Updated: May 29, 2012 (Initial publication: May 20, 2012)

Breaking news

The European Parliament, which according to the co decision procedure, must vote the text of directive, until the Council of European Ministers doing it, examined the draft of the Directive on Basel III standards on May 14, 2012. On prudential standards, he planned to leave the States free to adopt higher minimum requirements. In addition, it imposed that the bonus paid to the CEO didn't attain a higher price than their fixed compensation.

Updated: May 10, 2012 (Initial publication: May 5, 2012)

Breaking news

The financial crisis and the banking technology shows that the "trading" is specific. This is why the Basel Committee estimates that it appropriate to regulate banks trading activity in a specific way. But it is difficult to characterize the activity of "trading" and actual banking activity itself. Trading is limited to negotiation; it justifies less equity as security, since it does not present credit risk. But this characterization even is questionable. This is why a consultation opened on May, 3 by the Basel Committee, and the qualification, and the classification of operations, and the measures of prevention of risks to be taken by specific prudential measures. Responses can be made until September 7, 2012.

Updated: Jan. 4, 2012 (Initial publication: Dec. 14, 2011)

Releases : I. Isolated Articles

Translated Summaries

In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors


While financial regulation aims at achieving market stability, regulating markets can sometimes take an ironic turn when regulations end up having consequences that differ from their original regulatory purpose. The article provides such an example of regulation’s irony: how a regulatory change in Germany led Moody’s to downgrade 12 banks, therefore weakening such institutions and consequently enhancing the current issues of market volatility and credit cost.



Bien que la réglementation financière vise à assurer la stabilité du marché, la régulation des marchés peut parfois prendre une tournure ironique quand la régulation finit par avoir des conséquences qui diffèrent de son objectif de régulation d’origine. L’article fournit un exemple de l’ironie de la régulation : comment un changement de réglementation en Allemagne a conduit Moody’s à déclasser 12 banques allemandes,, donc à affaiblir ces institutions et par conséquent à accroître les problèmes actuels de la volatilité du marché et le coût du crédit.


Quando la regolazione è volta ad ottenere la stabilità del mercato, l’evoluzione di questi mercati oggetto di tale regolazione può essere particolarmente ironica quando la regolazione ha delle conseguenze ben differenti da quelle originariamente prepostesi. Questo articolo cerca quindi di mettere in evidenza un esempio di questa ironia: in effetti, un cambio di regolatore in Germania ha portato Moody’s a tagliare il rating di 12 banche, indebolendo ancora di più tali istituzioni ed aumentando si conseguenza le questioni relative alla volatilità del mercato e del costo del credito.


Other translations forthcoming

Updated: Dec. 22, 2011 (Initial publication: Dec. 16, 2011)