Etienne Wasmer is a Professor at Sciences Po Paris, where he directs doctoral studies in economics and co-directs a Laboratoire d’Excellence (Labex) on the Interdisciplinary Evaluation of Public Policy. (...)
On November 15, 2010, the Autorité de la Concurrence (the French Competition Authority) hosted a meeting on the theme of online gambling and the opening of the market to competition. The first debate concerned sports federations and betting rights.
FRENCH
Rapport bibliographique (Symposium): Symposium de l'Autorité de la Concurrence sur la régulation des jeux en ligne.
Le 15 novembre 2010, l'Autorité de la Concurrence a organisé un colloque sur le thème de la régulation des jeux en lignes et l'ouverture du marché à la concurrence. Le premier débat concernait les fédérations sportives et le droit au pari.
GERMAN
Bibliographischer Bericht (Symposium): Symposium der französischen Wettbewerbsbehörde über die Regulierung von Online-Wetten.
Am 15. November 2010 hat die Autorité de Concurrence (die französische Wettberwerbsbehörde) ein Symposium über die Regulierung von Online-Wetten und die Wettbewerseröffnung dieses Marktes veranstaltert. Im ersten Gespräch wurde das Thema Sportverbände und Wetterecht behandelt.
ITALIAN
Relazione bibliografica (Convegno): Il convegno dell’Autorità francese garante della concorrenza sulla regolazione delle scommesse on-line.
Il 15 novembre 2010, la Autorité de Concurrence (la Autorità francese garante della concorrenza) ospiterà un convegno sul tema delle scommesse on-line dell’apertura del mercato alla libera concorrenza. Il dibattito porterà sulle federazioni sportive e sul diritto a scommettere.
SPANISH
Informe bibliográfico (Simposio): El Simposio francés de la Autoridad de la competencia sobre la regulación del juego en la red.
El 15 de noviembre del 2010, la Autorité de la Concurrence (la Autoridad francesa de la competencia) organizó una reunión sobre el tema del juego en la red y el abrimiento de este mercado a la competencia. El primer debate se centraba en las federaciones deportivas y los derechos de juego.
CHINESE
书目报告（专题论丛）：法国竞争监管机构对于网络游戏监管的讨论。
2010年11月15日，Autorité de la Concurrence（法国反垄断机构竞争事务监察总署）举办了一场以网络游戏监管及开放市场竞争为主题的研讨会。第一期讨论内容涉及与体育协会和赌博活动及其相关权利。
Michel Prada is a graduate of the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Bordeaux (Sciences Po Bordeaux) and the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA). From 1966 to 1970, he was an Inspecteur des Finances. (...°
🧮The event will take place at Panthéon-Sorbonne University (Paris I) on 15 October 2026.
Il will be held in French.
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Presentation of the topic: While Contract Law, in its common rules expressed by the "general theory of contracts", is often considered to be the most developed branch of Law in practice and the most studied at university, at first glance it seems to be given little consideration when it comes to compliance matter.
This is undoubtedly due to the fact that the company, which is at the heart of the action expected of it—action that is expected to be powerful (since it affects the collective future) and diversified (since it concerns all systems beyond the company's direct activity)—seems above all to have the status of a subject of law. This is exacerbated if, by mistakenly confusing the latter terms, we only talk about "conformity" and assert that it is simply for businesses a matter of "complying with the regulations that apply to them", which then leaves little room for contractual initiative. This would be associated only with Ethics, a normative order that also differs from a contract, which is a binding legal act.
The relationship between Contract and many sorts of documents, standards and ethical acts that are so numerous in compliance techniques, to which we can add the soft law produced by courts, regulators, supervisors and the companies themselves, is therefore an open question. This delicate reconciliation, which the terms "CSR" and "Governance" express without referring to very precise legal definitions, can cause difficulties in relation to general Contract Law: thus, the "commitments" that punctuate the techniques and behaviours that make up the "culture of compliance" have a central place in Compliance Law. However, their place, if not their equivalence with the contract, is not established, and may even be excluded. This too is an open question.
Based on these initial questions, it appears that in order to gain a firmer footing in the analysis of the practices of companies that include compliance clauses into multiple contracts, we must observe that compliance may consist of a comprehensive service that is the very subject of a specific contract, the "compliance contract, or even assist in the conception that judges may, or must, develop in their office when they are seized of "contractual litigation involving Compliance", we must return to common contract law.
Indeed, if we stop viewing Compliance Law solely through the prism of punishment, if we do not limit it to the "detection and prevention" of fraudulent behaviour which, if it occurred, would be punished, the contract does not have the same place in practice. In this initial restrictive conception of Compliance Law based on sanctions, simply by moving from ex post to ex ante, the company remains subject to the regulations that apply to it, and the contract would be just one of the ways in which it fulfils its legal compliance obligation.
However, the obligation of compliance can also be considered to have its legitimate source in the Contract, which in general termes is based on the autonomy of will and all its consequences (contractual freedom, binding force, effect on third parties, etc.), with the Principle of Compliance fitting into it as a second pillar linked to the first pillar, which is the Principle of free Competition.
It is therefore very useful to better understand practices by comparing the technical principles of general Contract Law with Compliance Principles, such as concern for others that contractors may pursue independently of any regulatory requirement (these others who are distant in space and time), preservation of systems, the obligation to provide evidence, etc.
This is the subject of this symposium which, according to the classic dichotomy of contractual formation and contractual execution, revisits the contractual thread based on the founding principles of autonomy and freedoms, binding force and its relativity, the meeting of consents, groups of contracts, and regulatory contracts often drawn up to implement compliance policies. Enforcement and contractual liability under general Contract Law are themselves coloured in a unique way when a compliance concern or goal has been included in the contract or is implied by it.
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Speakers include:
🎤 Nicolas Bargue professor at Panthéon-Sorbonne University,
🎤 Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, university professor, editor-in-chief of the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the European School of Regulation and Compliance (EeRC)
🎤 Julia Heinich, professor at Panthéon-Sorbonne University
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The proceedings of this symposium will form the basis of a specific chapter in the following publications:
In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors
ENGLISH
While financial regulation aims at achieving market stability, regulating markets can sometimestake an ironic turn when regulations end up having consequencesthat differ from their original regulatory purpose. The article provides such an example of regulation’s irony: how a regulatory change in Germany led Moody’s to downgrade 12 banks, therefore weakening such institutions and consequently enhancing the current issues of market volatility and credit cost.
FRENCH
Bien que la réglementationfinancière vise àassurer la stabilitédu marché, la régulation des marchéspeut parfoisprendre une tournureironique quandla régulation finit par avoirdes conséquencesqui diffèrent deson objectifde régulationd’origine.L’article fournitun exemplede l’ironie de la régulation : commentun changement de réglementationen Allemagne a conduitMoody’sà déclasser12 banques allemandes,, donc à affaiblirces institutions etpar conséquentà accroître les problèmes actuels dela volatilité du marchéet le coûtdu crédit.
ITALIAN
Quando la regolazione è volta ad ottenere la stabilità del mercato, l’evoluzione di questi mercati oggetto di tale regolazione può essere particolarmente ironica quando la regolazione ha delle conseguenze ben differenti da quelle originariamente prepostesi. Questo articolo cerca quindi di mettere in evidenza un esempio di questa ironia: in effetti, un cambio di regolatore in Germania ha portato Moody’s a tagliare il rating di 12 banche, indebolendo ancora di più tali istituzioni ed aumentando si conseguenza le questioni relative alla volatilità del mercato e del costo del credito.
Margot Sève is a lawyer who holds a Master degree in Business Law from the University of Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas. She also studied Chinese in Paris (INALCO) and business law in China (...)
Rating agencies are private companies that assess the risk of defaulting payment by debtors. As such, the rating of a borrower affects the value of the debt security it issued and that is to circulate in the markets. That is why the activity of credit rating agencies is critical to the security of financial instruments and the functioning of financial markets, but also to the whole global credit system. For instance, an AAA rating guarantees security to investors. Rating agencies helps building trust in financial markets and in the banking system. Henceforth, since everyone relies on them as they save people's time from seeking on their own information on securities or on those who issue them on the marks, international rating agencies have become crucial operators.
'Rating' has also become a business, which is now concentrated within the hands of three undertakings (two American and one French). It has often been said that these three are conflicted. Some have indeed brought up the fact as they have provided the markets with unreliable information (especially about subprime and securitization) prevented them to self-discipline, which eventually participated in the global spread of risks and defaults.
The difficult history between the rating agencies, whether they are considered as mere businesses, crucial operators or as companies undertaking a public service, which eventually led to implement a specific Regulation in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, shows how the information is a public common. This justifies the intervention of the Financial Regulator, namely to better protect the consumer. Should we go further on? Some have mentioned the idea of nationalizing the business and hand it over to Government institutions (or at least public ones). This is, however, no longer on the agenda, as many conflicts of interests may arise since rating agencies keep on rating the paradoxical debtors that States are.
