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June 23, 2021
JoRC
►This scientific manifestation is placed under the scientific responsibility of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche and Jean-Christophe Roda. It is organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and the Centre de Droit de l'Entreprise of Lyon 3 University.
📅 It is one of the colloquia of the cycle of colloquia organized in 2021 around the general topic of Jurisdictionalisation of Compliance.

►The interventions will be then transformed into a chapter in the books:
📕 La Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance , to be published in the Regulation & Compliance series, jointly published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoR)C and Dalloz
📘Compliance Jurisdictionalisation, to be published in the Compliance & Regulation Series , co published by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and Bruylant.
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This colloquium will take place in Lyon 3 on 23rd of June 2021 with a limited audience. It will also be broadcasted in live on Zoom.
To register: https://zoom.us/webinar/register/8516215084724/WN_GoQ25I7pRoKhHuGomVMxYw
► Presentation of the topic: Initially, it was through Criminal Law, inseparable from the trial, which forced companies to take charge of monitoring within themselves behavior likely to be deviant, the requirement of Ex Ante to be designed by the 'Ex Post of the jurisdictional. From this reversal of things, there has always remained this presence of the judge and the prosecution bodies in a Compliance Law which is nevertheless defined by its concern for the future and the Ex Ante tools within the company.
In doing so, the company becoming on the one hand a judge of itself, on the other hand a prosecutor of itself, it splits up, taking in reverse the most established procedural principles. Moreover, because of the monumental goals which constitute Compliance Law, companies become attorneys and judges of the others, or for the others, the cutting machines and the "supreme courts" being by name instituted to regulate in Ex Ante all different before that it does not become litigation. The Ex Ante of Compliance would then make the Ex Post disappear.
► Method:
The colloquium which had to take place initially on 8th of April has been postponed to 23rd of June to enable speakers to meet and talk in face to face, with a limited audience.
These exchanges will be captured so that third parties can benefit from them, even before the publication of the works, La Juridictionnalisation de la Compliance and Compliance Juridictionalization, within which this work constitutes the basis for the development of a specific chapter.
Five practical cases will first be examined in five specific sectors, where this institution of the firm as prosecutor and judge of itself is particularly observable before both specific and more cross-sectoral themes are examined and discussed.
►speakers :
🎤 Luc-Marie Augagneur, Attorney before Lyon Court of Appeal, CVS Law Firm
🎤Ale xis Bavitot, Senior lecturer at Lyon 3 University
🎤 Alain Bruneau, Chief compliance officer at Natixis
🎤 Jean-Marc Coulon, Head of Legal Infrastructure at Bouygues Construction
🎤 Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, Director of the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC)
🎤 Cécile Granier, Senior lecturer at Lyon 3 University
🎤 Xavier Hubert, Director of Compliance at Engie
🎤 Jérémie Jourdan-Marques, Professor at Lyon 2 University
🎤 Jérémy Heymann, Professor at Lyon 3 University
🎤 Daphnée Latour, Attorney, DL Avocats, Paris
🎤 Christophe Lapp, Founding partner of Altana law firm
🎤 Samir Merabet, Senior lecturer at Lyon 3 University
🎤 Béatrice Oeuvrard, Public Policy Manager at Facebook France
🎤 Jean du Parc, Bâtonnier
🎤 Jean-Christophe Roda, Professor at Lyon 3 University and director of the Centre de droit de l'entreprise (Center of Company Law)
🎤 Jean-Baptiste Siproudhis, Director Ethics, Integrity and CSR at Thalès
Sept. 2, 2015
Sectorial Analysis
Passenger transport markets in Europe have been, and continue to be, liberalised across jurisdictions and sectors.
Since July 2015, passenger coach operators in France have been allowed to operate without regulation on longer routes (over 100km). For shorter routes, ARAFER, the French regulator for rail and roads, will test whether the coach service is likely to threaten the viability of the public rail service offered by SNCF on the same route. What changes could this reform bring, and how might the economic test be applied?
Europe
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/html/index.en.html
Switchboard: +49 69 1344 0
Public enquiries: +49 69 1344 1300 / info@ecb.europa.eu
ECB Contacts, here.
Updated: July 21, 2010 (Initial publication: April 26, 2010)
Books
Le livre Concurrence, santé publique, innovation et médicament publié aux éditions L.G.D.J propose une analyse du secteur, dans son oscillation entre la concurrence et la régulation. L’ouvrage est construit sur trois parties. La première est consacrée au Médicament dans la régulation des dépenses de santé, posant ainsi les questions sanitaires dans leurs aspects les plus régaliens, la deuxième envisage la santé dans sa fonction sociale à travers ’Innovation et incitation à la recherche, tandis que la dernière expose Les difficultés des prises en compte par le droit de la concurrence des spécificités du secteur pharmaceutique. Au travers de ces trois parties, c’est une présentation exhaustive des enjeux du droit, de l’économie et de la politique de la santé qui est proposée, posant nettement que cette mixité la fait relever de la régulation davantage que de la concurrence.
Click here to read the article.
GERMAN
Buchrezension : "Concurrence, santé publique, innovation et médicament" (Wettbewerb, öffentliche Gesundheit, Innovation und Medikamente)
Das Buch "Concurrence, santé publique, innovation et médicament"(Wettbewerb, öffentliche Gesundheit, Innovation und Medikamente), herausgeben von L.G.D.J., ein französischer Verlag, analysiert wie der pharmazeutische Sektor zwischen Wettbewerb und Regulierung schwankt. Das Buch bezieht sich auf drei Teilen. Der erste Teil handelt um die Rolle, die das Medikament im Gesundheitsausgaben spielt. Dadurch können die Gesundheitsfragen in rechtlichem Hinsicht erforscht werden. Im zweiten Teil wird die soziale Funktion der Gesundheitsbranche untersucht, nämlich durch Innovation und Forschungsanreize. Im letzten Teil werden die Schwäche des Wettbewerbsrechts im Bezug zur Berücksichtigung der Besonderheit der pharmazeutischen Branche analysiert. Dadurch können die rechtlichen-, wirtschaftlichen- sowie politischen Einsätze dieses Sektors ausführlich dargestellt werden. Was daraus herauskommt ist, dass die komplexe Vielfalt der Branche sie vielmehr in die Zuständigkeit der Regulatierung als der Wettbewerb fallen lässt.
SPANISH
“Concurrence, santé pubilque, innovation et médicament” (La competencia, la salud pública, la innovación y la medicina), bajo la dirección científica de Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, colección de “Droit et Economie,” L.G.D.J extenso éditions, Paris, enero 2010, 525 páginas.
El libro “Concurrence, santé pubilque, innovation et médicament” (La competencia, la salud pública, la innovación y la medicina), publicado por la editorial francesa L.G.D.J, provee un análisis de las oscilaciones entre la competencia y la regulación del sector farmacéutico. La primera parte del estudio se dedica a “Médicament dans la regulation des dépenses de santé” (El papel de la medicina en la regulación de gastos en salud), lo cual expone cuestiones relacionados a la salud en el aspecto de control gubernamental. La segunda parte concibe la salud a través de su función social, con “Innovation et incitation à la recherche” (La innovación y la incitación para la realización de la investigación). La última parte expilca “Les difficultés des prises en compte par le droit de la concurrence des spécificités du secteur pharmaceutique” (La difícil aprensión del derecho de la competencia de la especificidades del sector farmacéutico). Las tres partes de este estudio ofrecen una detallada presentación sobre los complicaciones involucradas en el derecho de la salud, la economía, la política y también sirve para demostrar que la naturaleza híbrida de este sector lo rinde una cuestión de regulación más que una del derecho de la competencia.
Updated: July 21, 2010 (Initial publication: May 24, 2010)
Grey Litterature
Click here to access the full Article
The « Centre d’analyse stratégique », the strategic analysis think-tank that is part of the French Prime Minister’s cabinet, published the report of the working group presided by Christian Stoffaës on the theme of « La securité gazière en Europe : de la dépendance à l’indépendance » (The Security of Natural Gas Supply in Europe : from dependence to independence). This report highlights the fact that Europe is in danger, in the long run, of not having access to enough gas and of becoming overly-dependent on its foreign suppliers. Europe must therefore establish policies to reduce and modify its natural gas consumption, and establish energy partnerships with Russia, North Africa, and finally, the Middle East. Europe must realise that competition is nothing more than a means to an end and must implement a true Regulation of the energy sector, in order to create secure conditions that avoid energy crises. Risk management can be achieved by creating emergency reserves; through the regulation of transport network infrastructures; and a renewed ‘energy solidarity’ using the interconnections at member states’ borders. Thereby, Europe will evolve from dependency to independency, which will ensure its natural gas security despite its insufficient supply.
FRENCH
Le Centre d’Analyse stratégique auprès du Premier Ministre publie en Mars 2010 le rapport de Christian Stoffaës sur « La sécurité gazière en Europe, de la dépendance à l’interdépendance ». Il prône une régulation européenne ayant pour but la sécurité énergétique, notamment par des partenariats entre l’Europe et ses fournisseurs (Russie et Afrique du Nord).
June 18, 2020
JoRC
June 23, 2019
Breaking news
The European Banking Union is based on supervision as much as on regulation: it concerns the operators as much as the structures of the sector, because the operators "hold" the sector.
This is why the "regulator - supervisor" holds the operators by the supervision and is close to them.
He meets them officially and in "soft law" relations. This is all the more necessary since the distinction between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post must be nuanced, in that its application is too rigid, in that it involves a long time (first of all the rules, then to apply them, then to notice a gap between rules and behaviors, then to repair it) is not appropriate if the system aims at the prevention of systemic crises, whose source is inside the operators.
This is why the body in charge of solving the difficulties of the systemic banks for the salvation of the systeme meets the banking sector itself, to ensure that they are permanently "resolvable", so that the hypothesis of their resolution never arises. This is the challenge of this system: that it is always ready, for never be applying.
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In the European Banking Union, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) is in charge of "resolve" the difficulties of European systemic banks in difficulty. It is the public body of the second pillar of the Banking Union. The first pillar is the prevention of these difficulties and the third is the guarantee of deposits. The resolution is therefore more like an Ex Post mechanism.
But in this continuum through these three pillars between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post, the SRB does not wait passively - as would a traditional judge do - that the file of the troubled bank reaches it. Like a supervisor - which brings it closer to the first public in the system (Single Supervisory Board -SSB), which supervises all the banks, it is in direct contact with all the banks, and it approaches the hypothesis of a bank in trouble by a systemic perspective: it is therefore to the entire banking system that the SRB addresses itself.
As such, it organizes meetings, where he is located: in Brussels.
To resolve in Ex Post the difficulties of a bank, it has to present a quality (a little known concept in Bankruptcy Law): "resolvability". How build it? Who build it ? In its very design and in its application, bank by bank.
For the resolution body vis-à-vis all players in the banking and financial sector, it's clear: "Working together" is crucial in building resolvability ".
In the projection that is made, it is affirmed that there can be a successful resolution only if the operator in difficulty is not deprived of access to what makes to stay it alive, that is to say the banking and financial system itself, and more specifically the "Financial Market Infrastructures", for example payment services.
Does the Single Resolution Board expect spontaneous commitments from the FMIs for such a "right of access"? In this case, as the Single Resolution Board says, this right of access corresponds to "critical functions" for a bank, the resolution situation can not justify the closure of the service.
By nature, these crucial operators are entities that report to regulators who oversee them. Who enforces - and immediately - this right of access? When one can think that it is everyone, it risks being nobody .... That is why the resolution body, relaying in this a concern of the Financial Stability Board, underlines that it is necessary to articulate the supervisors, regulators and "resolvers" between them.
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To read this program, since it is a proposed program of work for the banking sector, four observations can be made:
1. We are moving more and more towards a general "intermaillage" (which will perhaps replace the absence of a global State, but it is an similar nature because it is always to public authorities that it refers and not to self-regulation);
2. But as there is no political authority to keep these guardians, the entities that articulate all these various public structures, with different functions, located in different countries, acting according to different temporalities, these are the companies themselves that internalize the concern that animates those who built the system: here the prevention of systemic risk. This is the definition of Compliance, which brings back to companies, here more clearly those those which manage the Market Infrastructures, the obligations of Compliance (here the management of systemic risk through the obligation of giving access).
3. Even without a single systemic guard, there is always a recourse. That will be the judge. There are already many, there will probably be more in a system of this type, more and more complex, the articulation of disputes is sometimes called "dialogue". And it is undoubtedly "decisions of principle" that will set the principles common to all of these particular organisms.
4. We then see the emergence of Ex Ante mechanisms for the solidity of the systems, and the solidity of the players in the systems, and then the Ex Post resolution of the difficulties of the actors according to access to the solidity of the infrastructures of these systems, which ultimately depend on judges (throughout the West) facing areas where all of this depends much less on the judge: the rest of the world.
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Updated: Nov. 25, 2010 (Initial publication: Oct. 13, 2010)
I. Isolated Articles
ENGLISH
The paper suggests that the neo-realistic theory of Regulation encompasses both regulatory legal rules as well as an authoritarian supervisory monitoring of their application by market participants. Further, supervision should not merely encompass microeconomic supervision but rather integrate that financial market’s interconnectedness (finance, banking and insurance) entails a reform of its current architecture, in order to preserve from market failures the system as a whole. Regulation is transversal and should not be understood as sector-specific but rather as a governance mechanism for whole systems.
FRENCH
Quand régulation rime avec supervision: l'exemple de la nouvelle architecture de supervision européenne
L'article suggère que la théorie néo-réaliste de la régulation inclut à la fois les règles légales régulatoires ainsi que la supervision autoritaire de leur application par les acteurs du marché. De plus, la supervision ne doit pas comprendre uniquement la supervision microéconomique, mais doit plutôt intégrer que l'interconnectivité propre aux marchés financiers (finance, banque et assurance) suppose une réforme de son architecture actuelle afin de prémunir le système dans son ensemble des défaillances de marché. La régulation est transversale et ne devrait pas être comprise comme spécifique à un secteur, mais comme un mécanisme de gouvernance pour le système dans son ensemble.
GERMAN
Wenn Regulierung mit Überwachung reimt: das Beispiel der neuen europäischen Überwachungsarchitecktur.
Dieser Artikel deutet an, dass die neo-realistische Theorie der Regulierung beide die juristischen Regeln der Regulierung sowie die autoritärische Überwachung ihrer Anwendung integriert. Ausserdem soll unter dem Begriff Überwachung nicht nur die mikroökonomische Überwachung verstanden werden, aber auch die Verbindungen zwischen Finanzmärkte (Finanz, Bank, Versicherung), was eigentlich die Reform der heutigen Architektur bedeuten soll, um dem System von Märtkeversagen zu schützen. Die Regulierung ist transversal, und soll nicht nur mit Hinweis auf dem Sektor verstanden werden, sondern als ein Mechanismus für die Führung des Systems im breiten Sinne.
SPANISH
Cuando la Regulación rima con la supervisión: el ejemplo de la arquitectura de la nueva estructura de supervisión.
Este informe sugiera que la teoría neo-realística de la Regulación abarca tanto las reglas legales regulatorias como la supervisión autoritaria monitoreada de su aplicación por los participantes en el marcado. Además, la supervisión no debería solamente abarcar la supervisión microeconómica, sino que también debería integrar la naturaleza interconectada del mercado (financiera, bancaria y de seguros) lo cual requeriría de reformas de su arquitectura actual para poder preservarse de los fallos de mercado del sistema en general. La regulación es transversal y no debería conocerse como sector-específico sino como un mecanismo de gobierno para sistemas enteros.
ITALIAN
Articolo: Quando regolazione fa rima con supervisione: l’esempio della nuova organizzazione europea di supervisione.
L’articolo suggerisce che la teoria neorealista della regolazione racchiude sia norme legali di regolazione che una supervisione della loro applicazione da parte degli operatori del mercato. Inoltre, la supervisione non dovrebbe semplicemente includere una supervisione microeconomica quanto piuttosto introdurre un’interconnessione (finanza, banca e assicurazioni) del mercato finanziario, cosa che implica una riforma dell’organizzazione attuale, al fine di proteggere il sistema nel suo complesso da un mancato funzionamento del mercato. La regolazione é trasversale e non dovrebbe essere intesa come un meccanismo di settore ma piuttosto come un meccanismo globale di governance.
Updated: July 7, 2010 (Initial publication: July 5, 2010)
I. Isolated Articles
CHINESE
网络赌博监管的分析比较
网络赌博成为一种全球现象。无论纸牌、博彩还是体育赌博和赛马,越来越多的顾客通过网络汇集到组织概率类在线游戏的网站之中。但通常这些网站都欠缺政府的监督和管制。类比赌场或其他实体赌博机构所设置的较高赌注回报率,此类网站则通过其便捷性和私密性来招揽顾客。然而,实体赌博对比其他领域的赌博是最具规范性的:不同的文化和不同的公共政策在解释区别监管这一领域上发挥了重要的作用。
Updated: Sept. 15, 2010 (Initial publication: Sept. 9, 2010)
I. Isolated Articles
The Directive innovates and improves the UCITS’ single market in three ways: first by recasting the 1985 Directive on UCITS in order to implement a simpler and harmonized regulatory framework (therefore improving UCITS’ marketing and investors’ protection) ; second, by providing for more cooperation between national and supranational regulators in order to secure and supervise UCITS’ single market ; third, by integrating the Directive into the Lamfalussy process as to ensure that its provisions be well-conceived, concurrently implemented by Member States and efficiently controlled by regulators.
FRENCH
La directive innove et améliore le marché interne des OPCV de trois façons : tout d’abord en réformant la Directive de 1985 sur les OPCVM de manière à instaurer un système de régulation plus simple et harmonisé (améliorant ainsi l’activité des OPCVM et la protection des investisseurs) ; en second lieu, elle met en place un meilleure coopération entre régulateurs nationaux et supranationaux de façon à sécuriser et mieux superviser le marché des OPCVM ; enfin, elle intègre la Directive dans le processus Lamfalussy afin de s’assurer de la qualité de ses dispositions, de sa transposition simultanée par les Etats Membres et de son contrôle effectif par les régulateurs européens.
GERMAN
Dank der OGAW Richtlinie von July 2009 richtet sich der Europäische Aktionsplan für Finanzdienstleistungen schritterweise nach mehr Liberalisierung sowie Regulierung der Binnenmarkt.
Die OGAW Richtline führt drei Reformen ein: Erstens wird die vorherige Richtlinie von 1985 verbessert, damit die Regulierung von OGAW leichter und harmonischer wird (und infolgedessen, damit der OGAW Betrieb und der Investorensschutz besser funktionnieren). Zweitens wird die Zusammenarbeit zwischen nationale- und europäische Regulierungsbehörde gefördert, um den OGAW-Markt sicherer zu machen. Und letztens wird die Richtlinie im Lamfalussy- Verfahren integriert. So werden die Qualität der Anordnungen der Richtlinie, ihre gleichzeitige Umsetzung der Richtlinie von Mitgliedstaaten und ihre tatsächtliche Überwachung auf der EU-Ebene gewährleistet.
SPANISH
Una Directiva visionaria sobre los OICVM: un nuevo paso hacia un mercado interno liberal, pero regulado en el sector de servicios financieros
La Directiva innova y mejora el mercado interno de los OICVM de tres formas: la primera, al relanzar la Directiva de OICVM de 1985 para poder implementar un marco regulatorio mas simple y harmonizado (lo cual mejora las acciones de los OICVM y la protección de los inversores); la segunda, al proveer más cooperación entre los reguladores nacionales y supranacionales para asegurar y supervisar el mercado de los OICVM; y la tercera, al integrar la Directiva en el proceso Lamfalussy para asegurar la calidad de sus disposiciones, su transposición simultanea para los Estados Miembros y su control eficaz por los reguladores europeos.
CHINESE
指令通过三种方式对OPCVM (证券共同投资机构)的内部市场进行改革和完善。首先,通过修改1985年欧洲基金指令进而创设一套给为简便和统一的监管体系(由此改进OPCVM的活动以及完善对投资者的保护);其次,指令较好的协调了国家调控与超国家调控之间的协作配合关系,以起到安定与完善监督证券共同投资机构市场的作用。最后,将欧洲基金指令纳入Lamfalussy程序(欧盟金融监管机构趋同的制度框架)之中,一方面便于成员国确保其条款质量和其同步实施,另一方面也便于欧洲相关监管机构实施有效的监督。