Little is known about how to ‘regulate the Internet’…

Outline solutions, however, do seem to have to be found in ex-post mechanisms since Regulation (broadly speaking) understand ex-ante and ex-post mechanisms as a continuum, and since Regulators increasingly concentrate ex-post mechanisms in their hands as an effective way to ensure execution of the ex-ante prescriptions they themselves elaborated.

Ex-ante mechanisms aim at making algorithms more ‘loyal’.

As long as we hope for devices to be trustworthy and to be held accountable for their ‘loyalty’, we give merits to the idea that we probably should “take liability seriously”.                                                                                                                       

On June 14, 2016, the Californian father of one of the victims of the 11/13/2015 Paris attacks filed a suit in a U.S. District Court to prosecute Google, Facebook and Twitter. 

The legal dispute is clear.

The applicant based its claim to hold the companies liable on the grounds that they let terrorist groups use their networks: “The suit claims the companies “knowingly permitted” the Islamic State group, referred to in the complaint as “ISIS”, to recruit members, raise money and spread “extremist propaganda” via their social-media services”.

Conversely, the defendants unanimously claimed that they had actively implemented ‘policies’ against extremist material, and that they were working with law enforcement entities to improve regulations on the matter. Self-regulation and ethics versus common liability law.

The companies also pointed out the fact that they were not publishers, hence they could not face liability for the material users post on their networks. This is not, however, the issue at stake: the complaint concerns the use of the network not as a mere way to broadcast messages, but as a way to recruit murderers, provide them with convenient tools to communicate and to prepare criminal operations—allegations for which law does not exempt social media companies from liability.

These allegations are worth being ‘taken seriously’, should the law be unclear on whether the companies could be charged indeed, and should the total exemption from liability of such companies pleading for their ‘neutrality’ be the exception rather than the norm.

The question of principle is thus as follows: is exemption from liability of those who hold the ‘digital space’ together really the norm?

If so, their exemption from liability needs to be extended to a scenario that had not been covered by the law yet. If not, then common liability law is the rightful legal basis to assess whether the companies can be found liable or not—provided that a direct causal link between the unlawful act and an actual harm suffered by the applicant can be demonstrated.

The legal dispute is clear.

Translated Summaries

In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors

ENGLISH

On December 20, 2011, the Autorité de Régulation des Communications électroniques et de la Poste (ARCEP — French postal and telecommunications regulator) fined La Poste, France’s universal postal service provider, one million Euros for not having provided an easily-available and affordable priority mail service for the shipment of low-value objects weighing less than two kilograms. This failure was in disregard of the regulator’s injunction, French legislation, and European directives.

FRENCH

Par une décision du 20 décembre 2011, l’Autorité de Régulation des Communications Electroniques et de la Poste (ARCEP), condamne à une amende d’un million d’Euros l’opérateur en charge du service universel, La Poste, car celle-ci n’a pas offert d’une façon accessible et abordable, sur un modèle proche de la « lettre », l’envoi d’objet de faible valeur de moins de deux kilos. En cela, l’opérateur a méconnu la mise en demeure du régulateur, la loi française et les directives communautaires.

SPANISH

El 20 de diciembre del 2011, la Autorité de Régulation des Communications électroniques et de la Poste (ARCEP – el Regulador francés de servicios postales y telecomunicaciones) multaron a La Poste, el proveedor universal de servicios postales en Francia, un millón de Euros por no haber proveído un acceso fácil y asequible a un servicio postal prioritario por el envío de objetos de poco valor pesando menos de dos kilogramos. Este fallo fue un acto de indiferencia del mandamiento judicial del regulador, de la legislación francesa y de las directivas europeas.

ITALIAN

Il 20 dicembre 2011 l’“Autorité de Régulation des Communications électroniques et de la Poste (ARCEP – l’autorità di regolazione francese in materia di servizi postali e telecomunicazione) ha fatto una multa a “Le Poste”, fornitore francese del servizio universale di posta, per un importo di un milione di euro per non aver fornito un servizio di posta celere accessibile e affidabile per la consegna di oggetti di poco valore e di un peso inferiore ai due chili. La Poste ha quindi commesso tale infrazione violando la diffida dell’autorità di regolazione, la legislazione francese e le direttive europee.

ARABIC

منذ قرار20 ديسمبر 2011 السُّلطة التنظيمية للاتصالات الإلكترونية و البريد( عادل فرنسي للاتصالات و البريد) ، حكمت علا المشغل المسؤول عن الخدمة العالمي ، البريد*(نِظام بريدي فِرنسِي)، بِدفع غرامة قدرُها مِليون يورو. هذه لم توفِّر سُهولة تُماثِل "الرِّسالة" لإرسال أشياء ضعيفة القيمة ذُو وزن أقل من اثنان كيلوغرام العامل تجاهل إنذار المُنظّم، القانُون الفرنسي و التوجيهات المُجتمعِية.
 *La Poste : نِظام بريدي فرنسي

..................

Other translations forthcoming.

ENGLISH

Competition is the principle element of markets, in the princely sense of the term.The relationships that regulation maintains with competition are ambiguous. It is important to eliminate this ambiguity in order to reveal the ab initio opposition between regulation and competition, to shed light upon the dialectics between both of them. Indeed, regulation may aim at building competition, and is thereby presented as a tool that will cease being used when the competitive market functions effectively.

Administration - Autorité de Régulation des Communications électroniques et des Postes - Competition - Competition Authority - Conflict of intersts - Consumer - Contract - Equilibrium - European Commission - Ex ante / Ex post - Government - Hayek - Horyzontal regulation - Information asymmetry - Liberalisation - Market failure - Natural economic monopoly - Online gambling - Political mandate - Postal services - Power - Principle - Real economy - "Réglementation" - Regulator - Regulatory Authority - Self regulation - symmetrical regulation - Telecommunication - Tool - Watchdog *

* In The Journal of Regulation, these keywords are done by the Editor and not by the Author.

PORTUGUESE

Artigo: Regulação versus Concorrência

Concorrência é o principal elemento dos mercados, no mais genuíno sentido da palavra. As relações que regulação mantém com a concorrência são ambíguas. É importante eliminar essa ambiguidade de modo a relativizar a oposição ab initio entre regulação e concorrência, para trazer luz para a dialética entre elas. Com efeito, regulação pode tender a construir a concorrência, e é então apresentada como uma ferramenta que deixará de ser usada quando o mercado competitivo passar a funcionar realmente.

Administração – Autorité de Régulation des Communications électroniques et des Postes – Concorrência – Autoridade de concorrência – Conflito de interesse – Consumidor – Contrato – Equilíbrio – Comissão Europeia – Ex ante / Ex post – Governo – Hayek – Regulação horizontal – Informação assimétrica – Liberalização – Falha de mercado – Monopólio econômico natural – Jogo em linha – Mandato político – Serviços postais – Poder – Princípio – Economia real – Regulamentação – Regulador – Autoridade de regulação – Auto-regulação – Regulação simétrica – Telecomunicações – Ferramenta – Observador*

* No Journal of Regulation, as palavras-chave são fornecidas pelo Diretor, e não pelo Autor.

ITALIAN

Articolo: Regolazione vs. Concorrenza

La concorrenza è il principio fondamentale dei mercati, nel senso stretto del termine. Le relazioni tra regolazione e concorrenza sono ambigue. Per rivelare il contrasto tra regolazione e concorrenza è importante cancellare questa ambiguità e chiarire la dinamica di questi due concetti. In effetti, la regolazione punta a sviluppare la concorrenza ed è spesso considerata uno strumento che non avrà più ragion d’essere una volta che il mercato funzionerà in libera concorrenza.

Amministrazione - Asimmetria dell’informazione - Autoregolazione - Autorità di regolazione - Autorité de Régulation des Communications électroniques et des Postes - Autorità garante della concorrenza - Commissione Europea - Concorrenza - Conflitto di interessi - Contratto - Consumatore - Economia reale - Equilibrio - Ex ante / Ex post - Governo - Hayek - Liberalizzazione - Mancato Funzionamento del mercato - Monopolio economico naturale - Mandato politico - Potere - Principio - "Regolamentazione" - Regolatore - Regolazione orizzontale - Regolazione simmetrica - Servizi postali - Scommesse online - Strumento - Telecomunicazioni - Vigilanza *

* In The Journal of Regulation, le parole chiave sono responsabilità dell’Editore e non dall’Autore.

SPANISH

Artículo: Regulación versus la competencia

La competencia es el elemento principal de los mercados, en precisamente el sentido de este término. Es importante eliminar esta ambigüedad para poder revelar la posición ab initio entre la regulación y la competencia, para poder traer a luz las dialécticas entre las dos. Así tanto, la regulación puede intentar construir la competencia, y es, por consiguiente, un instrumento que cesará de ser utilizado cuando el mercado competitivo funcione de manera eficaz.

Other translations forthcoming.