Nicolas Curien is a graduate of the Université Paris IV-Pierre et Marie Curie and a former student of the Ecole Polytechnique and the Ecole nationale supérieure des télécommunications (ENST) (...)
As soon as Regulation assumes independence of the operator who manages the essential infrastructure, ex ante conditions of such independence must be met.
Europe doesn't require legal autonomy of the essential infrastructure manager, probably because such autonomy, it would be both too ask the Policy, which may want more integrated organizations as soon as public transportation is a mix of public policies and that to public funds are used. But it would also be too little to ask the Policy because no matter the legal autonomy, the key is the real independence of the manager, that is under the control of the Regulator.
The Loi portant réforme ferroviaire (Railway Reform Act) of August 4, 2014 has made the integration of the company that manages the rail network, which the new name is SNCF Réseau (SNCF Network) in a public group, which also includes the SNCF, public transportation operator, in competition with new entrants in a newly opened sector to competition.
The Competition Authority in its opinion of 4 October 2013 had expressed reluctance towards the bill, to the influence that such corporate organization offers to the public operator, to the detriment of its competitors and the opening of the railway sector to competition.
The Competition Authority issues its opinion as a real essay on what should be the Regulation of the railway sector through the "governance" of the network manager. Indeed, the first part of the opinion relates to "the independent management of railway infrastructure" while the second focuses on the integration of railway network in the public group built par the law. The third part of this Opinion draws conclusions to measure whether we can consider that the Autorité de Régulation des Activités Ferroviaires (French Regulatory Authority of Railways Activities) shall have the capacity to ensure this independence by governance or not.
This review, in its construction itself, demonstrates the dialectic between Regulation and Governance (I), which is an observation and stresses the role of the regulator in the effectiveness of governance (II), which is more a question .
It translates into a set of obligations that companies must perform to ensure that harmful behavior does not occur, such as bribery, money laundering, pollution, etc.
This results in "structural" obligations, such as the establishment of a risk map, a third-party vigilance system, internal controls, the adoption of codes.
The practical question that arises is whether to punish a company, it is necessary but it is sufficient that the company has not adopted these structural measures, or if it is also necessary that within it or through the persons whom it must be accountable (through the corporate officers and the employees, but also the suppliers, the sub-contractors, the financed operators, etc.) there were behaviors that Compliance Law prohibits, for example corruption, money laundering, pollution, safety-related accident, etc.
The question is probative. Its practical stake is considerable.
Because to obtain the conviction the prosecuting authority will have to demonstrate not only a failure in the structural device but also a behavioral failure.
Si l'on considère que le Droit de la Compliance est à la fois sur l'Ex Ante et sur l'Ex Post, alors l'autorité de poursuite qui requiert une sanction doit démontrer qu'il y a un comportement reprochable (Ex Post) et qu'à cela correspond une défaillance structurelle (par exemple le compte bancaire anormal n'a pas été signalé) ; si l'on considère que le Droit de la Compliance est purement en Ex Ante, alors même s'il n'y a pas de comportement reprochable en Ex Post, la seule défaillance structurelle suffit pour que l'entreprise qui doit l'organiser en son sein soit sanctionné.
If we consider that Compliance Law is both on the Ex Ante and the Ex Post, then the prosecuting authority that requires a sanction must show that there is a reprehensible behavior (Ex Post ) and that this corresponds to a structural failure (for example the abnormal bank account has not been reported); if we consider that Compliance Law is purely Ex Ante, then even if there is no reprehensible behavior in Ex Post, the only structural failure is enough for the company to be sanctioned, even if it does its best efforts, even if no prohibited behavior will have accured in Ex Post.
The second system, which is much more repressive and places a considerable burden on companies, even if there is no proven illicit behavior, is that of French Law, probably because of a tendency towards Ex Ante organization. ..
Mais il faut garder mesure. Et cette mesure est probatoire.
But we must keep measure. And this measure is probative.
This is what the Commission des Sanctions of the Agence Française Anticorruption -AFA (French Anti-Corruption Agency's Sanctions Committee) has just said, in its decision of 4 July 2019, SAS S. et Madame C.,(written in French) contradicting the position of its director, who acted as the prosecuting authority. This is yet another general proof of the autonomy of the Sanctions Committee vis-à-vis to the Administrative Authority of which it is a part, and in relation to its director, who nevertheless governs it. But, jurisdictional model obliges, he has here the status of prosecuting authority, is subject to the regime of this one and not to the regime of head of the entity. Demonstration of the "functional autonomy" of the sanctioning bodies within the administrative regulatory and compliance authorities.
Indeed, this important decision expresses with precision and reason the distribution of the "burden of the allegation" and the "burden of proof" on the prosecuting body and on the company pursued, as well as the role of presumption that the recommendations issued by the French Anti-corruption Authority can play.
Airports are critical infrastructure. They often receive support from the State and the European Commission has adopted specific guidelines to soften the principle of prohibition of State aid in this area. Yet it is not necessary that the regulation be the mask of a violation of competitive equality. This is why the Commission has extended and prolonged on June 27, 2012, the investigation initiated in 2007 proposed to the airport of Alghero, Italy. Indeed, the investigation revealed including infrastructure subsidies, which the Commission doubt that they are comply with EU law.
Edited by Roger J. Van den Bergh, Professor of Law and Economics, Alessio M. Pacces, Professor of Law and Finance,University Rotterdam, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI).
Snd ed., Elgar Publisher, 2012, 800 p.
Richard A. Posnor presents this collective book : "This book of essays on the economics of regulation is comprehensive and authoritative, and is particularly noteworthy for its emphasis on European as well as American regulatory methods. The international perspective is important because of the long history of regulatory failures on both continents, the increasing integration of the economies of both continents, and the resulting need of both regulatory cultures to learn from each other.".
Michel Riguidel is Professor Emeritus at the Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications, which has been renamed Telecom ParisTech, where he teaches digital security and new-generation networks. (...)
Athene Chanter is an associate at Allen & Overy Paris. She holds an LLB in Law and a degree in German and Italian. She trained as a solicitor in London before joining the Paris EU & Competition team in 2010. (...)
A "Chambre régionale de discipline des commissaires aux comptes" (Auditors’ regional chamber of discipline) had imposed a penalty on one of these professionals, who formed a retrial before this chamber. His action is dismissed for lack of text, that confirms the "Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux Comptes (French High Council of the Commissioner of Account). The "Conseil d’Etat" (French Council of State) invalidates the decision, demanding that retrial is open, even without special text, if the applicant claims that the decision was not adopted on the relevant documents.
FRENCH
Une chambre régionale de discipline des commissaires aux comptes avait infligé une sanction à un de ces professionnels, qui forme un recours en révision devant cette chambre. Le recours est rejeté faute de texte, ce que confirme le Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux Compte. Le Conseil d’Etat invalide la décision, en posant qu’un recours en révision est ouvert, même sans texte spécial, si le requérant prétend que la décision n’a pas été adoptée sur des pièces pertinentes.
Laurent Benzoni is a Doctor of Economics. He has been a Professor of Economics at the Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2) since 1996. At Paris 2, he is a member of the Equipe de Recherche sur les Marché, l'Emploi et la Simulation (ERMES). (...)
Comparison of various models of risk regulation in order to understand how those systems shape the relationship between law and science and how they attempt to overcome the public’s distrust of science-based decision making in the EU.
