Michel Riguidel is Professor Emeritus at the Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications, which has been renamed Telecom ParisTech, where he teaches digital security and new-generation networks. (...)
The Issing Commission, also called the Advisory Group on the New Financial Order, appointed by Chancellor Angela Merkel and directed by Otmar Issing, published a White Paper for the Toronto G20 Summit on June 21, 2010, detailing the criteria for a workable approach towards bank levies and bank restructuring. The Commission recommends two new regulatory measures: the introduction of a Systemic Risk Charge (SRC), and the implementation of a transparent bank resolution regime.
FRANCAIS:
Publication par la Commission Issing du livre blanc "Criteria for a workable approach towards bank levies and bank restructuring" le 21 Juin 2010.
Le Groupe d'Experts sur le Nouvel Ordre Financier, aussi appelé Commission Issing, mis en place par la Chancelière Angela Merkel et dirigée par Otmar Issing, a publié un livre blanc en préparation du sommet du G20 de Toronto le 21 Juin 2010. Ce document détaille les critères pour une approche fonctionnelle de la taxation et la refondation des banques. La Commission Issing recommande de prendr deux mesures régulatoires: la mise en place d'une Taxe sur le Risque Systémique et l'introduction d'un système transparent de résolution bancaire.
GERMAN:
Die Issing-Kommission veröffentlicht das White Paper "Criteria for a workable approach towards bank levies and bank restructuring" am 21. Juni 2010.
Der Expertengruppe Neue Finanzmarktarchitektur, die Issing-Kommission, unter Leitung der früheren EZB-Chef Otmar Issing, und von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel angestellt, hat am 21. Juni 2010 ein White Paper veröffentlicht. Dieser Bericht, der im Rahmen der G20 Gipfel in Toronto vorbereitet wurde, befasst sich mit der Kriterien für eine durchführsbare Einstellung zu einer Bankenangabe und zur Restrukturierung der Banken. Die Issing-Kommission schlägt zuerst vor, eine Bankenabgabe einzuführen, die sich an der Risikostruktur von Bankenaktivitäten orientiert. Dazu noch setzt sich die Expertengruppe Neue Finanzmarktarchitektur für die Einführung neuer und transparenter Regeln zur Restrukturierung von Banken.
SPANISH:
La publicación del Libro Blanco “Criteria for a workable appraoch towards bank levies and bank restructuring” (Critero para un acercamiento factible hacia gravámenes bancarios y restructuración bancaria) el 21 de junio del 2010.
El Grupo de Expertos sobre la Nueva Orden Financiera, también conocido como Commission Issing, establecido por la Cancillera Angela Markel y dirigido por Otmar Issing, publicó un Libro Blanco para la Cumbre del G20 en Toronto el 21 de junio del 2010 en donde detalla el criterio para un enfoque factible sobre gravámenes bancarios y restructuración bancaria. La Comisión recomienda dos medidas regulatorias: la introducción a un Systematic Risk Charge (SRC – un cargo sistemático de riesgo) y la implementación de un régimen de transparencia bancaria.
Like the previous cycles devoted to the general theme of Compliance and aiming to build a "Compliance Law", intended like them to be published in the Regulations & Compliance collection, this cycle addresses a particular aspect of this branch of Law in progress. to develop, which was applied even before it was conceived. The Compliance mechanisms having preceded the conceptualization of this way of doing things, the "Compliance Tools" having been the subject of the previous cycle of conferences, this new cycle addresses what characterizes Compliance : Les buts monumentaux de la Compliance (Monumental Goals of Compliance) .
The notion of "monumental goals" was proposed in 2016!footnote-139. It is central in the compliance mechanisms in that they can only claim to constrain and cost those in which they are inserted in that they tend to achieve goals whose substantial quality is to be "monumental" . This notion is not self-evident, having to be justified, detailed, put into perspective and concretely illustrated, a series of conferences organized by numerous universities is therefore devoted to it.
These various conferences will be held in several places, according to the part taken by the various university structures which bring their support to the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) for the realization of the cycle. This will result in two collective books, one in French: Les buts monumental de la Compliance, the other in English: Compliance Monumental Goals.
This cycle of colloquia Compliance Monumental Goals will take place between April 2021 and November 2021.
📅 Colloquium of May 17, 2021: Public norms and Compliance in time of crisis: monumental goals put to a test, co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Montpellier University Law School, under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Pascale Idoux, Antoine Oumedjkane and Adrien Tehrani: more information about this manifestation here
📅 Colloquium of September 16, 2021, Compliance Monumental Goals: Radioscopy of a Notion, co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Saclay University, under the scientific direction of Christophe André, Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Marie Malaurie and Benoît Petit : more information about this manifestation here
📅 Colloquium of October 14, 2021: Compliance and Proportionality, co-organised by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the IDETCOM of Toulouse University, under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Lucien Rapp: more information about this manifestation here
📅 Colloquium of November 4, 2021: Effectivity of Compliance and international competitiveness, co-organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Centre de recherches en Economie et Droit de l'Université Paris II, under the scientific direction of Laurent Benzoni, Bruno Deffains and Marie-Anne Frison-Roche: more information about this manifestation here
The technical modes of registration are specific to each colloquium.
This colloquium took place the 31st of March 2021.
The manifestation was live broadcasted on Zoom.
Presentation of the theme:
The arbitrator is the ordinary judge of international trade. It was natural that he or she encountered Compliance: by definition Compliance Law takes hold of the whole world and follows the paths of international trade while it can only be deployed with the help of institutions which, by nature are spreading around the world and need authorities like the Courts.
The conference is based on the already perceptible connection points between Compliance and Arbitration to better identify what is emerging for tomorrow: contradiction or convergence between the two; weakening or consolidation. We are already seeing the impact that Compliance can have on the arbitrator's treatment of corruption or the consideration of money laundering. More generally, where do we stand with the arbitrator's knowledge of the many technical issues related to compliance? Beyond these, will the courts and arbitrators be able to achieve the goals, themselves new, sometimes monumental, pursued by Compliance Law?
Through this joint exploration of these avenues, the fate of compliance clauses inserted in contracts, the relevance in the matter of private codes of conduct, etc. will be examined.
Tomorrow, as of today, is the arbitrator a full and complete judge of Compliance Law?
How, with what specificities and what controls?
Notably will speak:
Mathias Audit, professeur à l'Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I (full professor at Sorbonne - University - Paris)
Cécile Chainais, director of the Centre de Recherche sur la Justice et le Règlement des Conflits (CRJ) and professeur à l'Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II) (Full professor at Panthéon-Assas (Paris II) University)
Claire Debourg, professeure à l'Université Paris X- Nanterre (Full professor at Paris X - Nanterre)
Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, professeur à Sciences Po - Paris (Full Professor at Sciences Po - Paris)) and Director of the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC)
Catherine Kessedjian, professeur émérite de l'Université Panthéon-Assas (professor emeritus of Panthéon-Assas - Paris II University)
Regulation presupposes that we move from a political conception of Act (that is to say a collective Decision expressed by the State) or a civilist one (that is, a will expressed by one or several individuals in one Contract) to an economic vision of trading organizations whose action is the expression of the market. If one relies on the adjustment of supply and demand, that is to say, the meeting of desires and interests, there will be "self-regulation", which is the "Law of the Market ", referring to competition law. The act of the operators is only a reflection of this law, in action.
La Régulation est alors plus complexe car elle vise autre chose que cette rationalité mécanique, soit en raison d’une défaillance du marché (par exemple en cas de monopole naturel) soit parce qu’on veut obtenir plus que ce que le marché peut donner (par ex. l’accès de tous à des biens communs, comme la santé, même pour des demandeurs insolvables). Dans ce cas, sont élaborées des règlementations, interventions ex ante désignées en anglais par le terme regulation. La règlementation est adéquate si elle incite des agents économiques à adopter des comportements qui concrétisent le but recherché par l’auteur de la règlementation.
Regulation is then more complex because it aims at something other than this mechanical rationality, either because of a market failure (for example in the case of a natural monopoly) or because it wants to obtain more than the market can give ( Eg access to common goods by all, such as health, even for insolvent claimants). In this case, regulations are drawn up, ex ante intervention. The regulation is adequate if it encourages economic agents to adopt behaviors that concretize the aim sought by the author of the regulatory mechanisms.
This strategic use of law then requires the necessary detour through the economic analysis of law, that is to say the analysis of law in its economic effects.
This discipline created in the United States by Ronald Coase (Nobel Prize for Economics in 1991) can be merely descriptive and reveal what economic effects the law produced. This conception, which is that of Richard Posner, makes the economic analysis of law an instrument of expertise for the political decision-maker, who can take this into account if it is necessary to modify the rules. A more radical conception of the so-called "normative economic analysis of law" is to argue that the conclusions of the analysis would oblige the decision-maker to follow it.
The issue is decisive because in the first case the law and the jurists - in particular the Legislator and the judge - still have an autonomous existence, in the second case they no longer exist, they are no more than the binding and explicit form of the "Law of the market" whose nature is a-legal.
Even in its descriptive form, economic analysis of the law is generally rejected in France in that it disregards the role of the law in that it carries moral values. It is in reality to ignore its merely descriptive, instructive and useful function, and the fact that it opens instead the amplitude of the rational choice offered to political decision-makers. Moreover, regulation is not only a technical discipline, it is also a political and philosophical issue. Descriptive economic analysis is more appropriate to it than normative economic analysis of the law, which claims to vassalize or even destroy other disciplines, which are substantially unknown.
►Full reference : Journal of Regulation & Compliance(JoRC) and Jean Moulin University (Lyon 3), Contractual litigation in compliance: procedural and jurisdictional aspects, Jean Moulin University (Lyon 3), 29 May 2026.
Furthermore, compliance techniques are increasingly giving way to contractual mechanisms, either through "compliance contracts" or through "compliance clauses". This therefore gives rise to contractual disputes. These are also influenced by Compliance Law, notably its norative Monumental Goals, albeit indirectly rather than directly.
Thus, in various new ways, a new field of "contractual litigation involving compliance" is emerging. This field involves procedural and jurisdictional aspects, which will be examined during this event.
Firstly, it is necessary to define this contractual dispute involving compliance (I), which has only recently emerged, because although we have always been familiar with contractual disputes on the one hand, dispute over regulation and compliance in the second instance, their entanglement with the contractualisation of justice is new. This may even come as a shock, in that Compliance Law, because it is not at all simply an obligation to obey applicable regulations, carries with it systemic ambitions for the future and thus finds itself, through contracts, brought before judges who are more accustomed to disputes between two individual parties.
This opens up the topics of judges hearing cases and judges of nature (II), the parties to the dispute and the parties to the proceedings (III), procedural treatment (IV), judgement and its enforcement (V).
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Speakers will include :
🎤Anaïs Danet, Professor at the University of Reims
🎤 Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Professor of Regulatory Law and Compliance, Director of the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC)
🎤Nicolas Ida, Professor at the University of Haute-Alsace
🎤Alex Nicollet, Barrister at the Paris Bar, PhD student at Jean Moulin Lyon 3 University
🎤Cyril Nourissat, Professor at Jean Moulin Lyon 3 University
🎤Romain Raine, Senior Lecturer at Jean Moulin Lyon 3 University
🎤Fabrice Vert, First Vice-President of the Paris First Instance Court of Justice
🎤Liza Veyre, Professor at the University of Paris 8
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The proceedings of this symposium will form the basis of a specific chapter in the following publications:
📕Compliance et Contrat, to be published in French in the collection 📚Regulations & Compliance, co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Lefebvre-Dalloz.
📘Compliance and Contract, to be published in English in the 📚Compliance & Regulation Serie, co-published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant (Larcier-Intersentia).
The President of the Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes (Arcep –French Electronic and Postal Communications Regulation Authority) presents his vision of Telecommunications Regulation in favour of Network Neutrality.