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Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Judge between Platform and Regulator: current example of Uber case in U.K., Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation, 29th of September 2020

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Summary of the news:

On 22nd of September 2017, Transport of London (TFL), London Transport Regulator, refused to renew the licence, granted on 31st of May 2012 for 5 years, authorizing Uber to transport people because of criminal offenses committed by Uber's drivers. On 26th of June 2018, The Westminster Court prolonged Uber's licence for 15 months under the condition that the platform prevent the reproachable behaviors of its drivers. After these 15 months, the TFL refused once again to prolonge Uber's licence because of the persistence of aggressions against passengers. Uber, once again, contest this decision before the Westminster Court. 

In a decision of 28th of September 2020, the Court observes that during the 15 months, the platform implemented many measures to prevent aggressions, that the level of maturity of these measures has improved over time and that the number of offenses was reduced over the period (passing from 55 in 2018 to 4 in 2020). The Court estimated the the implementation of this actions is sufficient to grant a new licence to Uber. 

We can learn three lessons from this decision: 

1. The Compliance obligation is not a result obligation but a mean obligation, which means that it is not reasonable to expect from a crucial operator (Uber, for instance) that it prevent every cases of agression but that it is salient to judge it on the effort it deploys to try to be closer to this ideal situation. Moreover, the crucial operator must be proactive, that is going away from the figure of passive subject of Law who apply measures enacted by the regulator in terms of fighting against aggressions to be an actor of the research of the best way to fight abusive behaviors, internalizing this "monumental goal. 
2. The judge appreciates the violation committed by those whose the firm is responsible "in context", that is evaluates the concrete situation in a reasonable way. 
3. It is the judge who decides in last resort and like the crucial operator, it must be reasonable. 

 

Read to go further:

• Frison-Roche, M.-A., Firm, Regulator and Judge: thinking Compliance through these three characters, 2018
• The report of the Assemblée nationale (French Parliament chamber) on the question 

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Can Coordination between local Regulators replace a unique centralized Regulator? Example of the European organisation of the Open Internet Principle, Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation, 18th of August 2020

Read, by freely subscribing, the other news of the Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation

To go further, read Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's article: The hypothesis of interregulation 

 

Summary of the news

The principle of "open internet" enshrined in the European regulation of 30th of April 2016 guaranteeing a non discriminatory access to Internet contents and services. However, there is no European regulator to implement such a principle. Is it possible to guarantee the effectivity of this principle without a central regulator in charge of this principle? 

On 11st of June 2020, the BEREC (Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications) adopted guidelines concerning the application of the open internet principle. The BEREC is not a European regulator but a network of national regulators aiming to coordinate their actions. This body is only a consultative body but its recommendations are taken into account by national authorities which have deep legal power, as Osborne-Clarke said about the technical implementation of the European principle of open internet at the national level.  

It is thus non necessary to have a central regulator to ensure the effectivity of a principle since the moment when there is a local regulators network able to coordinate their actions through soft law.   

Etienne Wasmer is a Professor at Sciences Po Paris, where he directs doctoral studies in economics and co-directs a Laboratoire d’Excellence (Labex) on the Interdisciplinary Evaluation of Public Policy. (...)

Nicolas Curien is a graduate of the Université Paris IV-Pierre et Marie Curie and a former student of the Ecole Polytechnique and the Ecole nationale supérieure des télécommunications (ENST) (...)

The Government of Haiti will refer to Parliament so that a regulation Act of the insurance industry could be adopted. So far, it was quite undeveloped. Such a law is expected to facilitate its development without risk. These prospects have been raised in a symposium held in Haiti on May 11, 2012.

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., From Competition Law to Compliance Law: example of French Competition Authority decision on central purchasing body in Mass Distribution, Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation, 27th of October 2020

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Summary of the news: Through its decision of 22nd of October 2020, the Autorité de la concurrence (French Competition Authority) accepted the commitments proposed by retail sector's firms Casino, Auchan, Metro and Schiever so that their agreement by which a common body centralizes purchases from numerous retailers, allowing each to offer these products under private label, is admissible with regard to competitive requirements. 

In this particular case, the Authority had self-sized in July 2018, estimating that such a purchase center could harm competition, opening immediately a large consultation on the terms of the contract. In October 2018, the law Egalim permitted to the Authority to take temporary measures to suspend such a contract, what the Authority did from September. 

The convention parties' firms committed on the one hand to update their contract limiting the power on suppliers, especially small and very small suppliers, excluding totally of the field of the contract some kind of products, especially food products and reducing the share of bought products volume dedicated to their transformation in distributor brand. 

The Autorité de la concurrence accepts this proposal of commitments, congratulates itself of the protection of small suppliers operating like that and observe the similarity with the contract consisting in a purchase center between Carrefour and Tesco, which will be examined soon. 

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We can draw three lessons of this innovating decision, which could be a model for after: 

1. The technique of Compliance Law permits to the Autorité de la concurrence to find a reasonable solution for the future. 

• Indeed, rather than punishing much later by a simple fine or to annihilate the performing mechanism of the purchase center, the Authority obtains contract modifications. 
• The contract is structured and the obtained modifications are also structural. 
• The commitments are an Ex Ante technique, imposed to operators, for the future, in an equilibrium between competition, operators and consumers protection and the efficacy of the coordination between powerful operators. 
• The nomination of a monitor permits to build the future of the sector, thanks to the Ex Ante nature of Compliance Law. 

2. The retail sector finally regulated by Compliance technics.

• "Distribution law" always struggle to find its place, between Competition law and Contract Law, especially because we cannot consider it as a common "sector". 
• The Conseil constitutionnel (French constitutional court) refused a structural injunction power to the authority because it was contrary to business freedom and without any doubt ethics of business is not sufficient to the equilibrium of the sector.
• Through commitments given against a stop of pursuits relying on structuring contracts, it is by Compliance law that a Regulation law free of the condition of existence of a sector could leave.

3. The political nature of Compliance law in the retail sector

• As for digital space, which is not a sector, Compliance law can directly impose to actors imperatives that are strangers to them. 
• In the digital space, the care for fighting against Hate and for protecting private life; here the care for small and very small suppliers. 

 

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See in counterpoints the pursuit of a contentious procedure against Sony, whose the proposals of commitments, made after a public consultation, were not found satisfying.

To go further, on the question of Compliance law permitting through indirect way the rewriting by the Conseil of a structuring contract (linking a platform created by the State to centralize health data with an American firm subsidy to manage them).

The price in Law. From Contrat Law to Regulatory Law.

CAFAGGI, Fabrizio (ed.),Professor of Comparative Law, European University Institute, Italy. Elgar Publisher, 2012, 400 p. Globalization pushes the boundaries of markets. Alongside the greater “goods” of transnational economic activity come the “bads” of unregulated conduct. This important book looks to the new frontiers of legal intervention to make sure that global markets do not run riot over important public values. The signal contribution is not the search for ever higher levels of transnational authority – the superstates of a brave new world – but empowering numerous private actors to enforce legal norms in our fast-changing economic environment.