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Translated Summaries

In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors

ENGLISH

The current worldwide economic downturn has strongly impacted nearly every countries all over the world. Thus, in order to avoid any further global financial crisis, governments have to restructure their financial supervisory mechanisms. While many states in the western world started to reform their supervisory frameworks, a small post-communist country developed a very interesting and uncommon model. Indeed, Georgia decided to simplify its financial supervisory architecture by transfering all regulatory and supervisory powers to its central bank.

FRENCH

L’actuel ralentissement économique mondial a fortement impacté presque tous les pays du monde entier. Ainsi, afin d’éviter toute autre crise financière mondiale, les gouvernements ont à restructurer leurs mécanismes de supervision financière. Alors que de nombreux Etats dans le monde occidental ont commencé à réformer leurs systèmes de surveillance, un petit pays post-communiste a développé un modèle très intéressant et rare. En effet, la Géorgie a décidé de simplifier son architecture de supervision financière en transférant tous les pouvoirs de réglementation et de surveillance de sa banque centrale.

SPANISH

El sector financiero georgiano emergió de la crisis global financiera y el declive económico doméstico en una condición sustancialmente positiva, y por lo tanto, en el contexto económico actual, merece atraer un interés mundial.

ITALIAN

L’attuale rallentamento dell’economia mondiale ha avuto un impatto su quasi tutti gli stati del mondo. Così, per evitare una nuova crisi finanziaria globale, i governi devono modificare i propri meccanismi di supervisione finanziaria. Mentre molti stati occidentali hanno iniziato le riforme delle loro strutture di supervisione, un piccolo paese ex-comunista ha sviluppato un modello interessante e poco diffuso. In effetti, la Georgia ha deciso di semplificare la sua struttura di supervisione finanziaria trasferendo tutti i poteri di regolazione e supervisione finanziaria alla sua banca centrale.

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Other translations forthcoming.

►This scientific manifestation is placed under the scientific responsibility of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda. It is organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Centre de Droit de l'Entreprise of Lyon 3 University.  

📅  It is one of the colloquia of the cycle of colloquia organized in 2021 around the general topic of Jurisdictionalisation of Compliance.

►The interventions will be then transformed into a chapter in the books: 

 📕 La Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance  ,  to be published in the Regulation & Compliance series, jointly published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoR)C and Dalloz 

📘Compliance Jurisdictionalisation,    to be published in the Compliance & Regulation Series , co published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and  Bruylant.

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This colloquium will take place in Lyon 3 on 23rd of June 2021 with a limited audience. It will also be broadcasted in live on Zoom. 

To register: https://zoom.us/webinar/register/8516215084724/WN_GoQ25I7pRoKhHuGomVMxYw 

► Presentation of the topic: Initially, it was through Criminal Law, inseparable from the trial, which forced companies to take charge of monitoring within themselves behavior likely to be deviant, the requirement of Ex Ante to be designed by the 'Ex Post of the jurisdictional. From this reversal of things, there has always remained this presence of the judge and the prosecution bodies in a Compliance Law which is nevertheless defined by its concern for the future and the Ex Ante tools within the company.

In doing so, the company becoming on the one hand a judge of itself, on the other hand a prosecutor of itself, it splits up, taking in reverse the most established procedural principles. Moreover, because of the monumental goals which constitute Compliance Law, companies become attorneys and judges of the others, or for the others, the cutting machines and the "supreme courts" being by name instituted to regulate in Ex Ante all different before that it does not become litigation. The Ex Ante of Compliance would then make the Ex Post disappear.

► Method: 

The colloquium which had to take place initially on 8th of April has been postponed to 23rd of June to enable speakers to meet and talk in face to face, with a limited audience. 

These exchanges will be captured so that third parties can benefit from them, even before the publication of the works, La Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance and Compliance Juridictionalization, within which this work constitutes the basis for the development of a specific chapter.

Five practical cases will first be examined in five specific sectors, where this institution of the firm as prosecutor and judge of itself is particularly observable before both specific and more cross-sectoral themes are examined and discussed.

►speakers :

🎤 Luc-Marie Augagneur, Attorney before Lyon Court of Appeal, CVS Law Firm

🎤Ale xis Bavitot, Senior lecturer at Lyon 3 University 

🎤 Alain Bruneau, Chief compliance officer at Natixis

🎤 Jean-Marc Coulon, Head of Legal Infrastructure at Bouygues Construction

🎤 Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Director of the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC)

🎤 Cécile Granier, Senior lecturer at Lyon 3 University 

🎤 Xavier Hubert, Director of Compliance at Engie

🎤 Jérémie Jourdan-Marques,  Professor at Lyon 2 University

🎤 Jérémy Heymann, Professor at Lyon 3 University

🎤 Daphnée Latour, Attorney, DL Avocats, Paris 

🎤 Christophe Lapp, Founding partner of Altana law firm

🎤 Samir Merabet, Senior lecturer at Lyon 3 University 

🎤 Béatrice Oeuvrard, Public Policy Manager at Facebook France

🎤 Jean du Parc, Bâtonnier 

🎤 Jean-Christophe Roda, Professor at Lyon 3 University and director of the Centre de droit de l'entreprise (Center of Company Law)

🎤 Jean-Baptiste Siproudhis, Director Ethics, Integrity and CSR at Thalès

Constitutional Law will have an increasingly important role to play in regulatory Law. This is especially true since the State Council uses its power to filter itself become a sort of Constitutional Court or maybe a Supreme Court.

One can think so reading the UBS decision on the 5th of November 2014.

Indeed, to refuse to transmit to the Conseil constitutionnel (French Constitutional Council)  the priority question of constitutionality formulated by UBS, the French Council of State gives what it believes to be the correct interpretation of the constitutional principle of legality of offenses and penalties in banking regulatory Law.

So to say there is no "question", the Conseil d'État says there is no "problem" because, through the interpretation it gives, the provisions of the Code Monétaire et Financier offers to the Supervisory Authority, the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution (ACPR), the power to sanction the bank for having not properly implemented its internal control, comply with the constitutional principle of legality of offenses and penalties, which is applicable in administrative repression.

But because to estimate that there is no "question", it must be said that there is no "problem", it is assumed that the High Administrative Court has acted as Constitutional Court.

We must take note. Is this really what the Constituent wanted by instituting a filter system by the constitutional law of the 23rd July 2008 establishing the priority question on constitutionality? Indeed, in this very sensitive and decisive question of repression in banking and finance, is it not at least to the French Constitutional Council itself to say the authoritative interpretation to remember that the constitutional text it is the guardian?

Virtual currency is a perfect example of the difficulties of interregulation: indeed, the bitcoins are currencies created on the Internet, usually to play games, such as poker. Thus intersect banking regulation, banking supervision, regulation and control of the game, Internet regulation itself.

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Regulation presupposes that we move from a political conception of Act (that is to say a collective Decision expressed by the State) or a civilist one (that is, a will expressed by one or several individuals in one Contract) to an economic vision of trading organizations whose action is the expression of the market. If one relies on the adjustment of supply and demand, that is to say, the meeting of desires and interests, there will be "self-regulation", which is the "Law of the Market ", referring to competition law. The act of the operators is only a reflection of this law, in action.

La Régulation est alors plus complexe car elle vise autre chose que cette rationalité mécanique, soit en raison d’une défaillance du marché (par exemple en cas de monopole naturel) soit parce qu’on veut obtenir plus que ce que le marché peut donner (par ex. l’accès de tous à des biens communs, comme la santé, même pour des demandeurs insolvables). Dans ce cas, sont élaborées des règlementations, interventions ex ante désignées en anglais par le terme regulation. La règlementation est adéquate si elle incite des agents économiques à adopter des comportements qui concrétisent le but recherché par l’auteur de la règlementation.

Regulation is then more complex because it aims at something other than this mechanical rationality, either because of a market failure (for example in the case of a natural monopoly) or because it wants to obtain more than the market can give ( Eg access to common goods by all, such as health, even for insolvent claimants). In this case, regulations are drawn up, ex ante intervention. The regulation is adequate if it encourages economic agents to adopt behaviors that concretize the aim sought by the author of the regulatory mechanisms.

This strategic use of law then requires the necessary detour through the economic analysis of law, that is to say the analysis of law in its economic effects.

This discipline created in the United States by Ronald Coase (Nobel Prize for Economics in 1991) can be merely descriptive and reveal what economic effects the law produced. This conception, which is that of Richard Posner, makes the economic analysis of law an instrument of expertise for the political decision-maker, who can take this into account if it is necessary to modify the rules. A more radical conception of the so-called "normative economic analysis of law" is to argue that the conclusions of the analysis would oblige the decision-maker to follow it.

The issue is decisive because in the first case the law and the jurists - in particular the Legislator and the judge - still have an autonomous existence, in the second case they no longer exist, they are no more than the binding and explicit form of the "Law of the market" whose nature is a-legal.

Even in its descriptive form, economic analysis of the law is generally rejected in France in that it disregards the role of the law in that it carries moral values. It is in reality to ignore its merely descriptive, instructive and useful function, and the fact that it opens instead the amplitude of the rational choice offered to political decision-makers. Moreover, regulation is not only a technical discipline, it is also a political and philosophical issue. Descriptive economic analysis is more appropriate to it than normative economic analysis of the law, which claims to vassalize or even destroy other disciplines, which are substantially unknown.

The European Banking Union is based on supervision as much as on regulation: it concerns the operators as much as the structures of the sector, because the operators "hold" the sector.

This is why the "regulator - supervisor" holds the operators by the supervision and is close to them.

He meets them officially and in "soft law" relations. This is all the more necessary since the distinction between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post must be nuanced, in that its application is too rigid, in that it involves a long time (first of all the rules, then to apply them, then to notice a gap between rules and behaviors, then to repair it) is not appropriate if the system aims at the prevention of systemic crises, whose source is inside the operators.

This is why the body in charge of solving the difficulties of the systemic banks for the salvation of the systeme meets the banking sector itself, to ensure that they are permanently "resolvable", so that the hypothesis of their resolution never arises. This is the challenge of this system: that it is always ready, for never be applying.

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In the European Banking Union, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) is in charge of "resolve" the difficulties of European systemic banks in difficulty. It is the public body of the second pillar of the Banking Union. The first pillar is the prevention of these difficulties and the third is the guarantee of deposits. The resolution is therefore more like an Ex Post mechanism.

But in this continuum through these three pillars between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post, the SRB does not wait passively - as would a traditional judge do - that the file of the troubled bank reaches it. Like a supervisor - which brings it closer to the first public in the system (Single Supervisory Board -SSB), which supervises all the banks, it is in direct contact with all the banks, and it approaches the hypothesis of a bank in trouble by a systemic perspective: it is therefore to the entire banking system that the SRB addresses itself.

As such, it organizes meetings, where he is located: in Brussels.

Thus, on June 18, 2019, all banks came to discuss with the Single Resolution Board to know what it wants from the banks and for the banks, in what is called a "dialogue meeting".

To resolve in Ex Post the difficulties of a bank, it has to present a quality (a little known concept in Bankruptcy Law): "resolvability". How build it? Who build it ? In its very design and in its application, bank by bank.

For the resolution body vis-à-vis all players in the banking and financial sector, it's clear: "Working together" is crucial in building resolvability ".

In the projection that is made, it is affirmed that there can be a successful resolution only if the operator in difficulty is not deprived of access to what makes to stay it alive, that is to say the banking and financial system itself, and more specifically the "Financial Market Infrastructures", for example payment services.

Does the Single Resolution Board expect spontaneous commitments from the FMIs for such a "right of access"? In this case, as the Single Resolution Board says, this right of access corresponds to "critical functions" for a bank, the resolution situation can not justify the closure of the service.

By nature, these crucial operators are entities that report to regulators who oversee them. Who enforces - and immediately - this right of access? When one can think that it is everyone, it risks being nobody .... That is why the resolution body, relaying in this a concern of the Financial Stability Board, underlines that it is necessary to articulate the supervisors, regulators and "resolvers" between them.

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To read this program, since it is a proposed program of work for the banking sector, four observations can be made:

1. We are moving more and more towards a general "intermaillage" (which will perhaps replace the absence of a global State, but it is an similar nature because it is always to public authorities that it refers and not to self-regulation);

2. But as there is no political authority to keep these guardians, the entities that articulate all these various public structures, with different functions, located in different countries, acting according to different temporalities, these are the companies themselves that internalize the concern that animates those who built the system: here the prevention of systemic risk. This is the definition of Compliance, which brings back to companies, here more clearly those those which manage the Market Infrastructures, the obligations of Compliance (here the management of systemic risk through the obligation of giving access).

3. Even without a  single systemic guard, there is always a recourse. That will be the judge. There are already many, there will probably be more in a system of this type, more and more complex, the articulation of disputes is sometimes called "dialogue". And it is undoubtedly "decisions of principle" that will set the principles common to all of these particular organisms.

4. We then see the emergence of Ex Ante mechanisms for the solidity of the systems, and the solidity of the players in the systems, and then the Ex Post resolution of the difficulties of the actors according to access to the solidity of the infrastructures of these systems, which ultimately depend on judges (throughout the West) facing areas where all of this depends much less on the judge: the rest of the world.

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One can only be amazed or even upset.

First, the agreement is not yet concluded. It would be in a month or two. How is it that we already know? Secondly, contracts, because the transaction is a contract listed by the Civil Code, are not intended to be public. How is it that we already know everything? The person who gave the information "was keen to remain anonymous." It would have suspected ......

Third, it is true that the regulation of rating agencies is a big issue. Special texts have been taken but academics think the right tools stay missing and that is probably the liability, general legal instrument, which is the most appropriate.

But the responsibility of commitment requires a trial, evidence, respect for the rights of defense, due processs,  legality of offenses and penalties.. Here, $ 1 billion is paid by the company only to avoid that opens a lawsuit against it. The allegation is the rating agency would have underestimated the subprime risk.

But on one hand everyone says that the rating agency has actually done the facts allegued since payroll so that the file doesn't open. On the other hand, and from the perspective of regulating the information that would be out of the trial, a trial being a form of crisis, will not come out.

So this sort of industry fof "Deals of Justice", apart from the fact that some describe the phenomenon as a "racket", isn't a "decriminalization" of regulation for a "civilized regulation" through the transaction contract. On the contrary, this movement that is spreading constitutes an increased repression whic diminishes rights of defense for the operator and information for the sector.

One can only be amazed or even upset.