Economic regulation systems only work if regulators are independent, which implies in a minimal way that they are not corrupt. Few countries meet this basic requirement. Côte d'Ivoire has a telecommunications Agency, which is a State Corporation. By order of March 21, 2012, the Government creates the telecommunications regulatory authority. On May 4, 2012, the Board of Directors of the Agency of telecommunications convened to an extraordinary session and put an end to the mandate of its Director General, because of "serious shortcomings observed in the performance of his duties". He was immediately replaced by a telecommunication engineer, previously technical adviser to the Ministry. He was assigned the mission of preparing the transition of the system to an effectively independent, autonomous and impartial regulator.
What does Regulating to operators? How do they feel? Do they internalize? Does it means to them, simply a cost or an impact on their strategy on the markets?
The question is all the more important that you adhere to the theory of incentives, whereas the adequate regulatory techniques are those that produce the desired behavior by regulated operators.
The issue is not whether the Regulating is included in spending. This is acquired. For example, in two years the banks move internal forces of certain services, such as credit, to the compliance department and regulation. The regulation may represent a very high share of costs: it lies in the fact that through compliance the regulatory system has internalized the costs of regulation in the firms.
But does it make to change the strategic choice of the operator on the market, not only increase the number internal processes?
Mr. Blankfein Lloys who also sits on the board of the Harvard Law School, asked about the question of whether the bank doesn't suffer from the pressure of regulations and supervisors replied that must be considered especially in the very design of technical systems to meet compliance but that for him, Regulation isn't really an annoyance: it is a "background noise". He compares it to music: something that he listens a lot, but while he is doing its job. Something which remains outside.
This means that Regulation occupies its technical regulatory services but doesn't affect its own work of invest bank president.
We can rejoice, since it shows that Regulation doesn't impede free enterprise and the operator's choice. One might worry if Regulation should have an "educational" function wanting influence how the president himself decides. In this case, Regulation must cease to be a kind of expensive elevator music.
It is not sure that regulators and supervisors have the same understanding
A "cookie", so named because its shape recalls the shape of the cake, allows a site to remember the tastes of the user through visits and purchases which he made and decide to reuse this information. A European directive decided to limit these practices, the English legislature has provided the obligation for sites to warn the user that connects that a cookie identifies him and agrees of this acquisition of personal information, the justification for the Act is the protection of personal information that a third party data protection may thus have without the consent of the person concerned.
The Act came into application in the United Kingdom on May 25, 2012. Some companies they say it technically inapplicable, both as relevant information to justify the application of the consent form and what form the consent of the user should take. They are more concerned because the entire device is subjected to penal sanctions.
This shows that the document is primarily intended for investors and financial markets, the document being placed on the company website in the section for the "investors".
This illustrates the evolution from the traditional "contrats de plan" (plan contracts). But then, who are the parties to these types of contract?
Indeed, the very term "Regulatory contract" is new in public Law. It appears as a sort of modernization of "plan contract." The Conseil d'État (French State Council) finally admitted the contractual nature of these planning contracts. In these contracts, are parties were the State and the company in charge of a public service.
Because here the contract is an instrument of "economic regulation" the open public consultation draft rather expresses a global conception of ADP, the company which manages the Paris airports, for the future of the development of critical infrastructure that is the airport as the heart of global development of air transport.
The enterprise manager of the airport in the heart of the contract (rather than the State) in setting objectives for the coming four years is the letter and spirit of the French law of 20 April 2005 about Airports, which put the apparatus of this "Contrat de Régulation Economique" in place.
In this, the infrastructure manager is set by law as a "regulator of second degree", as can be a financial market enterprise. The company that manages and develops the Paris airports undoubtedly belongs to the category of " critical firms", as well it manages the future of the sector and helps to keep France a place in the world.
More, A.D.P. behaves like a Regulator, since it is carrying out the "public consultation", the consultation paper prepared by it, being placed on its site and developing its ambitions for the sector and for France. But A.D.P. also expressed as a financial and economic actor, emphasizing the competitive environment, demanding in passing more stability and clarity in the regulation in which it moves ...
That is why the consultation mechanism provided by the law must be more complex. Indeed, ADP can not be judge and jury. Therefore if the project raises observations, they must be formuled not to ADP but to the Ministries of Aviation and Economy, within a month. They shall communicate theiir content to ADP . Then the Commission consultative aéroportaire (French Airport Consultative Committee) will be consulted. At the end of this process, the "Contrat de Régulation Economique" will be signed.
Seing the end of the process, it remains in line with the plan contracts, since it remains the Economic Regulatory Contract is signed between the State and the essential infrastructure manager. But the consultation process shows firstly investors are the first recipients of the statements made by a privatized company presenting its draft primarily in terms of competitive context and international development and secondly the airlines that use daily services of the airports are also directly involved by theses questions of tarification.
Airlines protest against the increase in the money that will be asked. This will be imposed, since it is tarification and princing public policy. We are in unilateral rules. But it is indeed a "price" they feel to pay, they also heard a speech referring to competition in what the mechanism is presented as a "contract".
But then, does it take to admit that these "contracts for economic regulation" are not between two parties that are the state and the regulator of second degree that is the infrastructure manager but must be three, the State, the infrastructure manager and "stakeholders" that are mainly airlines?
This practical difficulty is much to the fact that the qualification of "contract" is difficult to justify in proceeding in which prevail unilateral mechanisms.
This collective work describes the contours of French, European, and International healthcare regulation, and explores past, present, and future evolutions and tendencies in this sector. Original French title: Annales de la régulation, 2009, volume 2, sous la direction de Thierry Revet et Laurent Vidal, collection Bibliothèque de l'Institut de Recherche Juridique de la Sorbonne (IRJS) – André Tunc. (LGDJ)
In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors
ENGLISH
Thematic Report (Energy): The French energy regulator publishes its first unfavorable opinion regarding the government’s proposed natural gas tariffs for residential customers.
The Commission de Régulation de l’Energie (CRE — French energy regulator) published an opinion “regarding the draft executive order regarding the regulated tariffs for natural gas publicly distributed by GDF Suez.” This non-binding opinion was published on September 29, 2011, and claims that it is not acceptable for the Government to leave natural gas prices unchanged because these prices do not cover GDF Suez’s costs and symmetrically prevent newcomers from competing with it.
ITALIAN
Relazione tematica (Energia): L’autorità di regolazione francese nel settore dell’energia ha reso pubblica il suo primo parere sfavorevole a proposito delle tariffe del gaz proposte dal governo per le utenze residenziali
La Commission de Régulation de l’Energie (CRE – l’autorità francese di regolazione nel settore dell’energia) ha reso pubblico un parare « riguardante la bozza di proposte di tariffe per il gaz naturale distribuito da GDF Suez ». Questo parere non vincolante è stato pubblicato il 29 settembre 2011 e afferma che non è possibile per il Governo di lasciare immutati i prezzi del gas naturale poiché questi prezzi non coprono i costi di GDF Suez e, al contempo, impedisce ai nuovi operatori di competere con tali costi.
In Senegal, the Autorité de régulation des télécommunications et des postes (ARTP ; English translation: Telecommunications and Posts Regulatory Authority) has, just like all regulators, inherent powers to impose sanctions. In general, the important thing is not only to exercise this sanctioning power but to exercise it in a way that reinforces the authority of the Regulator. In this perspective, the new Sonatel sanction decision is important.
As a sanctions always carry a heavier weight when people are made aware of it, the Director General of the Artp issued a press release, that has been flagged as particularly important, and held a press conference (in French) on a particularly serious sanction imposed following what the Regulator considers as the non-fulfilment of obligations stemming from formal notices (which, by the way, the telecom operator challenges on the merits).
On 21 November 2014 indeed, the Sonatel was given a formal notice from the Artp to respect consumer rights. As the code of telecommunications provides since its modification in 2014, operators shall "prendre les mesures appropriées de dimensionnement de leurs réseaux de nature à garantir à leurs clients un accès ininterrompu à leur service client commercial ou technique en respectant un taux d’efficacité minimal" (translation: "take appropriate measures to size their networks in a way that provides their consumers with an uninterrupted access to their customer service (sales service and technical support) which would respect a minimum efficiency rate") set by the Regulator itself- as to, namely, ensure that the right of consumers to be informed is satisfied (as regards billing mechanisms) and that their calls to consumer services remain free of charge. As the Regulator estimated that the Sonatel was not complying with such regulations, it conducted a formal investigation and notified a statement of objections to the operator, before sending on 28 January 2015 a second formal notice for the same reasons.
On 14 July 2016, the Regulator imposed a sanction on Sonatel since the it still estimated that the operator's behavior still was not leading to a compliant situation as regards the consumer right to be informed. The sanction, as stated in the Sonatel decision, is 13 billion 959 million FCfa (c. €20m), i.e., 15% of Sonatel's 2015 turnover. The sanction decision also provides that if the operator does not enforce it, an additional penalty of 10m FCfa (c. €15,000) per day will be charged.
The operator, however, challenges this sanction insofar as it estimates that its behavior is not to be blamed. To support its claim, Sonatel avails itself from the fact that upon reception of the first formal notice, it undertook a 'progressive compliance' with the requirements process as regards its network, then let the Regulator know about it, etc. It is henceforth to lodge an appeal.
The issue at stake, therefore, is to know whether the obligations on operators are obligations regarding the means used (that is to say, means obligations), or, conversely, if they are obligations to produce results (performance obligations). If they are means obligations, then the operator is right. However, considering the efficiency and effectivity principes that are closely linked with the teleological nature of Regulation, it is more likely that such obligations are performance obligations.
For instance, in France, the Commission Informatiques et Libertés (French Data Protection Authority- CNIL) considered on 1 March 2016!footnote-42 that the obligations on operators to have accurate and complete data are performance obligations and not mere means obligations.
Thus, there is probably more to follow with this Sonatel decision. The day the press release was issued, the operator stated it intended to lodge a hierarchical appeal before the Minister.
The next day, the Director General of the Artp stated in the press (in French) that under the Senegal law, the appeal could only be lodged before a jurisdiction, or before... the Regulatory Authority itself (request for reconsideration - in French : "recours gracieux").
This situation is thus a great reminder that new illustrations of the interplays between Regulation and Politics can always be found.
Each year, the Autorité des marchés financiers (French financial markets regulator), the European Central Bank and the Agence française anti-corruption (French anti-corruption agency) publish risk maps. At first glance, risk maps established by the regulator aim to both help regulator and the regulated company to face risks by anticipating them. These documents would only be an assistance brought to firms in their Compliance mission and not an injunction from the regulator to take into account the risks that it emphasizes.
However, Law forces firms to do their own risk maps under penalty of sanctions. Since the regulator has previously published its own risk map, can companies, obliged to write theirs, deviate from it? If the firm follows the map published by the regulator, can it protect itself against this if it is accused of not having fulfilled its compliance obligations? On the contrary, if the operator does not follow regulator's risk map, can this be blamed on it? Formally, regulator's risk maps do not come with an injunction to take it into account but, as everyone knows, any recommendation from a regulator or supervisor must be taken into account.
The legal solution could here be the implementation of a system of "comply or explain" which would mean that if the firm decides to no follow the risk map established by the regulator, it must be able to justify its choice.
The laws are general and abstract. It is the mark of their modernity (Max Weber) and the mark of the rule of law. Thus, a State adopting or applying for adoption of a text against a designated person or a company that aims is literally backwards.
However, France and Germany have asked 27 November 2014 to the European Commission to take steps against those who hold the platforms on the Internet, including search engines. Everyone knows that this is the famous "GAFA" (Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon).
It seems that the EU institutions fit, since the European Parliament voted on November 27 a text saying that it could ban these companies to monetize their platform activities themselves.
By their regulatory perspectives, Europe gets "retrograde" against the US dynamism?
At first glance, one might say. But it may be that these companies have become "critical", they take the heart of the digital economy, or even the knowledge economy and social cohesion. In such cases, the regulation of these objective phenomena justifies intervene directly in companies in which the social group comes to identify itself. If the company comes to stifle others, it is not that it stifles competition only, but innovation and free expression.
Then pass the mere vigilance competition law instruments of regulation, common in banking and financial law, such as transparency requirements.
This demonstrates Regulation and Supervision meet when companies become crucial.
Online gambling is becoming a worldwide phenomenon. Whether it be card games, lotteries, or betting on sports games and races, more and more customers flock towards websites that operate games of chance online, often without any sort of government control or supervision. Customers are attracted to the facility and privacy of these services, and especially the higher rate of return on their outlay than provided in physical casinos or betting services. However, physical gambling and betting are amongst the most universally regulated sectors: cultural and public policy differences play a very significant role in explaining the differences in regulation found in this sector.
FRENCH
Article: Une analyse comparative de la régulation des jeux en ligne
Jouer en ligne est désormais un phénomène mondial. Qu'il s'agisse des jeux de cartes, des loteries, ou des paris sportifs et hippiques, de plus en plus de clients affluent vers des sites Internet qui organisent des jeux de chance et de hasard sur Internet, souvent sans aucune forme de supervision ou de contrôle étatique. Les clients sont attirés par la facilité et la confidentialité de tels services, et surtout le taux de retour plus élevé sur leurs mises que dans un casino ou service de pari physique. Cependant, les jeux d'argent physiques sont parmi les secteurs les plus régulés: les différences culturelles et d'ordre public jouent un rôle important dans l'explication des différences dans la régulation de ce secteur.
GERMAN
Artikel: Vergleichende Analyse der Regulierung von Online-Wetten
Online-Wetten sind dabei eine weltweites Phänomen zu werden. Ob Kartenspiele, Lotterien oder Sportwetten: mehr und mehr Kunden strömen auf die Seiten von Online-Wettmachern, die ihr Geschäft oft ohne jegliche staatliche Kontrolle oder Aufsicht betreiben. Gelockt werden die Kunden durch die Vertraulichkeit und Mühelosigkeit der Online-Spiele, aber auch durch die höheren Returns auf ihren Einsatz im Vergleich zu traditionellen Casinos. Allerdings gehören Glücksspiele und Casinos zu den weltweit am stärksten regulierten Sektoren: kulturelle und politische Unterschiede spielen jedoch eine große Rolle bei der Erklärung der Unterschiede in der Regulierung in diesem Bereich.
POLISH
Artykuł: Analiza porównawcza regulacji gier na Internecie.
Grać na Internecie stało się światowym fenomenem. Czy chodzi o gry w karty, loterie lub o stawienie pieniędzy na zakłady sportowe lub wyścigi hippiczne, coraz więcej konsumentów przybywa na strony internetowe firm, które oferują gry hazardowe, często bez jakiejkolwiek formy nadzoru czy kontroli państwowej. Klientów przyciąga łatwość i poufność usług, a szczególnie wyższa stawka procentowa niż ta proponowana w klasycznym kasynie lub firmach przyjmujących zakłady na gry hazardowe. Pomimo, że gry na pieniądze należą do sektorów ekonomicznych najbardziej uregulowanych, odmiennosci kulturowe, jak również różnice w polityce porządku publicznego, odgrywają ważną rolę w wyjaśnianiu różnic związanych z regulacją tego sektoru gospodarki.
SPANISH
Un análisis comparativo sobre la regulación del juego en el Internet
El juego en el Internet se ha vuelto un fenómeno mundial. Ya sean juegos de cartas, loterías, o apuestas sobre partidos deportivos y carreras, es más y más la cantidad de consumidores que se dirigen hacia sitios web que operan, frecuentemente sin control o supervisión del gobierno, los juegos sobre el Internet. La facilidad y privacidad que ofrecen estos servicios atraen a muchos consumidores, especialmente considerando la gran tasa de rendimiento que reciben aquí en comparación con los casinos físicos o los servicios de apuestas. No obstante, los juegos físicos y las apuestas se encuentran entre los sectores con la mayor cantidad de regulación a nivel mundial: diferencias de culturas y políticas públicas juegan un papel muy importante para explicar las diferencias entre la regulación existente en este sector.
