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 It is often observed, even theorized, even advised and touted, that Compliance is a mechanism by which public authorities internalize political (eg environmental) concerns in big companies, which accept them, in Ex Ante, because they are rather in agreement with these "monumental goals" (eg saving the planet) and that this shared virtue is beneficial to their reputation. It is observed that this could be the most successful way in new configurations, such as digital.

But, and the Compliance Mechanism has often been brought closer to the contractual mechanism, this is only relevant if both parties are willing to do so. This is technically true, for example for the Deferred Prosecution, which requires explicit consent. This is true in a more general sense that the company wants to choose itself how to structure its organization to achieve the goals politically pursued by the State. Conversely, the compliance mechanisms work if the State is willing to admit the economic logic of the global private players and / or, if there are possible breaches, not to pursue its investigations and close the file it has opened, at a price more or less high.

But just say No.

As in contractual matters, the first freedom is negative and depends on the ability to say No.

The State can do it. But the company can do it too.

And Daimler just said No.

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Publicly, including through an article in the Wall Street Journal of June 28, 2019.

The company sets out in a warning to the market that it is the object of a requirement on the part of the German Motor Authority (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt)  of an allegation of fraud, by the installation of a software, aimed at misleading instruments for measuring emissions of greenhouse gases on cars using diesel.

It is therefore an environmental compliance mechanism that would have been intentionally countered.

On this allegation, the Regulator both warns the company of what it considers to be a fact, ie compliance fraud, and attaches it to an immediate measure, namely the removal of the circulation of 42,000 vehicles sold or proposed by Daimler with such a device.

And the firm answers : "No".

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Which is probably only beginning, since a No ends the dialogue of Ex Ante to project in the Ex Post sanction procedures, calls 6 observations:

 

• 1. No doubt Daimler, a German car manufacturing company, has it in mind in this allegation of fraud calculating pollution of its diesel cars what happened to his competitor Volkswagen: namely a multi-billion dollar fine, for lack of compliance in a similar hypothesis (so-called dieselgate). The strategic choice that is then made depends on education through the experience of the company, which benefits as such from a previous case that has had a very significant cost. Thus educated, the question is to measure the risk taken to refuse any cooperation, when the company can anticipate that it will still result in such an amount ....

 

• 2. In addition, we find the difficulty of the distinction of Ex Ante and Ex Post. Indeed, saying No will involve for the company a cost of confrontation with the Regulator, then the peripheral jurisdictions or review courts. But in Germany, the Government itself, concerning a bank threatened with compliance proceedings and almost summoned by the US regulator to pay "of its own free will" a transactional fine, felt that this was not normal, because it must be the judges who punish, after a contradictory procedure with due process and after established facts. 

 

• 3.  However, this is only an allegation, of probable assertions, of what legally allows to continue, but which does not allow to condemn. The confusion between the burden of proof, which presupposes the obligation to prove the facts before being able to sanction, and the burden of the allegation, which only supposes to articulate plausibility before being able to prosecute, is very damaging, particularly if we are committed to the principles of Repressive Law, such as the presumption of innocence and the due process. This distinction between these two probationary charges is at the heart of the probatory system in the Compliance Law. Because Compliance Law always looks for more efficiency, tends to go from the first to the second, to give the Regulator more power, since businesses are so powerful ....

 

• 4. But the first question then arises: what is the nature no so much of the future measure to be feared, namely a sanction that could be taken later, against Daimler, if the breach is proven, or which will not be applied to the firm if the breach is not established; but what is the nature of the measure immediately taken, namely the return of 42,000 vehicles?

 

• This may seem like an Ex Ante measurement. Indeed, the Compliance assumes non-polluting cars. The Regulator may have indications that these cars are polluting and that the manufacturer has not made the necessary arrangements for them to be less polluting (Compliance) or even organized so that this failure is not detected ( Compliance fraud).

 

• This allegation suggests that there is a risk that thiese cars will polluting. They must immediately be removed from circulation for the quality of the environment. Here and now. The question of sanctions will arise after that, having its procedural apparatus of guarantees for the company that will be pursued. But see the situation on the side of the company: having to withdraw 42,000 vehicles from the market is a great damage and what is often called in Repressive Law a "security measure" taken while the evidence is not yet met could deserve a requalification in sanction. Jurisprudence is both abundant and nuanced on this issue of qualification.

 

• 5. So to withdraw these cars, it is for the company to admit that it is guilty, to increase itself the punishment. And if at this game, taken from the "cost-benefit", as much for the company immediately assert to the market that this requirement of Regulation is unfounded in Law, that the alleged facts are not exacts, and that all this the judges will decide. It is sure at all whether these statements by the company are true or false, but before a Tribunal no one thinks they are true prima facie, they are only allegations.
•  And before a Court, a Regulator appears to have to bear a burden of proof in so far as he has to defend the order he has issued, to prove the breach which he asserts exists, which justifies the exercise he made of his powers. The fact that he exercises his power for the general interest and impartially does not diminish this burden of proof.

 

• 6. By saying "No", Daimler wants to recover this classic Law, often set aside by Compliance Law, classic Law based on burden of proof, means of proof, and prohibition of punitive measures - except imminent and future imminente and very serious damages  - before 'behavior could be sanctioned following a sanction procedure.
• Admittedly, one would be tempted to make an analogy with the current situation of Boeing whose aircraft are grounded by the Regulator in that he considers that they do not meet the conditions of safety, which the aircraft manufacturer denies , Ex Ante measurement that resembles the retraction measure of the market that constitutes the recall request of cars here operated.
• But the analogy does not work on two points. Firstly, flight activity is a regulated activity that can only be exercised with the Ex Ante authorization of several Regulators, which is not the case for offering to sell cars or to drive with. This is where Regulatory Law and Compliance Law, which often come together, here stand out.Secundly, the very possibility that planes of which it is not excluded that they are not sure is enough, as a precaution, to prohibit their shift. Here (about the cars and the measure of the pollution by them), it is not the safety of the person that is at stake, and probably not even the overall goal of the environment, but the fraud with respect to the obligation to obey Compliance. Why force the withdrawal of 42,000 vehicles? If not to punish? In an exemplary way, to remind in advance and all that it costs not to obey the Compliance? And there, the company says: "I want a judge".

 

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Translated summaries

The translated summaries are done by the Editors and not by the Authors.

ENGLISH

The European Commission’s initiatives towards a Single Market in energy, transport and electronic communications should aim to further regulatory transparency and not market homogenisation. The article provides a quantitative and qualitative assessment of indiscriminating homogenisation of the mobile telecommunications market. The potential impacts on market power and the loss of consumer welfare are by no means negligible and imply important policy considerations

FRENCH

Les initiatives de la Commission européenne en vue d’un marché unique des communications de l’énergie, de transport et électroniques devraient viser à une plus grande transparence réglementaire et non pas à l’homogénéisation du marché. Le présent article fournit une évaluation quantitative et qualitative de l’homogénéisation inconsidérée du marché des télécommunications mobiles. Les impacts potentiels sur le pouvoir de marché et la perte de bien-être des consommateurs ne sont nullement négligeables et impliquent des considérations politiques importantes.

ENGLISH

In the most developed nations, as in emerging countries, the economy and society are currently being entirely transformed by an industrial revolution originating in information and communication technologies.

Anti-competitive Behaviour Audacity - Autorité de Régulation des Communications Electroniques et des Postes (ARCEP - French Electronic Communications and Posts Regulator) - Communication - Competition - Confidence - Cooperation - Darwin - Digital revolution - Discrimination - European Commission - Ex ante / Ex post - Fiber optic - Future - impredictibility - Information - Infostructure - Infrastructure - Innovation - Internet - Lamarck - Napoleon - Network - Overregulation - Risk - Uncertainty - Underregulation *

* In The Journal of Regulation, these keywords are done by the Editor and not by the Author.

ITALIAN

Articolo: Innovazione e regolazione al servizio della rivoluzione digitale

Nelle nazioni le più sviluppate, nonché negli stati in via di sviluppo, l’economia e la società sono completamente trasformati da un rivoluzione industriale che trova le sue origini nelle teconologie d’informazione e di comunicazione.

Autorité de Régulation des Communications Electroniques et des Postes (ARCEP – Autorità francese di regolazione dei servizi postali e di telecomunicazione) – Commissione Europea - Comportamento anticoncorrenziale – Comunicazione – Concorrenza – Cooperazione – Darwin – Deregolamentazione - Discriminazione - Ex ante / Ex post – Fibra ottica – Imprevisibilità – Incertezza - Inflazione normativa - Informazione – Infostruttura – Infrastruttura – Innovazione – Internet – Lamarck – Napoleone – Rete – Rischio - Rivoluzione digitale *

* In The Journal of Regulation, le parole chiave sono responsabilità dell’Editore e non dall’Autore.

 
PORTUGUESE

Artigo: Inovação e Renovação a serviço da Revolução digital.

Nos países mais desenvolvidos, bem como nos em desenvolvimento, a economia e a sociedade vem sendo, atualmente, completamente transformados por uma revolução industrial baseada em tecnologias da informação e da comunicação.

Comportamento anti-concurrencial – Autoridade de regulação das comunicações eletrônicas e dos correios (ARCEP – Regulador francês de Comunicações e dos Correios) – Comunicação – Concorrência – Confiança – Cooperação – Darwin - Revolução digital – Discriminação – Comissão Europeia – Ex ante / Ex post – Fibra ótica – Futuro – Imprevisibilidade - Informação – Info-estrutura – Infra-estrutura – Inovação – Internet – Lamarck – Napoleão – Rede – Sobre-regulação – Risco – Incerteza – Sub-regulação.*

 * No Journal of Regulation, as palavras-chave são fornecidas pelo Diretor, e não pelo Autor.

SPANISH

Artículo: Innovación y regulación sirviendo la revolución digital

En las naciones más desarrolladas, tal como en los países emergentes, la economía y la sociedad están actualmente siendo transformadas por una revolución industrial provenientes de las tecnologías informáticas y de telecomunicaciones.

 

 

Other translations forthcoming.

During the discussion that followed the inaugural conference for the Cycle Pour une Europe de la Compliance (For a Europe of Compliance) that Koen Lenaerts devoted to the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the construction of the Europe of Compliance, and after a first discussion led by Antoine Garapon, a problem has particularly emerged.

Indeed, President Koen Lenaerts has taken up the question of the influence of the adoption of a "compliance program" by a company when subsequently anticompetitive behavior is imputed to it.

Competition or regulatory authorities, as well as courts, have three possibilities: either to consider that the company had done what it could to prevent this behavior, to educate the persons in its charge, that this prevention not enough but must be taken into account in its "discharge" to lighten its sanction; on the contrary, to consider that the adoption of such a compliance program by the enterprise by which it expresses its express and pro-active desire to bear the efficiency of the standard itself while at the same time it disregards it constitutes an aggravating circumstance of its responsibility; consider that the fact must remain neutral in the judge's assessment of the behavior.

The Court of Justice stands by the third solution.

But everyone agrees that this is an essential question for which the arguments are well-founded, the European Commission, on the other hand, leaning towards the qualification of an aggravating fact.

During the discussion, it was emphasized in the opposite direction that in the perspective of Compliance as an incentive mechanism, not taking into account on the part of companies the adoption of such expensive programs is very discouraging for them. Moreover, this contradicts the definition of compliance as a "Trust pact" between the company and the public authority.

 

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QWhat can be done to remain from this discussion of a very great interest?

So it's a question that is still open, because the arguments are strong and we could say that "everyone is right", and companies that want to take note of their behavior, and authorities who can not be abused by what would be only a screen of behavior violating Law.

The question is maybe whether the choice of "neutrality" of the Court of Justice is a solution of waiting or a decision of non-choice, because one could never know if a company is "sincere" or not when it has adopted a Compliance Program.

It is probably here that a solution could be found: in probative mechanisms. Because in these matters, it is by technical processes by which the subject of law (that is to say the company) reveals that it has done everything to achieve the Compliance purpose (obligation of means strengthened). ).

It is probably by formulating probative requirements of this kind that the Court of Justice could move out of its position of neutrality. While it is true that the judge must be "impartial" in relation to the facts, the attitude of giving no "relevance" to a fact as important as the compliance programs is inherently annoying. It seems difficult to associate a substantive rule, nor is it desirable to practice casuistry. But, because Economic Law lends itself to it, a probationary system that the Court would make clear would perhaps be a good solution.

 

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Dans l'ouvrage qui paraîtra à la fin du cycle de conférences, un article sera inséré dans l'ouvrage sur cette question plus particulière de la portée des programmes de conformité sur l'appréciation du comportement de l'opérateur au regard des faits qui lui sont reprochés, question sur laquelle les différents régulateurs des différents systèmes juridiques divergent.

In the book that will be published at the end of the conference cycle, an article will be inserted in it  on this particular question of the effects of compliance programs on the appreciation of the behavior of the enterprises with regard to the facts that are reproached, an issue on which the different regulators of the different legal systems diverge. For the moment.

The President of the Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes (Arcep –French Electronic and Postal Communications Regulation Authority) presents his vision of Telecommunications Regulation in favour of Network Neutrality.

TRANSLATED SUMMARIES

The translated summaries are done by the Editors and not by the Authors.

ENGLISH

“Global Financial Integration, Thirty Years on. From reform to crisis” combines many academic contributions on international financial governance, that each offer original and in-depth analysis of the financial crisis’ causes. To safeguard the authors’ legal and economic reasoning, the bibliographical report has been divided in three parts and will be brought to The Journal of Regulation’s readers in three successive issues . The following report analyses the third part of the volume.

Other translations forthcoming.

La liberté de prendre des risques

Main information

Two judgments of the General Court of the ECJ challenge the greenhouse gas emissions allowances trading system within the European market.

It is sometimes argued that the competitive freedom will destroy the "old regulated world", platforms being the perfect example of this fresh wind, the invention of the adjective "disruptive" which could express a "novelty" before which it is only suitable to bow.

It would be therefore necessary to smile or even laugh, what would be a "rearguard battle" when the Conseil Constitutionnel (French Constitutional Council) in a decision of 22 May 2014 had limited the expansion of Uber, protecting the correspondingly monopoly holders of a municipal taxi license.

But in the US, cities adopt regulations. So on the next city council of the city of Chicago, will be proposed the vote of an order to compel the rideshare drivers.

In 2014, the French Constitutional Council justified its decision by referring to "the public order of parking", which the municipality is mistress... The justification given here is to protect the occupant.

Indeed all rideshare drivers will be obliged provide proof that they are subject to health checks, especially on drugs and provide criminel check also.
This is justified because Regulation of an activity implies control of those who exercise it and equal competitors can justify that for the same activity some are removed, especialy  in view of the protection of the person transported.

The third new requirement is of a different nature: the driver must prove that it is not in debt to the municipality. Why not, since the infrastructure of the city allows them to exercise the economic activity in question. This is another underlying objective, which lies rather in the idea of an exchange between the city and the one who transports people, the beneficiary of infrastructure should not be otherwise debtor that it enjoys public infrastructure.
The latter provision shows that the "contract" is increasingly not between the carrier and transported - via the virtual platform - but between the very concrete public space and one that circulates and do not live there.