancha ultrarrápida requiere ahora más que nunca una política eficaz para maximizar el desarrollo del FFTH y minimizar el coste incurrido por el público.

Other translations forthcoming.