The Report on The Patent Markets in Knowledge Economy focuses on the development of new forms of “commoditisation” patents (as sold at auction, by brokers’ interventions, electronic platforms...) that lead to a more structured and open market. The difficulties linked to the emergence of those new tools, first and foremost, the valuation of the patents, are real and must not be ignored. However, for the authors of the Report, the great state of uncertainty where we currently find ourselves implies the need for the authorities to be very cautious, despite that fact the opportunities these different Patent Markets present must at the same time lead to a positive and proactive approach. France and Europe (the European level is imperative) must be present in this arena. For these actors, new experiments must undoubtedly be encouraged and the creation of new forms of valorisation must be developed. Simultaneously, the Patent System would have to be reconsidered to ensure the delivery of high quality patents. In sum, the authors of the Report plead for “sustained attention” to be accorded to these questions on behalf of the public authorities.
FRENCH
Rapport bibliographique (Littérature Grise): Les marchés des brevets dans l'économie de la connaissance (The Patent Markets in Knowledge Economy)
Le rapport sur Les marchés des brevets dans l'économie de la connaissance se concentre sur le développement de nouvelles formes de "marchandisation" des brevets (lorsque vendus aux enchères, par l'intervention de courtiers, sur des plateformes électroniques...) qui aboutissent à un marché plus structuré et plus ouvert. Les difficultés liées à l'émergence de ces nouveaux outils, avant tout l'évaluation des brevets, sont réelles et ne doivent pas être ignorées. Cependant, pour les auteurs du rapport, l'état de grande incertitude dans lequel nous sommes aujourd'hui implique des autorités qu'elles soient très précautionneuses, malgré le fait que les possibilités que ces marchés des brevets offrent doivent faire l'objet d'une approche à la fois positive et incitative. La France et l'Europe (le niveau Européen est inévitable) doivent être présentes dans domaine. Pour ces acteurs, de nouvelles formes de valorisation doivent être développées. Simultanément, le système de brevets devrait être reconçu pour assurer la délivrance de brevets de haute qualité. En somme, les auteurs du rapport plaident pour qu'une "attention maintenue" soit accordée à ces questions au nom des autorités publiques.
GERMAN
Bibliographischer Bericht: die Patentmärkte in der Ökonomie des Wissens (The Patent Markets in Knowledge Economy)
Der Bericht über „Die Patentmärkte in der Ökonomie des Wissens“ beschreibt die Entwicklung von neuen Formen der „Kommodifizierung“ und Kommerzialisierung von Patenten (Verkauf auf Auktionen, durch Börsenmakler, auf elektronischen Plattformen…), die zu einem strukturierteren und offeneren Markt führen. Die Schwierigkeiten dieser Kommerzialisierung sind beträchtlich, vor allem im Hinblick auf die Wertbestimmung der Patente. Die Autoren betonen einerseits, dass die allgemeine Ungewissheit, in der wir uns befinden, zur Vorsicht anhält, aber dass andererseits ein proaktives Eingreifen und Regulierung notwendig erscheinen um dieses Potential zu nutzen. Frankreich und vor allem Europa muss in diesem Bereich aktiv werden. Sie müssen sich hier auf unbekanntes Terrain wagen und neue Formen der Bewertung von Patenten erproben. Gleichzeitig sollte jedoch das Patentsystem reformiert werden um eine hohe Qualität der Patente zu sichern. Insgesamt, fordern die Autoren „nachhaltige Aufmerksamkeit“ der öffentlichen Autoritäten zu diesen Fragen.
ITALIAN
Relazione bibliografica (Letteratura Grigia): Les Marchés des brevets dans l’economie de la connaissance (I mercati dei brevetti nell’economia della conoscenza)
La relazione su “I mercati dei brevetti nell’economica della conoscenza” si concentra sullo sviluppo di nuove forme di mercificazione di brevetti (vendita all’asta, per mezzo di intermediari finanziari, piattaforme elettroniche…) che portano verso un mercato più strutturato e più aperto. Le difficoltà legate alla diffusione di questi nuovi meccanismi, soprattutto per quanto riguarda la valutazione dei brevetti, sono reali e non devono essere sottovalutate. Tuttavia, secondo gli autori della relazione, il grande stato di incertezza, in cui versiamo , implica la necessità per le autorità di essere molto caute, nonostante le opportunità offerte da questi mercati dei brevetti e devono indurre ad un approccio positivo e proattivo. La Francia e l’Europa (lo standard europeo è obbligatorio) vanno tenuti in debita considerazione. Per questi operatori, vanno certamente incoraggiate nuove esperienze e sviluppata la creazione di nuove forme di valorizzazione. Nel contempo, il sistema dei brevetti dovrebbe essere riconsiderato in modo da assicurare il rilascio di brevetti di alto livello. In sintesi, gli autori sostengono che le autorità pubbliche debbano accordare una “attenzione sostenuta” a tali questioni.
CHINESE
书目报告（灰色文献）：知识经济中的专利交易(The Patent Markets in Knowledge Economy)
Informe bibliográfico (Literatura Gris): Los mercados de patentes en la economía del conocimiento (The Patent Markets in Knowledge Economy)
El informe Los mercados de patentes en la economía del conocimiento se enfoca en el desarrollo de nuevas formas de patentes de "commoditización" (vendidos en subastas, por intervención de agentes, plataformas electrónicas...) que llevan a un mercado más estructurado y abierto. Las dificultades liadas al surgimiento de esos nuevos instrumentos, primordialmente, la tasación de los patentes, son reales y no deberían de ser ignoradas. Sin embargo, para los autores del informe, el estado de gran incertitud en la cual nos encontramos ahora implica la necesidad de que las autoridad actúen con cautela, pero a pesar de esto, las oportunidades que presentan estos diferentes Mercados de Patentes deberán a la misma vez llevar a una postura positiva y proactiva. Francia y Europa (el nivel europeo es imperativo) deberán de estar presentes en esta arena. Para estos actores, nuevos experimentos deberán ser alentados y la creación de nuevas formas de valoración deberán ser desarrolladas. Simultáneamente, el Sistema de Patentes debería de ser reconsiderado para asegurar la entrega de patentes de alta calidad. En síntesis, los autores del informe le ruegan a las autoridades públicas una mayor "atención sostenida" a estas cuestiones.
The Executive Board of Governors of the North America Federal Bank had only four governors on seven seats established. But two people, Jerome Powell (Banker), and Jeremy Stein (Economist) appointed by the President of the United States Barak Obama, could not take their function, because their appointment in December 2011, was not approved by the Senate. It was enough that two parties will disagree with each other, while Mr. Powell is Republican and Mr. Stein is democratic, to paralyse the whole because of the willingness of opposition of the Republican Senator David Vitter. The JP Morgan case led the two parties to an arrangement and the appointments were approved by the Senate on May 18, 2012.
Online gambling is becoming a worldwide phenomenon. Whether it be card games, lotteries, or betting on sports games and races, more and more customers flock towards websites that operate games of chance online, often without any sort of government control or supervision. Customers are attracted to the facility and privacy of these services, and especially the higher rate of return on their outlay than provided in physical casinos or betting services. However, physical gambling and betting are amongst the most universally regulated sectors: cultural and public policy differences play a very significant role in explaining the differences in regulation found in this sector.
FRENCH
Article: Une analyse comparative de la régulation des jeux en ligne
Jouer en ligne est désormais un phénomène mondial. Qu'il s'agisse des jeux de cartes, des loteries, ou des paris sportifs et hippiques, de plus en plus de clients affluent vers des sites Internet qui organisent des jeux de chance et de hasard sur Internet, souvent sans aucune forme de supervision ou de contrôle étatique. Les clients sont attirés par la facilité et la confidentialité de tels services, et surtout le taux de retour plus élevé sur leurs mises que dans un casino ou service de pari physique. Cependant, les jeux d'argent physiques sont parmi les secteurs les plus régulés: les différences culturelles et d'ordre public jouent un rôle important dans l'explication des différences dans la régulation de ce secteur.
GERMAN
Artikel: Vergleichende Analyse der Regulierung von Online-Wetten
Online-Wetten sind dabei eine weltweites Phänomen zu werden. Ob Kartenspiele, Lotterien oder Sportwetten: mehr und mehr Kunden strömen auf die Seiten von Online-Wettmachern, die ihr Geschäft oft ohne jegliche staatliche Kontrolle oder Aufsicht betreiben. Gelockt werden die Kunden durch die Vertraulichkeit und Mühelosigkeit der Online-Spiele, aber auch durch die höheren Returns auf ihren Einsatz im Vergleich zu traditionellen Casinos. Allerdings gehören Glücksspiele und Casinos zu den weltweit am stärksten regulierten Sektoren: kulturelle und politische Unterschiede spielen jedoch eine große Rolle bei der Erklärung der Unterschiede in der Regulierung in diesem Bereich.
POLISH
Artykuł: Analiza porównawcza regulacji gier na Internecie.
Grać na Internecie stało się światowym fenomenem. Czy chodzi o gry w karty, loterie lub o stawienie pieniędzy na zakłady sportowe lub wyścigi hippiczne, coraz więcej konsumentów przybywa na strony internetowe firm, które oferują gry hazardowe, często bez jakiejkolwiek formy nadzoru czy kontroli państwowej. Klientów przyciąga łatwość i poufność usług, a szczególnie wyższa stawka procentowa niż ta proponowana w klasycznym kasynie lub firmach przyjmujących zakłady na gry hazardowe. Pomimo, że gry na pieniądze należą do sektorów ekonomicznych najbardziej uregulowanych, odmiennosci kulturowe, jak również różnice w polityce porządku publicznego, odgrywają ważną rolę w wyjaśnianiu różnic związanych z regulacją tego sektoru gospodarki.
SPANISH
Un análisis comparativo sobre la regulación del juego en el Internet
El juego en el Internet se ha vuelto un fenómeno mundial. Ya sean juegos de cartas, loterías, o apuestas sobre partidos deportivos y carreras, es más y más la cantidad de consumidores que se dirigen hacia sitios web que operan, frecuentemente sin control o supervisión del gobierno, los juegos sobre el Internet. La facilidad y privacidad que ofrecen estos servicios atraen a muchos consumidores, especialmente considerando la gran tasa de rendimiento que reciben aquí en comparación con los casinos físicos o los servicios de apuestas. No obstante, los juegos físicos y las apuestas se encuentran entre los sectores con la mayor cantidad de regulación a nivel mundial: diferencias de culturas y políticas públicas juegan un papel muy importante para explicar las diferencias entre la regulación existente en este sector.
In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors
ENGLISH
The French Loi de finance rectificative pour 2011 (Rectified Budget for 2011) was censured by the Conseil constitutionnel (French Constitutional Council) after being adopted by Parliament, but before it was published in the Journal officiel de la République Française (Official Journal of the French Republic), as a simple law can not limit the power available to the independent regulator of hiring. The "Conseil constitutionnel" does not allow the "Loi de Finances" to ask a general limit of the Regulator workforce, paid by the State. Consequently, the "Loi de Finances 2012" will not give up the will of Parliament to limit the numbers but will do in a precise and quantitative way.
FRENCH
LaLoi definancesrectificativepour 2011a été censuré parle Conseil constitutionnel,après avoir étéadoptée par le Parlement, mais avantd’avoir été publiéeau Journal officielde la République française, car une loi simple ne peut limiter le pouvoir autonome d’embauche du régulateur. Le Conseil constitutionnel n’admet pas que la loi de finance puisse poser d’une façon générale la limite des effectifs du régulateur, payés par l’Etat. En conséquence, la loi de finance pour 2012 ne renoncera pas à la volonté du Parlement de limiter ces effectifs mais le fera d’une façon précise et chiffrée.
SPANISH
El Loi de finances rectificative pour 2011 (presupuesto rectificado de 2011) fue censurado por el Conseil Constitutionnel (Consejo Constitucional francés) después de haber sido aprobada por el Parlamento, pero antes de su publicación en el Journal Officiel de la République Française (Diario Oficial de la francesa República), como una simple ley no puede limitar la potencia disponible para el regulador independiente de la contratación.
ITALIAN
La loi de finance rectificative pour 2011 (legge finanziaria per il 2011) è stata modificata dal Conseil Constitutionnel (la Corte costituzionale francese) dopo essere stata votata in parlamento e prima di essere stata pubblicata alla Gazzetta ufficiale della Repubblica francese.
Rating agencies are private companies that assess the risk of defaulting payment by debtors. As such, the rating of a borrower affects the value of the debt security it issued and that is to circulate in the markets. That is why the activity of credit rating agencies is critical to the security of financial instruments and the functioning of financial markets, but also to the whole global credit system. For instance, an AAA rating guarantees security to investors. Rating agencies helps building trust in financial markets and in the banking system. Henceforth, since everyone relies on them as they save people's time from seeking on their own information on securities or on those who issue them on the marks, international rating agencies have become crucial operators.
'Rating' has also become a business, which is now concentrated within the hands of three undertakings (two American and one French). It has often been said that these three are conflicted. Some have indeed brought up the fact as they have provided the markets with unreliable information (especially about subprime and securitization) prevented them to self-discipline, which eventually participated in the global spread of risks and defaults.
The difficult history between the rating agencies, whether they are considered as mere businesses, crucial operators or as companies undertaking a public service, which eventually led to implement a specific Regulation in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, shows how the information is a public common. This justifies the intervention of the Financial Regulator, namely to better protect the consumer. Should we go further on? Some have mentioned the idea of nationalizing the business and hand it over to Government institutions (or at least public ones). This is, however, no longer on the agenda, as many conflicts of interests may arise since rating agencies keep on rating the paradoxical debtors that States are.
On April 7, 2011, the Belgian Council of State handed down a ruling (n° 212.557) in which it overruled a decision by the Commission de Regulation de l’Electricité et du Gaz (CREG – Belgian Regulatory Commission for Electricity and Gas) to fine the City of Wavre for non-compliance with its annual reporting obligations.
GERMAN
Thematischer Bericht (Energie): Der belgische Bundesrat kippt ein von der belgischen Regulierungsbehörde für Elektrizität und Gas beschlossenes Bußgeld
Am 7. April 2011 beschließt der Belgische Bundesrat per Gerichtsentscheid (n° 212.557) die Entscheidung der Kommission für Regulierung von Elektrizität und Gas (CREG – Belgian Regulatory Commission for Electricity and Gas) umzustoßen, welche der Stadt Wavre ein Bußgeld für nicht-Einhaltung der jährlichen Berichtspflicht auferlegte.
PORTUGUESE
Informe temático (Energia): O Conselho de Estado belga anulou multas impostas pela Comissão regulatória belga para eletricidade e gás.
Em 7 de abril de 2011, o Conselho de Estado belga publicou julgamento (nº 212.557) no qual ele anulou uma decisão da Commission de Regulation de l’Electricité et du Gaz (CREG – Comissão regulatória belga para eletricidade e gás) em que a cidade de Wavre foi multada pelo descumprimento de suas obrigações de divulgação de informes anuais.
ITALIAN
Relazione tematica: Il Consiglio di Stato belga abroga la multa fatta dalla Commissione di regolazione per il gas e l’elettricità
Il 7 aprile 2011, il Consiglio di Stato belga ha reso una decisione (n° 212.557) nella quale dichiara illegittima una decisione della Commissione di regolazione del gas e delle’elettricità (CREG - Commission de régulation de l’électricité et du gaz) che aveva previsto una multa alla città di Wavre per inadempienza agli obblighi di rendiconto annuale.
A contract between Free (a French Internet Service Provider) and one of its subscribers contained a clause stipulating that access to audiovisual services was conditional upon the eligibility of the user’s telephone line for such services. The Court of Cassation deems that except in cases of force majeure, such a clause does not exempt the service provider from his strict liability to provide such services
Asymmetry is a key concept of regulation. Indeed, a competitive market works well when operators are in symmetrical relationships, ie there is no structural obstacle which prevents an agent from increasing his power solely on his merits (" competition by merits "). If there is an asymmetry, for example because a sector is monopolistic and the legislator has just declared it open to competition, there is a temporary asymmetry between the installed companies, the incumbent operators and the willing companies to enter this new market, the "new entrants". Historical operators, such as in the telecommunications or energy sector, when they were opened to competition by European directives, transposed by national laws (in french Law in 1996 for telecommunications and gas, in 2000 for electricity), benefit (sometimes referred to as grandfather clause), in particular because they have all the clients or all the know-how or all the patents, and that, in fact, the competitors can not enter the market. It is then necessary to establish a regulator also a priori temporary itself to establish to forceps the competition, by an asymmetrical regulation.
Asymmetric regulation, particularly applied in Great Britain at the time of the liberalization of the aforementioned sectors, means that the regulator will systematically favor new entrants, for example by dispossessing the incumbents for their benefit to make them on the market. Today, in the telecommunications sector, competition, notably on mobiles, is established, but the regulator does not intend to leave its place to disappear and today supports "symmetric regulation" .... Instead, it acts as a specialized competition authority.
Asymmetry may not be temporary but definitive, when inequality between operators, regardless of merit, does not come from a context of liberalization but from a structural failure of the market. For example, there are transport networks, transport of passengers or goods, railways or airstrip for airplanes, data or voice communication networks, pipes where gas or electricity circulate, etc., which belong to a single operator because they constitute economically natural monopolies. Under these conditions, the competitors of the monopoly must nevertheless have fair and effective access to this service and a regulator must necessarily be established for the effectiveness of that right (see Access).
Moreover, the Nobel Prize of Joseph Stiglitz (2001) was justified by his work on the asymmetry of information on certain markets, in particular the financial markets on which companies offer securities. Through the theory of the agency, it appears that the ordinary partners or ordinary investors have less information than the managers, even though the latter have the function of making decisions that bring the most to the former. But information asymmetry offers managers an "information rent" that allows them to offer many benefits and transfer risks to others. Regulators, in particular banking and financial regulators, are needed to combat information asymmetry. Transparency is one of the procedural means to combat this asymmetry. The financial and banking crisis of 2008 showed the extent of this asymmetry and, in fact, the inability of regulators to remedy it, for example, the British government estimated in 2010 that it was the financial regulator itself that was responsible for the crisis for not having sufficiently watched over conflicts of interest. In general, the global financial crisis was often later characterized as a crisis of regulators and regulation.
