In the United States, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), on 1994 allows some services of the State which justify it, in particular the F.B.I, to carry out telephone tapping. But the technology also allows the transmission of voice by other means than the phone, especially via the Internet. However, wiretapping as a threat to individual liberties, only an Act may extend the powers of listening, on the phone on the modes of transmission of voice on the Internet. In this view, the F.B.I. is developing which is intended to become an extension of the Act of 1994.
We cannot properly design and build banking regulation, or run it well if you do not have a clear idea of what a bank is and what it is for.
However, it is precisely this criticism has formulated the Managing General of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) September 5, 2012: the banks do not know who they are, what they serve.
Indeed, the regulator imputes many dysfunctional banking system and financial banking to agents that behave like ordinary product vendors, products which are financial products, in exchange for which they receive a commission. In contrary, the regulator believes that the bank does not have a sales business but a service activity: that of serving the interests of his client. It was forgotten, he said, and the cause for many ills.
This collective work describes the contours of French, European, and International healthcare regulation, and explores past, present, and future evolutions and tendencies in this sector. Original French title: Annales de la régulation, 2009, volume 2, sous la direction de Thierry Revet et Laurent Vidal, collection Bibliothèque de l'Institut de Recherche Juridique de la Sorbonne (IRJS) – André Tunc. (LGDJ)
In a judgment taken on March 9th 2010, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice upheld the European Commission’s action against the Federal Republic of Germany, stating that by making the authorities responsible for monitoring the processing of personal data outside the public sector in the different Länder subject to State oversight, Germany incorrectly transposed the requirement of "complete independence" of the supervisory authorities responsible for ensuring data protection, and thereby failed to fulfil its obligations under the second subparagraph of Article 28(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 "on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data".
FRENCH
Un jugement rendu par la Grande Chambre de la Cour Européenne de Justice le 9 mars 2010 insiste sur l'indépendance nécessaire des autorités en charge de la protection des données personnelles dans les Länder allemands au regard de l'application de la directive européenne 95/46/CE du 24 Octobre 1995 relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l'égard du traitement des données à caractère personnel et à la libre circulation de ces données (Directive "Données Personnelles").
Dans un jugement rendu le 9 mars 2010, la Grande Chambre de la Cour Européenne de Justice a jugé que les autorités de protection des données des Länder allemands qui contrôlent les fichiers du secteur privé n’agissaient pas en pleine indépendance, contrairement aux exigences de la Directive européenne de 1995 sur la protection des données.
GERMAN
Am 9. März 2010 verkündete der Europäische Gerichtshof sein Urteil in der Sache EG / Deutschland (C-518/07) betreffend der Verpflichtung des Mitgliedsstaats sicherzustellen, daß die nationalen Aufsichtsbehörden, die zur Überwachung der Datenverarbeitung verantwortlich sind, ihre Funktionen vollkommen unabhängig auszuüben.
Der Europäische Gerichtshof hat am 9. März 2010 sein Urteil verkündet in der Sache EG/Deutschland, in dem er betont, dass das deutsche Datenschutzsaufsichtssytem die Verpflichtung der Unabhängigkeit von Aufsichtsbehörden, die in den Rechtlinien 95/46 vorgeschrieben ist, unvollständig umgestetzt hat.
SPANISH
En una sentencia dictada por la Gran Cámara de la Corte Europea de la Justicia el 9 de marzo del 2010 insiste en la independencia necesaria de las autoridades a cargo de la protección de la privacidad de data en German Länder, en cuanto a la aplicación de la Directiva 95/46/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 24 de octubre de 1995, relativa a la protección de las personas físicas en lo que respecta al tratamiento de datos personales y a la libre circulación de estos datos
En una sentencia del 9 de marzo del 2010 la Gran Cámara de la Corte Europea de la Justicia confirmó que la acción que tomó la Comisión Europea contra la República Federal de Alemania, constatando que, al darle a las autoridades la responsabilidad de monitorear el procesamiento de data personal fuera del sector público en los diferentes Länder sujetos a la vigilancia estatal, Alemania transpuso incorrectamente el requisito de ‘independencia completa’ de las autoridades supervisoras responsables de asegurar la protección de data y por lo tanto, no cumplen con los requisitos detallados en el segundo subpárrafo del artículo 28(1) de la Directiva 95/46/CE del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 24 de octubre de 1995, relativa a la protección de las personas físicas en lo que respecta al tratamiento de datos personales y a la libre circulación de estos datos
The European Commission published a Green Paper in September 2010 on Audit Policy, in order to give its opinion on the Lessons from the Crisis.From a systemic perspective of financial markets' stability, the Commission analyzes the role of the auditor, the internal structure of audit firms, the concentration of the audit market, and the possibility of a European market for auditing. But, what the Commission presents as a neutral description is actually a series of ideological stances, which are tenable, but also debatable. Thus, the Green Paper makes auditing out to be a structural element of financial markets, which shatters auditing's uniqueness, while attributing it a structural and systemic role, which is questionable. It then requires regulatory tools to open the auditing market to more competition, which will, in reality, expose it to the pressures of demand and lower the efficiency of auditing missions. It would be better to reinforce regulatory mechanisms towards security and conflicts of interest, rather than towards competition, which corresponds to the traditional French model of audit regulation.
FRENCH
La Commission européenne a lancé en septembre 2010 un Livre vert la Politique de l’audit, pour que soient tirée à son propos les Leçons de la Crise. C’est donc dans une perspective systémique de stabilité des marchés financiers que les questions sont posées par la Commission, concernant l’auditeur, l’organisation des sociétés d’audit, la concentration du marché de l’audit et l’hypothèse d’un marché européen de l’audit. Mais ce que la Commission présente comme une description neutre est une réalité une série de prises de positions idéologiques, soutenables mais aussi discutables. Ainsi, le Livre Vert présente l’audit comme un élément structurel des marchés financiers, ce qui brise l’unicité de l’audit, tandis qu’elle lui confère un rôle structurel et systémique, ce qui est discutable. Elle requiert ensuite des outils de régulations pour ouvrir à une plus forte concurrence le marché de l’audit, ce qui va en réalité l’exposer à la pression de la demande et abaisser l’effectivité des missions de l’audit, alors qu’il faut renforcer les outils de régulations, non pas par rapport à la concurrence mais par rapport à la sécurité et aux conflits d’intérêts, ce à quoi correspond le modèle traditionnel français.
GERMAN
Artikel: Kritische Analyse des Grünbuches der Europäischen Kommission im Bereich Abschlussprüfung: Eine problematische Definition vom systemrelevanten Agent und eine Illustration des Gegensatzes zwischen Regulierung und Wettbewerb.
Die Europäische Kommission hat im September 2010 ein Grünbuch zur Rolle der Abschlussprüfung veröffentlicht, um ihre Stellungnahme über die Lehre der Krise zu verbreiten. Die Kommission analysiert die Rolle des Abschlussprüfers, die innere Struktur von Abschlussprufüngsunternehmen, die Marktkonzentration des Prüfungsmarktes und die Möglichkeiten der Entstehung eines europäischen Abschlussprüfungsmarktes aus der systemischen Perspektive der Finanzmarktstabilität. Aber was die Europäische Kommission als eine neutrale Schilderung darstellt trägt eher mit sich eine Reihe von ideologischen Einstellungen, die zwar haltbar aber auch strittig sind. So stellt das Grünbuch die Abschlüssprufung als Strukturelement für die Finanzmärkte, was die Einheit der Abschlussprüfung zerbricht. Laut des Grünbuches spielt sie auch eine systemische und strukturelle Rolle, was auch fragwürdig ist. Der Prufüngsmarkt sollte auch zu mehr Wettbewerb durch Regulierungsmassnahmen eröffnet werden, was in der Tat dem Markt dem Drück der Anfrage aussetzen wird, und die Effizienz von Abschlussprüfungsaufträgen einschränken wird. Es wäre besser, Regulierungsmechanismen mit Hinsicht auf Sicherheit und Interessenkonflikten, eher als Wettbewerb, zu verfestigen, was eigentlich dem französichen Modell der Prüfungsregulierung entsprechen würde.
ITALIAN
Articolo: Analisi critica del Libro verde della Commissione europea sulla politica in materia di revisione dei conti: una definizione problematica dell'agente sistemico ed un'illustrazione dell'opposizione tra regolazione e concorrenza.
Nel mese di settembre 2010, la Commissione europea ha pubblicato un libro verde sulla politica in materia di audit (revisione dei conti) per emettere il suo parere sulle "Lezioni dalla crisi". Con una prospettiva sistemica della stabilità dei mercati finanziari, la Commissione analizza il ruolo del revisore dei conti, la struttura interna degli studi di revisione dei conti, la concentrazione del mercato dell'audit e la possibilità di strutturare un mercato europeo della revisione dei conti. Tuttavia, quello che la commissione presenta come un dato di fatto, in realtà è il frutto di una riflessione ideologica, sostenibile ma sicuramente discutibile. Il Libro verde rende la revisione dei conti, un'attività strutturale dei mercati finanziari, la cui unicità è quindi frazionata, e gli attribuisce un ruolo strutturale e sistemico, di per sé discutibile. Inoltre auspica con l'intervento di meccanismi di regolazione, un'apertura del mercato dell'audit al fine di garantire una concorrenza maggiore, che sarà esposta alle pressioni della domanda e diminuirà l'efficienza degli incarichi di revisione dei conti. Sarebbe meglio rafforzare i meccanismi di regolazione al fine di raggiungere una sicurezza maggiore ed evitare conflitti d’interessi, invece di auspicare una maggiore concorrenza, cosa che corrisponde al modello francese tradizionale della regolazione del mercato della revisione dei conti.
SPANISH
Artículo: Análisis crítico del Libro Verde de la Comisión Europea sobre su política de auditoría: una definición problemática sobre el agente del sistema y una ilustración sobre la oposición entre regulación y competencia.
En septiembre del 2010, la Comisión Europea publicó El Libro Verde sobre la política de auditoría para proveer su opinión sobre Las Lecciones de la Crisis. Desde una perspectiva sistemática de la estabilidad de los mercados financieros, la Comisión analiza el papel del auditor, la estructura interna de empresas de auditoría, la concentración del mercado de auditoría y la posibilidad de un mercado europea de auditoría. Pero, lo que la Comisión presenta como una descripción neutral es, de hecho, una serie de declaraciones ideológicas, que son defendibles, pero también discutibles. Por lo tanto, el Informe Verde describe a la auditoría como un elemento estructural de los mercados financieros, lo cual destruye la cualidad única de la auditoría, mientras que le atribuye un rol estructural y sistemático, lo cual es cuestionable. También requiere de instrumentos regulatorios para abrir el mercado de auditoría a una competencia más substancial, lo cual, en realidad, lo expone a las presiones de demanda y disminuye la eficacia de las misiones de auditoría. Sería mejor reforzar los mecanismo regulatorios hacia la seguridad y conflicto de intereses, y no hacia la competencia, lo cual corresponde al modelo tradicional francés de la regulación de auditoría.
Competition is the principle element of markets, in the princely sense of the term.The relationships that regulation maintains with competition are ambiguous. It is important to eliminate this ambiguity in order to reveal the ab initio opposition between regulation and competition, to shed light upon the dialectics between both of them. Indeed, regulation may aim at building competition, and is thereby presented as a tool that will cease being used when the competitive market functions effectively.
Administration - Autorité de Régulation des Communications électroniques et des Postes - Competition - Competition Authority - Conflict of intersts - Consumer - Contract - Equilibrium - European Commission - Ex ante / Ex post - Government - Hayek - Horyzontal regulation - Information asymmetry - Liberalisation - Market failure - Natural economic monopoly - Online gambling - Political mandate - Postal services - Power - Principle - Real economy - "Réglementation" - Regulator - Regulatory Authority - Self regulation - symmetrical regulation - Telecommunication - Tool - Watchdog *
* In The Journal of Regulation, these keywords are done by the Editor and not by the Author.
PORTUGUESE
Artigo: Regulação versus Concorrência
Concorrência é o principal elemento dos mercados, no mais genuíno sentido da palavra. As relações que regulação mantém com a concorrência são ambíguas. É importante eliminar essa ambiguidade de modo a relativizar a oposição ab initio entre regulação e concorrência, para trazer luz para a dialética entre elas. Com efeito, regulação pode tender a construir a concorrência, e é então apresentada como uma ferramenta que deixará de ser usada quando o mercado competitivo passar a funcionar realmente.
Administração – Autorité de Régulation des Communications électroniques et des Postes – Concorrência – Autoridade de concorrência – Conflito de interesse – Consumidor – Contrato – Equilíbrio – Comissão Europeia – Ex ante / Ex post – Governo – Hayek – Regulação horizontal – Informação assimétrica – Liberalização – Falha de mercado – Monopólio econômico natural – Jogo em linha – Mandato político – Serviços postais – Poder – Princípio – Economia real – Regulamentação – Regulador – Autoridade de regulação – Auto-regulação – Regulação simétrica – Telecomunicações – Ferramenta – Observador*
* No Journal of Regulation, as palavras-chave são fornecidas pelo Diretor, e não pelo Autor.
ITALIAN
Articolo: Regolazione vs. Concorrenza
La concorrenza è il principio fondamentale dei mercati, nel senso stretto del termine. Le relazioni tra regolazione e concorrenza sono ambigue. Per rivelare il contrasto tra regolazione e concorrenza è importante cancellare questa ambiguità e chiarire la dinamica di questi due concetti. In effetti, la regolazione punta a sviluppare la concorrenza ed è spesso considerata uno strumento che non avrà più ragion d’essere una volta che il mercato funzionerà in libera concorrenza.
Amministrazione - Asimmetria dell’informazione - Autoregolazione - Autorità di regolazione - Autorité de Régulation des Communications électroniques et des Postes - Autorità garante della concorrenza - Commissione Europea - Concorrenza - Conflitto di interessi - Contratto - Consumatore - Economia reale - Equilibrio - Ex ante / Ex post - Governo - Hayek - Liberalizzazione - Mancato Funzionamento del mercato - Monopolio economico naturale - Mandato politico - Potere - Principio - "Regolamentazione" - Regolatore - Regolazione orizzontale - Regolazione simmetrica - Servizi postali - Scommesse online - Strumento - Telecomunicazioni - Vigilanza *
* In The Journal of Regulation, le parole chiave sono responsabilità dell’Editore e non dall’Autore.
SPANISH
Artículo: Regulación versus la competencia
La competencia es el elemento principal de los mercados, en precisamente el sentido de este término. Es importante eliminar esta ambigüedad para poder revelar la posición ab initio entre la regulación y la competencia, para poder traer a luz las dialécticas entre las dos. Así tanto, la regulación puede intentar construir la competencia, y es, por consiguiente, un instrumento que cesará de ser utilizado cuando el mercado competitivo funcione de manera eficaz.
In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors
ENGLISH :
In order to establish a competitive energy market, the distribution infrastructure, as a monopolistic segment of energy networks, should be demonopolized. Instruments of economic regulation, which are often attributed ex ante character, are put in place to open the market and enable competitive forces. Unbundling is specific for it may also represent an ex post measure of a structural nature, exerted by competition protection authorities.
FRENCH
Afin d’établirun marché énergétiquecompétitif,l’infrastructure de distribution,en tant qu’il est un segmentmonopolistiquedes réseaux d’énergie,devrait êtrelibéralisé.Les instruments derégulation économique, quisont souvent attribués d’une façonex ante,sont mises en placepour ouvrir le marchéet rendent possibles les forces concurrentielles.Le dégroupage estspécifique,car il peutaussi représenterune mesure ex postde nature structurelle,exercée parles autorités de protectionde la concurrence.
ITALIAN
Per costruire un mercato concorrenziale dell’energia, le infrastrutture di distribuzione, in quanto segmento monopolistico delle reti di energia, dovrebbero essere liberalizzate. A tal fine, sono applicati dei meccanismi di regolazione economica, spesso previsti ex ante, per aprire il mercato e permettere le forze concorrenziali. L’unbundling è particolare, in quanto potrebbe anche costituire un provvedimento ex post di natura strutturale, utilizzato dalle autorità di tutela della libera concorrenza.
A simple question: be regulator, is it a profession?
As soon as one asks the question, it should be down. Indeed, the time has passed when the regulator was a natural person. Today, in most cases, the regulator takes the form of a Regulatory Authority, that is to say an entity with or without legal personality, incorporated in the State or professional.
Individuals appear as a member of the Authority, even if it is true that the President of the Regulatory Authority often has a very importan role!footnote-17.
The choice of Commissioners is crucial to the independence and effectiveness of the regulatory authority. It is appropriate that the person has "authority" over the area, must be respected and participates effectively in the collective action of the College.
Let us try to recall the two sets of criteria to determine how one thinks the "good regulator" before taking such case the appointment of Mr. Yann Padova as a new member of the College of the Commission de Régulation de l'Énergie (French Energy Regulatory Commission).
The Morocco is overhaul its system of financial regulation. The Dahir related the Regulatory and Public Offering Authority was approved by the Council of the Government on April, 11 2012. The Conseil déontologique des valeurs mobilières (CDVM) - Council for the Code of Ethics in Securities is now called l’Autorité Marocaine du marché des Capitaux (AMMC) (the Moroccan Authority of capital markets). The Bill justifies the change of name and the use of the word "authority" by the wish expressed to ensure the independence of the Regulatory Authority and the reference to its monitoring power. This is takes the form of new powers for the Regulatory Authority which allows it to require information and sanction infringements. The Regulatory Authority establishes the standard form that any corporation interest in conducting a public offering must complete to receive the approval from the Regulatory Authority. The use of inside information is prohibited. The Bill organises the regular dissemination of information on the initiative of companies which conducted a public offering.
