Ordinance n° 2010-76 of 21 January 2010 establishes a new independent administrative authority designated as the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel (Prudential Control Authority), resulting from the merger of the approval and monitoring authorities of the banking and insurance sectors.
Michel Prada is a graduate of the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Bordeaux (Sciences Po Bordeaux) and the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA). From 1966 to 1970, he was an Inspecteur des Finances. (...°
On May 12, 2011, both Neelie Kroes, the European Commissioner for the digital agenda within the European Commission, and Larry Strickling, Assistant Commissioner for Communications and Information within the United States Department of Commerce, sent a notification to the ICANN, a private association that manages Internet domain names. First of all, they agreed with the principle of self-regulation of Internet domain names by the ICANN. But, they requested a reform of its “governance” to improve its transparency and better take into account public authorities’ recommendations.
Association - Conflict resolution - Domain name - European commission - Internet - Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers (ICANN) - Memorandum - Power - Private regulator - Regulatory Authority - Self regulation - Soft law - Transparency - United Nations (UN) *
* In The Journal of Regulation, these keywords are done by the Editor and not by the Author.
PORTUGUESE
Informe bibliográfico (Internet): Autoridades europeias e norte-americanas notificaram a ICANN, uma associação privada encarregada da auto-regulação de nomes de domínio na Internet, que ela deve adotar uma governança mais transparente e também adotar as recomendações de estruturas públicas.
Em 12 de maio de 2011, tanto Neelie Kroes, o Comissário Europeu para a agenda digital dentro da Comissão Europeia, quanto Larry Strickling, Comissário Assistente para Comunicações e Informação dentro do Departamento de Comércio dos Estados Unidos da América, enviaram uma notificação para a ICANN, uma associação privada que gerencia nomes de domínio na internet. Em primeiro lugar, eles concordaram com o princípio da auto-regulação dos nomes de domínio na Internet pela ICANN. No entanto, eles solicitaram uma reforma em sua governança para melhorar sua transparência e melhor levar em consideração as recomendações de autoridades públicas.
Associação – Resolução de conflitos – Nome de domínio – Comissão Europeia – Internet - Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers (ICANN) – Memorandum – Poder – Regulação privada – Autoridade de regulação – Auto-regulação – Soft law – Transparência – Nações Unidas (ONU)*
* No Journal of Regulation, as palavras-chave são fornecidas pelo Diretor, e não pelo Autor.
ITALIAN
Relazione bibliografica (Internet): Le autorità europee e nord americane hanno indicato che l’ICANN, una società privata che ha lo scopo di auto-regolare i nomi a dominio di internet, dovrà aumentare la trasparenza della gestione ed adottare le raccomandazioni delle strutture pubbliche
Il 12 maggio 2011, Neelie Kroes, Commissario europeo per l’agenda digitale della Commissione europea, e Larry Strickling, Commissario assistente per le comunicazioni e l’informazione del Dipartimento del Commercio degli Stati Uniti, hanno entrambi dichiarato che l’ICANN, una società privata che gestisce i nomi a dominio di Internet, deve riformare il proprio sistema di gestione migliorando la sua trasparenza e deve prendere in debita considerazione le raccomandazioni provenienti dalle autorità pubbliche.
Associazione - Autorità di regolazione - Autorità privata di regolazione - Auto-regolazione - Commissione Europea - Internet - Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers (ICANN) - Memorandum - Nazioni Unite (ONU) - Nomi di dominio - Potere - Risoluzione di controversie - Soft law - Transparenza *
* In The Journal of Regulation, le parole chiave sono responsabilità dell’Editore e non dall’Autore.
A simple question: be regulator, is it a profession?
As soon as one asks the question, it should be down. Indeed, the time has passed when the regulator was a natural person. Today, in most cases, the regulator takes the form of a Regulatory Authority, that is to say an entity with or without legal personality, incorporated in the State or professional.
Individuals appear as a member of the Authority, even if it is true that the President of the Regulatory Authority often has a very importan role!footnote-17.
The choice of Commissioners is crucial to the independence and effectiveness of the regulatory authority. It is appropriate that the person has "authority" over the area, must be respected and participates effectively in the collective action of the College.
Let us try to recall the two sets of criteria to determine how one thinks the "good regulator" before taking such case the appointment of Mr. Yann Padova as a new member of the College of the Commission de Régulation de l'Énergie (French Energy Regulatory Commission).
Two Ministerial Orders of 5 March 2010 and a Ministerial Order of 8 March 2010 nominate the members of the Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel (Prudential Control Authority), created by the Ordinance of 21 January 2010. Besides the Presidency, which will be exercised by Christian Noyer, governor of the Banque de France, the composition reveals the prevalence of banking regulators, which is a pragmatic consequence of the fact that insurers propose products equivalent in risk to those proposed by banks.
As soon as Regulation assumes independence of the operator who manages the essential infrastructure, ex ante conditions of such independence must be met.
Europe doesn't require legal autonomy of the essential infrastructure manager, probably because such autonomy, it would be both too ask the Policy, which may want more integrated organizations as soon as public transportation is a mix of public policies and that to public funds are used. But it would also be too little to ask the Policy because no matter the legal autonomy, the key is the real independence of the manager, that is under the control of the Regulator.
The Loi portant réforme ferroviaire (Railway Reform Act) of August 4, 2014 has made the integration of the company that manages the rail network, which the new name is SNCF Réseau (SNCF Network) in a public group, which also includes the SNCF, public transportation operator, in competition with new entrants in a newly opened sector to competition.
The Competition Authority in its opinion of 4 October 2013 had expressed reluctance towards the bill, to the influence that such corporate organization offers to the public operator, to the detriment of its competitors and the opening of the railway sector to competition.
The Competition Authority issues its opinion as a real essay on what should be the Regulation of the railway sector through the "governance" of the network manager. Indeed, the first part of the opinion relates to "the independent management of railway infrastructure" while the second focuses on the integration of railway network in the public group built par the law. The third part of this Opinion draws conclusions to measure whether we can consider that the Autorité de Régulation des Activités Ferroviaires (French Regulatory Authority of Railways Activities) shall have the capacity to ensure this independence by governance or not.
This review, in its construction itself, demonstrates the dialectic between Regulation and Governance (I), which is an observation and stresses the role of the regulator in the effectiveness of governance (II), which is more a question .
The cycle of conferences Les outils de la Compliance(The Compliance tools) began in November 2019 and runs until June 2020. It is organized by The Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC) and all of its partner universities. It includes a conference more particularly devoted to the theme of "Les expertises requises dans l'Ex Ante de la Compliance" ("The expertises required in the Ex Ante of Compliance").
in the amphitheater of the Paris Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Friedland Avenue, 27, 75008 Paris
General Presentation
After examining various specific tools, such as Risk mapping or Incentives, these showing that the tools only have their efficiency through their use designed and carried out by human beings, endowed themselves with the required expertise. But it is often because it is very difficult to identify and define these "skills" that operators subject to the Ex Ante Compliance obligations end up entrusting this observance to machines, via Compliance by Design ...
The mass of what should actually be observed leads to favoring massification expertise, as the "Regtech" handle it. But the rules being a living thing, Company Law adjoins Governance and one must know both. In the same way as the mastery of Ex Ante supposes that one always thinks of Ex Post (sanction for failure in the Ex Ante), so that this Ex Post does not appear, under its unwelcome face of Repressive Law which therefore must be anticipated and therefore present in Ex Ante.
In the same way, Tax Compliance presupposes that the State must be present in the good technical conception of Compliance. Compliance being the means by which States internalize their "monumental goals", or even confront each other under the mask of companies, it is then international policies in question, and this political expertise is required in Ex Ante.
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under the scientific direction of Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, professor fo Regulatory Law Compliance Law at Sciences Po.
In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors
ENGLISH
Bibliographic Report (Book): Libéralisation et services publics : économie postale [Liberalization and Public Services: Postal Economics] by François Boldron, Claire Borsenberger, Denis Joram, Sébastien Lecou, and Bernard Roy.
The authors of Liberalization and Public Services: Postal Economics set out to provide a complete and comprehensive economic study of the challenges and possibilities engendered by the liberalization of the French Postal Service. Using experiences from other countries and industries, as well as taking into account the specificities of France’s postal service, the authors have used economic studies to provide an exhaustive account of what the contours of the postal service of the future may be.
ITALIAN
Relazione bibliografica (Libri) : Libéralisation et services publics : économie postale [Liberalizzazione e Servizi pubblici: economia postale] di François Boldron, Claire Borsenberger, Denis Joram, Sébastien Lecou, and Bernard Roy.
Gli autori di “Libéralisation et services publics : économie postale” (Liberalizzazione e Servizi pubblici: economia postale) cercano di predisporre uno studio economico completo e comprensivo delle sfide e delle possibilità generate dalla liberalizzazione del servizio postale francese. Utilizzando le esperienze di altri paesi e di altre industrie, e prendendo in considerazione le specificità del servizio postale francese, gli autori hanno usato studi economici per definire il possibile futuro del sevizio postale.
The press release is short. Here is what it says: "Le Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel exprime sa vive inquiétude à la suite de la décision du Conseil suprême de la radio et de la télévision (RTÜK), le régulateur des médias en Turquie, de retirer leurs droits d'émission à de nombreuses radios et télévisions. Le Conseil appelle son partenaire de longue date au sein de la Plateforme européenne des instances de régulation (EPRA) et du Réseau des institutions de régulation méditerranéennes (RIRM) à ne pas mettre en cause la liberté de communication et le pluralisme des médias, garanties fondamentales d'une société démocratique." (courtesy translation: "The Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisual expresses its deep concerns following the decision of the Supreme Council for Radio and Television (RTÜK), the Turkish Media Regulator, to withdraw the broadcasting rights of numerous radios and televisions. The Conseil calls upon its long-time partner within the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities (EPRA) and the Mediterranean Regulation Authorities Network (RIRM) not to jeopardize the freedom of communication and media pluralism, which are fundamental guarantees in a democratic society").
The press release is entitled "Le CSA s'inquiète du retrait par le régulateur turc des droits d'émission de radios et de télévision" (courtesy translation: "The CSA worries about the decision of the Turkish Regulator to withdraw broadcasting rights to radios and televisions").
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Isn't this surprising?
One would understand that the members of a Regulatory Authority, just as many people, would worry about what has been happening lately in Turkey. One can also share the view that these events might cause them to fear for the sake of public liberties and democracy in the country.
Should a Regulatory Authority express its "worry" though?
Shouldn't it be the Government's role instead, within the framework of its 'diplomatic relations' with the state and with the use of an appropriate vocabulary, to express any 'worry'?
First of all, this is a salient example of the ambiguity of the Audiovisual Regulator. Indeed, while it itself insists on the fact that it acts as an economic regulator of a sector whose development and innovation falls under its watch and monitoring (which namely justifies the fact that he reviews candidacies to the presidency of public televisions channels), the Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel had initially been created to preserve public liberties.
As such, people who still embrace the distinction that was previously assumed between public liberties regulation and economic regulation still consider the CSA - along with the CNIL - as the prototype of the former type of regulatory body.
Here the CSA expresses its "deep concern" and sends a request not to "jeopardize liberties", which is the polite version of an injunction, to a foreign regulatory authority upon which it has no authority whatsoever.
One can understand that the Regulator develops soft law about operators on which he has actual authority. But what about here? Shouldn't the adage Nemo plus juris apply?
How is the Regulator competent to issue 'releases' in which he formulates desiderata towards a foreign body whose behavior is unappealing to him? Shouldn't the Quai d'Orsay (French Ministry for Foreign Affairs) be in charge?
The Regulator took a political stance here, while it is known that a Regulatory Authority can only be legitimate when it stands as a technical authority; emphasizing on the political features of its job actually jeopardizes this legitimacy, all the more when international politics are involved (which is the case here).
However, the Regulator does preempt criticism in its press release:
It starts indeed by stating that it only expresses this sort of 'feeling' because of the old ties that exists between the French and the Turkish Regulators: it essentially considers that friends can be true to one another, express a few criticism and expect changes. Friendship in the digital media and in politics would allow for many things.
Besides, the CSA recalls the solidarity that prevails between the two regulators. Because they are "long-time partner within the European Platform of Regulatory Authorities (EPRA) and the Mediterranean Regulation Authorities Network (RIRM)", the French Regulator is enabled to express the Turkish Regulators its view on how it is jeopardizing democracy and how it should consequently stop.
Maybe the many ties that exists between the Regulators now enable them to give more or less stringent advice to one another, whereas diplomatic embassies now play an increasing economic role: how blur do the lines get!
