Oct. 29, 2015

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Sept. 16, 2015


Attendance at this conference can be validated under the continuing education of lawyers of Paris Bar.
After the holding of this conference, a French-written book will be published in the Regulations Series, edited by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, in the French Publisher Dalloz
Initially the Regulation assumes the consideration of technical objects (telephone, airplane, train, wheat, currency, electricity, etc.). This practical perspective opposes the abstract view of competition law that neutralizes objects by their monetary evaluation and the elaboration of a "fair price" obtained by the meeting of supply and demand in a market.Thus, each technical object has developed specific regulation as in a cottage garden: banking regulation, financial regulation, railway regulation, telecommunications regulation, power regulation, gaming regulation, horse races regulation, and so on. The body of rules and institutions were built, unique to each object, more effective than the behemoth that is the State in charge of all these so different objects and pursuing so many objectives that it was criticized for its inefficiency.
But different technical objects are not isolated from each other. As financial products have long taken the other items as "underlying". More Internet has introduced a novelty that could be radical.
Indeed, the Internet allows a circulation seems unhindered benefits that fall most often regulated sectors (financial services, health service, audiovisual services, etc.). Moreover, new objects appear, the "connected objects" whose creation is based on the Internet's ability to set effective relationship hitherto separate sectors, eg telecommunication and health services (the "connected health ).
Therefore, the Internet, which is often presented as a regulatory desert, appears as a jumble of different regulations, which contradict or are deformed by passing in the virtual world and crossing or even clashing with other regulation. So Internet would appear at first glance as a "space of interregulation".
The conference of 16 September 2015 dedicates its morning to draw up a diagnostic for measuring the "needs" of the Internet interregulation, so that the afternoon will allow to develop some "solutions" to interregulation. On this occasion, we can measure whether it will adapt traditional regulations because of new technologies and new uses, or more radically rethink sectoral regulations and regulatory law because Internet

May 22, 2015

Translated Summaries : 01. Transports

May 20, 2015

Thesaurus : Texts

May 20, 2015

Sectorial Analysis

March 27, 2015

Sectorial Analysis

The cost issue of regulation is a recurring issue.

One can complain specifically, when companies are protesting about the "cost of regulation" or when the topic is taken as an object of study, through the cost / benefit calculation.

A practical question of importance is whether there is a "legal question" or not.

The "juridicity" of a question is defined by the fact that discussing about this question has an effect on the outcome of a case before a judge. This concrete definition, leaving the judge's power, binding nature of the rule (here the balance between cost and benefit) the effectiveness of its decision before the judge, its consideration by him in the decision he makes, has been proposed in France by Carbonnier. It is opposed to a definition of Law by the source, the author of the rule, which identifies law for example through Parliament Acts, because the text is adopted by the legislator, listed source of law.

The first definition, more sociological, more flexible, giving the spotlight on judge better corresponds to a legal system which gives more room for ex post and for the judge. It is logical that we find more demonstrations of this conception in the common law systems.

However, the issue of cost / benefit is being debated before the Supreme Court of the United States, about the latest environmental regulations, adopted by the Environment Protection Agency (EPA). It is a question of law. It is under the empire of the judge.

For it is in this light that President Barack Obama in November 2014 asked a very costly regulation, and it was under his leadership that the Environmental Protection Agency has developed texts. Indeed, pollution of certain plants are the cause of asthma and laid in public health imperative to fight a regulation that results in a direct cost on firms. Indeed, some plants pollution is the cause of asthma and President Obama has asked public health imperative to combat by a regulation that results in a direct cost on the industry. The regulations adopted in 2012 they cost a $ 9 million, some claiming that future ones could result in billions of costs directly related to business The President emphasized by stating that the health of children was priceless.

By challenging those of 2012 before the Supreme Court, in the case Michigan v. EPA, this is the other texts that conservative states and companies have in mind because it is the principle that is posed: : does A regulator have the right to take regulations very "expensive" when the advantage, however legitimate it is, is small-scale in terms of costs? The Supreme Court, having chosen to handle the case, listened to March 25, 2015, the arguments of each other and discussed the case.

The question is the integration or not into the constitutional notion of "necessity of the law" of the "cost / benefit" calculation. This is a crucial point because the concept of "necessity of the law" is a common notion to the constitutions of many countries.

However, not only the so-called judges "conservatives" as Justice Antonio Scalia, took position felt it was crazy not "consider" the cost of new regulations from the expected health benefits, but also Justice Stephen Breyer called "progressive," said "irrational" the environmental regulator has not taken in consideration such an imbalance between cost and benefit.

It is true that Justice Breyer was formerly professor of competition law at Harvard.

Judgment will be given in June.

March 11, 2015

Thesaurus : Doctrine

Feb. 21, 2015

Breaking news

There was a time when the key was in the rule. Today is essentially in the effectiveness of the rule. What the English and Americans call: Enforcement.

When operators are very powerful and regulators have little information, when the rule is complex, when situations are always changing and diverse, most of the regulatory art focuses on enforcement.

It shows a little more the continuum between Ex ante and ex post, moreover the circularity between them. Not only sanction is necessary ex post to the regulatory body for the rules that it asked ex ante have an effectiveness, but conversely, if we want that breaches the rule that powerful operators are committed could be sanctioned, it is through the Ex ante they must be punished.

Thus, when a financial operator wants to raise funds in the US financial market, he must request authorization from the Regulator to do so or at least to declare beforehand. It is therefore an Ex Ante mechanism. But if the operator is trustworthy, then it can be a kind of privilege that allows him to raise funds without submitting to the heavy and lengthy procedure. It takes but just whether trusted opérator.

However, Reuters reported the next development by the SEC guidelines for applying its power to withdraw the exemption to operators which had broken the law, civil or criminal.

While this may be explained by the fact that these operators have shown they don't deserve the confidence that justified access to the status of "well-known seasoned issuer" (WKSI) offering this "privilege" exempting regulation.

This is especially a new crackdown. The withdrawal of that relief proceedings valuable to the operator who regularly raises funds on the market, making him reach the common lot of borrowers, making carrying a disadvantage compared to operators who respect the law and shall remain holders of "bureaucratic privilege".

In a regulation in which repression becomes the central arrow in the quiver, here is an acute .

It begs the question: claiming that it is within the Ex Ante, can the regulator be dispensed to apply the rights of the defense?

Feb. 18, 2015

Sectorial Analysis

February 17, 2015, as the previous "Contrat de Régulation Économique" (Economie Regulatory Contract), the firm Aéroport de Paris (ADP)  has made available on its site to all "for consultation" the draft  "Contrat de Régulation Economique ("Economic Regulatory Contract)  for the period 2016 -2020.

Published in the wake of the meeting of the Board of ADP, the text is presented as a tool "for the Paris place", especially for air transport.

This shows that the document is primarily intended for investors and financial markets, the document being placed on the company website in the section for the "investors".

This illustrates the evolution from the traditional "contrats de plan" (plan contracts). But then, who are the parties to these types of contract?

Indeed, the very term "Regulatory contract"  is new in public Law. It appears as a sort of  modernization of "plan contract." The Conseil d'État (French State Council) finally admitted the contractual nature of these planning contracts. In these contracts, are parties were the State and the company in charge of a public service.

Because here the contract is an instrument of "economic regulation" the open public consultation draft rather expresses a global conception of  ADP, the company which manages the Paris airports,  for the future of the development of critical infrastructure that is the airport as the heart of global development of air transport.

The enterprise manager of the airport in the heart of the contract (rather than the State) in setting objectives for the coming four years is the letter and spirit of the French law of 20 April 2005 about Airports, which put the apparatus of this "Contrat de Régulation Economique" in place.

In this, the infrastructure manager is set by law as a "regulator of second degree", as can be a financial market enterprise. The company that manages and develops the Paris airports undoubtedly belongs to the category of " critical firms", as well it manages the future of the sector and helps to keep France a place in the world.

More, A.D.P. behaves like a Regulator, since it is carrying out the "public consultation", the consultation paper prepared by it,  being placed on its site and developing its ambitions for the sector and for France. But A.D.P. also expressed as a financial and economic actor, emphasizing the competitive environment,  demanding in passing more stability and clarity in the regulation in which it moves ...

That is why the consultation mechanism provided by the law must be more complex. Indeed, ADP can not be judge and jury. Therefore if the project raises observations, they must be formuled not to ADP but to the Ministries of Aviation and Economy, within a month. They shall communicate theiir content to ADP . Then the Commission consultative aéroportaire (French Airport Consultative Committee) will be consulted. At the end of this process, the "Contrat de Régulation Economique" will be signed.

Seing the end of the process, it remains in line with the plan contracts, since it remains the Economic Regulatory Contract is signed between the State and the essential infrastructure manager. But the consultation process shows firstly investors are the first recipients of the statements made by a privatized company presenting its draft primarily in terms of competitive context and international development and secondly the airlines that use daily services of the airports are also directly involved by theses questions of tarification.

Airlines protest against the increase in the money that will be asked. This will be imposed, since it is tarification and princing public policy. We are in unilateral rules. But it is indeed a "price" they feel to pay, they also heard a speech referring to competition in what the mechanism is presented as a "contract".

But then, does it take to admit that these "contracts for economic regulation" are not between two parties that are the state and the regulator of second degree that is the infrastructure manager but must be three, the State, the infrastructure manager and "stakeholders" that are mainly airlines?

This practical difficulty is much to the fact that the qualification of "contract" is difficult to justify in proceeding in which prevail unilateral mechanisms.

Feb. 17, 2015

Translated Summaries : 05. Energie

In regulatory law, municipalities are very important, as consumers but also as issuers standards. They can do this through contracts but also by unilateral standards such orders.

This power of municipalities is coming to a halt by the decision taken 17 February 2015 by the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio,, State of Ohio ex rel. Jack Morrison Jr., Law Director for City of Munroe Falls, Ohio v. Beck Energy Corp.

Indeed, a municipal law had made provisions for imposing rules on location, drilling and well operations and gas. These provisions were contrary to the law of the State of Ohio.

In its judgment of 17 February 2015, the state Supreme Court considers that this is enough to make the first non-compliant text of the Constitution because it is not possible for a local authority to exercise normative power by contradicting a state standard.

The stakes are certainly legal and lies in the implementation of the hierarchy of norms. But it is also political: in energy, due to the power of the operators, which is most likely not to be captured by the sector? The political power of the state or the political power of municipalities?

As suggested by one of the judges, must be taken into consideration which of the two powers depends most operators in the financing of campaigns.

Factual and determinant consideration, specific element of the US, an element which Kelsen couldn't think .....

Feb. 16, 2015

Bibliographic Reports : Books

Published by Oxford University Press (OUF), the collective book, Public Accountability, edited by Mark Bovens, Robert Goodin and Thomas Schillemann, consists of 43 contributions.

Few strictly focus on issues of regulatory matters. One can still quote the article by Colin Scott on Independent Regulators or those of Christie Hayne, Steven E. Salterio and Paul L. Posner and Shahan Asif on auditing (Accounting and Auditing; Audit Institutions).

The subject of most of the contributions is rather the necessary renewal of the management of the State, public governance incorporating this new way of "accountability," which explains the book title : itself: Public Accountability. But as we know that the line between public and private is more porous than ever, we can appreciate that the bookk extends its thoughts to the governance of private organizations or non-profit private sector by some contributions.

Indeed, the fact that Accountability is what is common to the Regulation and Governance. This is the first sentence of the book : "Accountability is the buzzword of modern governance".

Probably because of accountability has become a central concept, as shown in the introductory contribution, these are the articles that confront the most general elements such as "time" (Accountability and Time), "crisis" (Accountability for Crise) or "trust" (Accountability and trust), which are the most instructive for the future.

Thus, despite its collective character, the book is very consistent and often takes a critical tone about this invasion of public space by the will of accoutability, the authors emphasizing the "deficits", the failures and especially thet prohibitively expensive of this mechanism.

It would come to regret the simple mechanism of hierarchical rule to which a nostalgic contribution is devoted, which describes how operated the State before we apply to it the State the agency theory.

So it is a practical book, complete, critical and prospective, of great interest.

Feb. 15, 2015

Breaking news

In an article written in French, the press of Senegal reported a conference in which the First President of the Dakar Court of Appeal stated that the judicial court -  in the present case the Dakar Court of Appeal - after being a bit "frightened "by the regulatory law, because of its technicality, and after its fear of being dispossessed of cases because of the power of that the regulatory authorities in place to exercise the dispute resolution, is able to play its role today.

He first asserts that judges learned the technic of regulatory matter(in this case, his speech was about the public markets).

He asserts, secondly, that when the parties are in conflict, they continue to go before the judicial court, regardless of the existence of the independant administrative bodies and their dispute resolution function.

Feb. 14, 2015

Sectorial Analysis

The repression is inseparable from how to repress. This is why the procedural difficulties are indicative of underlying fundamental problems. Currently, the basic issue updated by the battles around the procedures of financial sanctions is about the sanction bais.

For the regulator, the penalty is one tool among others to regulate financial markets. The penalty in a continuum with its legislative powers, are its teeth and claws through which financial markets are developing. The purpose of financial policy justifies an objective repression with a probationary system often based on presumptions leading to impute breaches players in some positions on or financial markets. The regulator must have this card in hand and use it according to this method.

Moreover, if it happens that people commit reprehensible misconducts, perceived as such by the social group, they should be punished, possibly up to the prison. Only the criminal justice is legitimate to do so legitimately weighed down by the burden of proving intentionality, etc.

We must distinguish these two types of criminality. It is from there that the two procedures and two probationary systems can take place at the same time but on different offenses.

For now this is not the case, as "financial misconduct" are only the carbon copy of "financial crimes" lightened loads of evidence that protected the defendant and who should answer for now twice.

Procedural problem? No, problem of criminalization, which won't be released by procedural solutions, the most hazardous being to create a new institution, the most calamitous being to weaken the system by removing one of the ways of prosecution. It is necessary to make distinctions in the offenses that are currently redundant.

Thus, repression as a regulatory tool used by the Regulator is in focus, but the real financial criminal law remains to be consolidated to achieve its own and classic goal: punish faults including through the prison.

Feb. 13, 2015

Breaking news

Read the conference presentation (this presentation is written in French).

Feb. 12, 2015

Sectorial Analysis

There is no point in counting one by one the powers of a Regulator and add them to try to measure its power. We must measure what consideration the others have of the exercise of its powers it.

So it is with its advice power. Sometimes, in fact, its opinion is  worth as much as if it adopted the text itself, as those who read its comments are impressed. Sometimes, the Regulator may have taken a rational opinion, motivated and relevant, those to whom it is addressed don't care.

The result is often that the Regulator takes note of this weakness against which strictly within the framework of this opinion mechanism the regulatory body can do nothing,  but in a continuation of powers between the Ex Ante and the Ex post, because the area is an enclosed space, the diverse attitudes will be remembered, especially when the Regulator will be exercising its powers to resolve disputes or its power of sanctions. And there ...

Take the example of railway activities. The French Regulatory Authority of Railway Activities (Autorité de Régulation des Activités Ferroviaires - ARAF )) is a new regulator, in front of powerful actors, where the State has interests. The fact that these interests are legitimate don't remove the weight that such integrated public operator is facing the regulator. On 27 November 2014, ARAF expressed negative opinions about the main draft decrees. January 6, 2015, the Autorité de la Concurrence  (French Competition Authority) has also made a critical opinion, including in its discontent and the law of "Railway Reform" and the draft decrees.

February 11, 2015, 7 decrees implementing the February 10, 2015 have been published. Adverse opinion on three of them by the regulator (ARAF) were swept away. We can admit quite, both regarding the Competition Authority opinion, since we are in terms of regulation and not in the simple competition system, and about ARAF opinion because its opinion is only a consultative and executive power remains in line with the will of Parliament. It's almost as if the Regulator had not said  a word.

Thus, under the hierarchy of norms, in the letter and in spirit, the decrees are in line with the law they enforce. No blame.

But it is not excluded that the regulator of rail activities can remember of having been so little after, when it must be considered as a kind of judge in civil functions (dispute resolution) and in punitive functions  (sanctions) that almost the same will appear before the regulatory body.



Jan. 23, 2015

Breaking news

What does Regulating to operators? How do they feel? Do they internalize? Does it means to them, simply a cost or an impact on their strategy on the markets?

The question is all the more important that you adhere to the theory of incentives, whereas the adequate regulatory techniques are those that produce the desired behavior by regulated operators.

The issue is not whether the Regulating is included in spending. This is acquired. For example, in two years the banks move internal forces of certain services, such as credit, to the compliance department and regulation. The regulation may represent a very high share of costs: it lies in the fact that through compliance the regulatory system has internalized the costs of regulation in the firms.

But does it make to change the strategic choice of the operator on the market, not only increase the number internal processes?

To listen Lloyds Blankfein, chairman of Goldman Sachs in Davos, words immediately commented in the British press as considerations allayed regarding Regulation!footnote-22, we doubt it.

Mr. Blankfein Lloys who also sits on the board of the Harvard Law School, asked about the question of whether the bank doesn't suffer from the pressure of regulations and supervisors replied that must be considered especially in the very design of technical systems to meet compliance but that for him, Regulation isn't really an annoyance: it is a "background noise". He compares it to music: something that he listens a lot, but while he is doing its job. Something which remains outside.

This means that Regulation occupies its technical regulatory services but doesn't affect its own work of invest bank president.

We can rejoice, since it shows that Regulation doesn't impede free enterprise and the operator's choice. One might worry if Regulation should have an "educational" function wanting influence how the president himself decides. In this case, Regulation must cease to be a kind of expensive elevator music.

It is not sure that regulators and supervisors have the same understanding

Jan. 22, 2015

Sectorial Analysis

A simple question:  be regulator, is it a profession?

As soon as one asks the question, it should be down. Indeed, the time has passed when the regulator was a natural person. Today, in most cases, the regulator takes the form of a Regulatory Authority, that is to say an entity with or without legal personality, incorporated in the State or professional.

Individuals appear as a member of the Authority, even if it is true that the President of the Regulatory Authority often has a very importan role!footnote-17.

The choice of Commissioners is crucial to the independence and effectiveness of the regulatory authority. It is appropriate that the person has "authority" over the area, must be respected and participates effectively in the collective action of the College.

Let us try to recall the two sets of criteria to determine how one thinks the "good regulator" before taking such case the appointment of Mr. Yann Padova as a new member of the College of the Commission de Régulation de l'Énergie (French Energy Regulatory Commission).

Jan. 21, 2015

Breaking news

Just released the book of Sofia Ranchordiàs, Constitutional Sunsets and Experimental Legislation. This  topic is particularly important in regulatory systems where this method is used very often.

As soon as Legislation is case management, it becomes a matter of time, good timing, and efficiency.

Because the figure of the Law has changed its terms should change. The most appropriate law then appears the "experimental law", the "trial law." This ephemeral legislation as regulatory bodies promote, can claim to be part of the future only if it has "successful". Operators must be good students if they want to conserve the Law!footnote-14.

Thus, the law is only a draft and it is its success that allows the standard access to the status that was natural: the Act that applies to the future.

These precarious laws that certains authors and regulatory bodies present as the right model, challenge the constitutional principles, the Constitution itself being the supreme law governing the future.

This book shows the extent to which notions of efficiency, testing, flexibility, can attack the very idea of Parliament Law  and Constitution. It is true that in regulatory systems everything becomes simple regulations, including laws but it is also true that constitutional courts are restive to admit "experimental laws".

Cet ouvrage montre jusqu'à quel point les notions d'efficacité, de test, de flexibilité, peuvent attaquer l'idée même de Loi et de Constitution. Il est vrai qu'en Régulation, tout ne deviendrait que réglementation, y compris la loi et il est vrai que les cours constitutionnelles sont rétives à admettre les "lois expérimentales".

Jan. 19, 2015

Breaking news

We hardly listen to to sermons. This is probably why Alain Supiot puts us on the table the text of Bossuet only occupying few pages, but since 1659 occupies the minds on "l'éminente dignité des pauves" (the eminent dignity of the poor). When Bossuet speaks of wealth and poverty, economists have interest in reading it. When Bossuet speaks of just order and "rightful place", lawyers must read it.

Alain Supiot comments it by writing to the following "Le renversement de l'ordre du monde" (The reversal of the order of the world).

Bossuet reminds that wealthy people think everything is owed to them while grace is given to the poor. Bossuet contends that rich people have interest to share with the poor, for thus it can alleviate the wealth that overwhelm them and they can enter the community (composed by the Church) in which poor people occupy the first place by natural order.

In his study, Alain Supiot looks back on the very definition of 'poverty', which accounts for the money the individual has. He takes up the theme of Bossuet to assert that, contrary to what the result of statistical methods (how much per person per day), the wealthy are "poor" since the market isolates them, spreading them of solidarity. Yet the natural order should lead them to share, by paying taxes, and other mechanisms through the welfare state. But he notes that the State departs increasingly this function, drawn in by this model only wealthy (the "rich-poor"), the only available model becoming what Alain Supiot calls "le marché total" (total market)!footnote-15.

We can no share this view of the world, for example if it is believed that the rich share (Social Responsibility Company theory), or if one believes that the state - sort of church - was often selfish, but already listen to the first advice: read Bossuet.

Reading the Union Address by President Barack Obama of the 21th of January 2015 themed fair sharing between rich and poor by public redistribution, we think back to Bossuet.

Jan. 16, 2015

Breaking news

Reading the press, for example Les Echos January 16, 2015, we learn that Standard & Poor's will sign an agreement of $ 1 billion with the US administration to avoid a trial.

One can only be amazed or even upset.

First, the agreement is not yet concluded. It would be in a month or two. How is it that we already know? Secondly, contracts, because the transaction is a contract listed by the Civil Code, are not intended to be public. How is it that we already know everything? The person who gave the information "was keen to remain anonymous." It would have suspected ......

Third, it is true that the regulation of rating agencies is a big issue. Special texts have been taken but academics think the right tools stay missing and that is probably the liability, general legal instrument, which is the most appropriate.

But the responsibility of commitment requires a trial, evidence, respect for the rights of defense, due processs,  legality of offenses and penalties.. Here, $ 1 billion is paid by the company only to avoid that opens a lawsuit against it. The allegation is the rating agency would have underestimated the subprime risk.

But on one hand everyone says that the rating agency has actually done the facts allegued since payroll so that the file doesn't open. On the other hand, and from the perspective of regulating the information that would be out of the trial, a trial being a form of crisis, will not come out.

So this sort of industry fof "Deals of Justice", apart from the fact that some describe the phenomenon as a "racket", isn't a "decriminalization" of regulation for a "civilized regulation" through the transaction contract. On the contrary, this movement that is spreading constitutes an increased repression whic diminishes rights of defense for the operator and information for the sector.

One can only be amazed or even upset.


Jan. 14, 2015

Breaking news

Jan. 13, 2015

Breaking news

Jan. 10, 2015

Sectorial Analysis

As soon as Regulation assumes independence of the operator who manages the essential infrastructure, ex ante conditions of such independence must be met.
Europe doesn't require legal autonomy of the essential infrastructure manager, probably because such autonomy, it would be both too ask the Policy, which may want more integrated organizations as soon as public transportation is a mix of public policies and that to public funds are used. But it would also be too little to ask the Policy because no matter the legal autonomy, the key is the real independence of the manager, that is under the control of the Regulator.
The Loi portant réforme ferroviaire (Railway Reform Act) of August 4, 2014 has made the integration of the company that manages the rail network, which the new name is SNCF Réseau (SNCF Network) in a public group, which also includes the SNCF, public transportation operator, in competition with new entrants in a newly opened sector to competition.
The Competition Authority in its opinion of 4 October 2013 had expressed reluctance towards the bill, to the influence that such corporate organization offers to the public operator, to the detriment of its competitors and the opening of the railway sector to competition.
The critical tone increases with the Opinion of 6 January 2015 relatif à des projets de décrets pris pour l'application de la loi portant réforme ferroviaire (on draft orders made for the purposes of Railwayl Reform Law).
The Competition Authority issues its opinion as a real essay on what should be the Regulation of the railway sector through the "governance" of the network manager. Indeed, the first part of the opinion relates to "the independent management of railway infrastructure" while the second focuses on the integration of railway network in the public group built par the law. The third part of this Opinion draws conclusions to measure whether we can consider that the Autorité de Régulation des Activités Ferroviaires (French Regulatory Authority of Railways Activities) shall have the capacity to ensure this independence by governance or not.
This review, in its construction itself, demonstrates the dialectic between Regulation and Governance (I), which is an observation and stresses the role of the regulator in the effectiveness of governance (II), which is more a question .

Jan. 9, 2015

Breaking news

The United Kingdom is probably country of "self-regulation", many academics devote studies, regulators praise its merits, the legislation puts it in place. This is in the area of the press. The electronic media are regulated by OFCOM, but the written press is still self-regulated. British tradition remains so.

Yet, note the number of reforms which succeed, one comes to doubt. Learning that the House of Lords tells its Communications Committee investigate this system of self-regulation that will begin in January 2015, it comes suspicions this system to be ineffective.

La presse britannique, dont on connait la variété du niveau, du Daily Mirror à The Economist et à propos de laquelle les scandales sont nombreux à propos des violations de vie privée et des méthodes pour acquérir les informations, est "autorégulée".

C'est pourquoi un rapport a été publié en 2012, le rapport Leveson, lui-même continuant à recommander l'autorégulation. Sur cette recommandation, a été élaborée le Press Recognition Panel (PRP), entré dans le système juridique par une "Charte royale" le 30 octobre 2013, articulé avec un organe de supervision, le Independent Monitor for the Press (IMPRESS), créé quelques mois plus tard. On ne sait si cela avait bien fonctionné, mais le 8 septembre 2014 le premier organisme est absorbé par le second.

Jan. 8, 2015

Breaking news

The French law provides that the Commission de Régulation de l'Énergie - CRE (French Regulatory Energy Commission) publishes an annual report on compliance with codes of conduct and independence of the power transmission grid operators. In Decembre 2014, CRE has published its report on compliance with codes of conduct and independence of electricity networks and natural gas (Respect des codes de bonne conduite et indépendance des gestionnaires de réseaux d'électricité et de gaz naturel).

This particular statutory provision shows the proximity between Regulation and Governance, nearby sometimes believed limited to the sphere of banking and finance.

This is designed especially for managers of transport networks which are often subsidiaries of incumbents production and energy sales, economic and legal integration that the law does not prohibit even though it requires independence transport network managers. This independence must be de facto and not de jure, which is a higher requirement than mere legal autonomy of companies, the result of the requirements of "governance", the operator is obliged not to exercise the rights and powers its parent company status yet gives a regular basis so that the first principle of independence of the network manager is preserved.

The relationship between the controlling shareholder and its subsidiary are governed by "codes of conduct" in the mandatory order of the independence of management and decision making of the subsidiary. In a 90-page reportthe regulator sets the constraints so that this goal leads in effect on the parent company, beyond corporate law.

However, the regulator is very severe. It believes that the way in which subsidiaries present themselves to consumers mark such similarity with their parent that these third parties can't identify them as independent of them. According to the regulator, consumers therefore don't identify them as carriers or distributors of energy also offered by competitors of their parent.

Thus, the regulator considers it necessary that these subsidiaries will change their brands, logos and legal designation, eg ERDF ceases to have a name so close to EDF.

The implicit question is the legal effect of such reproaches and suggestions, if the companies aren't listening. The report discusses the prospect to bring the question before their independent body able to impose sanctions. But the case will be difficult because the principle of independence meets the principle of freedom and the terms of the interference between regulatory law and corporate law aren't yet clearly established.