Search results (1699 cards)

Updated: June 7, 2010 (Initial publication: April 1, 2010)

Translated Summaries

Updated: April 12, 2010 (Initial publication: Feb. 9, 2010)

None

Updated: Sept. 25, 2012 (Initial publication: Feb. 12, 2010)

Sectorial Analysis

Main information

The European Directive of September 16th 2009 introduces a clear definition of electronic money and establishes a new prudential supervisory regime of the business of electronic money institutions.

Updated: Feb. 22, 2012 (Initial publication: Feb. 16, 2012)

Books

TRANSLATED SUMMARIES

The translated summaries are done by the Editors and not by the Authors.


ENGLISH

“Global Financial Integration, Thirty Years on. From reform to crisis” combines many academic contributions on international financial governance, that each offer original and in-depth analysis of the financial crisis’ causes. To safeguard the authors’ legal and economic reasoning, the bibliographical report has been divided in three parts and will be brought to The Journal of Regulation’s readers in three successive issues . The following report analyses the third part of the volume.


Other translations forthcoming.

Updated: Jan. 4, 2012 (Initial publication: Dec. 14, 2011)

I. Isolated Articles

Translated Summaries

In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors


ENGLISH

While financial regulation aims at achieving market stability, regulating markets can sometimes take an ironic turn when regulations end up having consequences that differ from their original regulatory purpose. The article provides such an example of regulation’s irony: how a regulatory change in Germany led Moody’s to downgrade 12 banks, therefore weakening such institutions and consequently enhancing the current issues of market volatility and credit cost.

 


FRENCH

Bien que la réglementation financière vise à assurer la stabilité du marché, la régulation des marchés peut parfois prendre une tournure ironique quand la régulation finit par avoir des conséquences qui diffèrent de son objectif de régulation d’origine. L’article fournit un exemple de l’ironie de la régulation : comment un changement de réglementation en Allemagne a conduit Moody’s à déclasser 12 banques allemandes,, donc à affaiblir ces institutions et par conséquent à accroître les problèmes actuels de la volatilité du marché et le coût du crédit.



ITALIAN

Quando la regolazione è volta ad ottenere la stabilità del mercato, l’evoluzione di questi mercati oggetto di tale regolazione può essere particolarmente ironica quando la regolazione ha delle conseguenze ben differenti da quelle originariamente prepostesi. Questo articolo cerca quindi di mettere in evidenza un esempio di questa ironia: in effetti, un cambio di regolatore in Germania ha portato Moody’s a tagliare il rating di 12 banche, indebolendo ancora di più tali istituzioni ed aumentando si conseguenza le questioni relative alla volatilità del mercato e del costo del credito.



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Other translations forthcoming

Updated: April 12, 2010 (Initial publication: April 1, 2010)

Contributions

Updated: Sept. 25, 2012 (Initial publication: June 9, 2012)

Sectorial Analysis

TRANSLATED SUMMARIES


ENGLISH

In France, the Minister of Ecology has issued an Order to facilitate the purchase of electricity generated by wind. The text is being challenged before the "Conseil d’Etat" (State Council) for illegality, in that it constitutes state aid. The State Council considers the matter serious enough to suspend the proceeding and seized the Court of Justice of the European Union of a preliminary question on 15 May 2012.


FRENCH

En France, le ministre de l’Ecologie a émis une ordonnance afin de faciliter l’achat de l’électricité produite par le vent. Le texte est actuellement contestée devant le «Conseil d’Etat" (Conseil d’Etat) pour cause d’illégalité, en ce qu’elle constitue une aide d’Etat. Le Conseil d’Etat considère que l’affaire suffisamment grave pour suspendre la procédure et saisi la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne d’une question préjudicielle le 15 mai 2012.

Updated: April 12, 2010 (Initial publication: Feb. 25, 2010)

Contributions

Updated: July 5, 2010 (Initial publication: June 7, 2010)

I. Isolated Articles

Updated: April 21, 2011 (Initial publication: April 16, 2011)

I. Isolated Articles

ENGLISH

Cost orientation can be seen as a natural obligation in cases involving access to an essential facility held by an incumbent operator, such operator having generally inherited a facility developed over decades (not to say centuries) by the State (and therefore financed by tax payers) and having enjoyed a long period of legal monopoly before the opening of its market to competition. This has been the case in a number of sectors, such as energy, transportation, and of course telecommunications.
 
SPANISH 
 

Artículo: Asegurando una efectiva orientación de costes: El enfoque de Ofcom en las repagas de sobrecargos.

La orientación de costes puede verse como una obligación natural en casos involucrando el acceso a una facilidad esencial perteneciendo a un operador dominante, tal operado habiendo generalmente heredado una facilidad desarrollada a lo largo de algunas décadas (o quizá siglos) por el Estado (y por lo tanto financiado por pagadores de impuestos) y habiendo gozado de un largo periodo como monopolio antes del abrimiento del respectivo mercado a la competencia. Esto ha sido el caso en una multitud de sectores, como el de energía, transporte y, por supuesto, telecomunicaciones.   


Other translations forthcoming.