The Basel Committee on banking supervision issues regularly a monitoring report on the implementation of Basel III regulatory reforms.

In August 2016, the seventh issue was published by the Committee as to be taken into account for the upcoming G20 meeting: Implementation of Basel standards. A report to G20 Leaders on implementation of the Basel III regulatory reforms.

In this report, the Committee mesures how national systems gradually implement the prudential reforms they have informally elaborated in common. 

All the power derived from the Basel System stems indeed from the fact that it is concentrated; however, it still has to face a 'hard law' issue, as it is necessary to implement the reforms within the national systems in identical terms and in a constrained timeframe. 

The Committee indicates in its reports that some countries still face a number of issues regarding this implementation, whether these issues arise from the rules themselves or from the transposition period that the countries are given to implement them. Those same countries tend to justify themselves by saying that banks are to blame for these issues, since they report having trouble adjusting their information system as to satisfy the new requirements.

The Committee underlines the fact that this delay occurs in some countries whereas others are already compliant creates a situation of unfair 'jurisdiction' competition between them, which is all the more concerning since these national systems host international banks: "Delayed implementation may have implications for the level playing field, and puts unnecessary pressure on jurisdictions that have implemented the standards based on the agreed timelines. A concurrent implementation of global standards is all the more important, as many jurisdictions serve as hosts to internationally active banks.".

In order to improve an effective implementation of the whole system, the Committee proposed to implement instead a calculus method that would be less complex: "These proposals would constrain banks’ use of internal models and would reduce the complexity of the regulatory framework.".

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A few general observations can be drawn from this very specific Basel III issue underlined in the aforementioned report:

• soft law needs at some point to get concrete (which is closely monitored since the rules do need to be implemented), otherwise it is not law at all;   
• it is through implementation that the weight and the contours of common rules are actually being felt;
• this situation is a good reminder of the fact that competing jurisdictions are an actual thing and a issue to deal with;
• what is an argument based of complexity, or even impossibility, of the technical implementation of a requirement worth? 

This last question is crucial. Those who impose the requirement may consider that the non-enforcement for technical reasons cannot be accepted!footnote-68. Here, however, maybe since it is not a formal requirement as this is all soft law, and since there is a good communication between the supervisor and the executing agent (who is, at the same time, the one that is subject to the requirement, the one who elaborated it and the one who proposes to review it as to make it less complex).

Cass. R. Sunstein's last book was entitled Simpler. French Conseil d’État  (French administrative supreme court) conducts thorough work on the quality of laws and on their simplicity, both qualities that probably go hand in hand. The Basel Committee steps in the same directions...

On 30 June 2016, Sébastien Soriano, President of the French Telecommunications Authority (Autorité de Régulation des Communications Electroniques et des Postes - ARCEP) gave an interview to the French magazine L’Usine digitale (in French).

Speaking to the press is a way for the Regulator to reach everyone, including policymakers, European institutions, and fellow Regulators who also seek to compete for space in the digital area.

As he reported: "Nous arrivons aujourd’hui, avec l'irruption du numérique, à un acte 2 de la régulation. Il y a 20 ans, on est passé du modèle PTT où l’Etat produisait le service public, au modèle d’État-régulateur qui a permis l’ouverture à la concurrence. Ce modèle vise à une bonne organisation du marché avec des outils de pilotage efficaces, mais parfois très intrusifs : les licences mobiles, qui sont des contrats assortis de sanctions administratives en cas de non-respect des obligations, ou le dégroupage, qui est une intervention sur la propriété privée… Aujourd’hui il nous faut franchir une étape nouvelle et nous projeter dans la suite, repenser nos outils pour permettre, en complément, une régulation plus focalisée, plus humble et plus agile". We can translate this passage as it follows : “As of today, considering the onset of digital, we are getting to a second phase for Regulation. Over the past 20 years, we went from the ‘PTT model’, where the State provided for public service, to a new Regulatory State model that enabled competition to thrive. This model aims for good market organization with effective management tools, which may be sometimes very intrusive: e.g., mobile licenses, which are agreements that include administrative penalties in the event of failure to comply with its provisions, or unbundled access, which relates to a State intervention on private ownership… Today, we need to take it another step further and plan for the future, reconsider our tools to allow for a Regulation that would be better focused, humbler and nimbler”.

Whatever “Phase 1” was would thus be already outpaced. Farewell stringent public service, so long market openings to competition. Such an understanding of Regulation was certainly consistent with the idea that Regulation was only meant to be temporary, namely considering the everlasting protection of personal data by the dedicated supervisory authority (Commission Nationale Informatique et Libertés, CNIL)…

We would then need to implement “Phase 2” and, as Sébastien Soriano advises, to “Regulate by the multitude”, which is "a concept that includes consumers, but also users, observers, and the civil society as a whole. The key question is how to use the power of information to get the greatest possible leverage on the market while relying on the multitude. The answer is clear: Regulation by data" ("La multitude, ce sont les utilisateurs, les observateurs, la société civile. Cela inclut les consommateurs, mais pas uniquement. Et la question centrale, c’est comment utiliser le pouvoir de l’information pour avoir un maximum d'effet de levier sur le marché et grâce à la multitude. La réponse, c’est la régulation par la data.").

Like all the others, the Telecom Regulator introduces himself as a sort of ‘natural’ Regulator for digital activities, as he relies on the key notion that is information. In doing so, he is seeking allies that are just as natural as he is— that is to say, consumers. Consumers fall indeed into the scope of the Regulator insofar as they provide him with the information he needs to Regulate the digital sector and space.

The Regulator thus does not define himself anymore as the one that protects consumers against the market, but as the one that binds the two together, transforming the complaint into a civic act: “There’s a problem. As a consumer, I am alerting you as a Regulator who has the means to regulate market failures and whom I shall let operate”.

In such a statement, the ARCEP not only becomes the ‘natural’ digital Regulator, but it also become the one that operates on the grounds of information brought by the web-user, who is protected by and who somehow benefits in return from the action of the Regulator.

Two concluding thoughts:

• What a nimble reasoning indeed from the Regulator, who had initially been created to be the ‘container Regulator’, and who is now becoming, since Phase 2 is on its way, a kind of ‘overall’ Regulator that regulates both the container and the content.
• This is a salient example that rationales and frameworks that were developed by the Banking and Financial Regulation are modelling Regulation in general: see whistleblowers, information, obsolescence of the ‘public service’.

It is often argued that energy because it is a matter of sovereignty and because it is rooted in the territory, returns to the State. But it is resolutely towards Europe that Michel Derdevet pulls the whole system.

Probably by conviction, by will of a strong Europe and because there has economic power only when propped on energy. However, an energy system that is up by networks as in energy, we never doubted the convergence between the container and the content, meaning that the energy source is irrelevant whitout being carried, whitout being 'provided to users.

This construction of the networks is political and it is in terms of "mesh" that the report Michel Derdevet just submitted to the President of the Republic, François Hollande, presents a European project. In a way, it is not "revolutionary", as it is to finally fulfill the will of those who conceived Europe in 1945 through the coal, steel and energy, to a common Europe from which built the industry, not only for the reconstruction of Europe but for its economic dynamism and its common security policy.

In this, the European network of the transportation of electricity is essential. Yet it is to be done because the legislation of the European Union rather liberalized energy markets whitout building Europe of energy, leaving remaining national specificities. The result is what Michel Derdevet rightly called "inertia".

He therefore proposes the establishment of an "European industrial project." In this context, Michel Derdevet requires better definition of "model of norms and regulation", aiming in particular the structure of tariffs that include or not the R & D according to the Member States, claiming the alignment of the tasks of network operators and a price guarantee for users, which would facilitate investment. He stressed that national regulatory differences hinder the development of smart grids (and therefore the European market). Without a convergence of regulations, interoperability is not optimal, as it would allow Europe to be a major global player in energy.

Michel Derdevet therefore advocates regulation that goes to both a stronger European articulation, but at the same time which must be more "decentralized", for users to make better use of new uses of energy through the action of regulators they are close.

It is true that we are very far off ...

This is why the author asks what one favors "regulatory convergence". This is not only to harmonize rules but also to redirect them to detach the competitive prism to direct them to the long-term financing.

It is true that Europe's energy, without which a single industrial space can hardly be, can not actually do if the regulation does not resolutely takes over the principle of competition, competition remaining in the moment of exchange, while the Regulation is in the long term and what to take to designate as "industrial policy" which is nothing but a form of expression of the Political.

So what Michel Derdevet request, what ever that finally the arrival of a political Europe, the need for it finds its place in the global competition.

Référence complète : Giraud, A., Exégèse de l'arrêt Groupement des Cartes Bancaires, RLDA, n°98, nov.2014, p.43-48.

Lire une présentation de l'arrêt et des conclusions de l'avocat général.

Les étudiants de Sciences po peuvent accéder à l'article lui-même par le Drive  de Sciences po.

L'auteur rappelle ce cas dans lesquelles les banques membres du GIE ont été condamnées par la Commission européenne, en ce que les nouvelles règles adoptées au sein de ce GIE de gestion du mécanisme des cartes bancaires, qualifiées de "régulation" avaient un "objet anticoncurrentiel", ce qui suffisait à justifier la condamnation des opérateurs (décision de la Commission du 17 octobre 2007). Le Tribunal de Première Instance a confirmé cette analyse par un arrêt du 29 novembre 2012, estimant que la condamnation était fondée, puisque par sa nature un tel accord était "susceptible de produire des effets négatifs sur la concurrence".

Cela est invalidé par la Cour de justice, qui casse l'arrêt et renvoie le cas devant le Tribunal de première instance car le fait que l'accord soit "susceptible d'affecter la concurrence" ne le rend pas "anticoncurrentiel par objet".

Read the Judgment (in French).

Read the conclusions of the General Counsel Nils Wahl.

Read about this Judgment a presentation of the article of Andrien Giraud, Exégèse de l'arrêt Groupement des Cartes Bancaires