Asymmetry is a key concept of regulation. Indeed, a competitive market works well when operators are in symmetrical relationships, ie there is no structural obstacle which prevents an agent from increasing his power solely on his merits (" competition by merits "). If there is an asymmetry, for example because a sector is monopolistic and the legislator has just declared it open to competition, there is a temporary asymmetry between the installed companies, the incumbent operators and the willing companies to enter this new market, the "new entrants". Historical operators, such as in the telecommunications or energy sector, when they were opened to competition by European directives, transposed by national laws (in french Law in 1996 for telecommunications and gas, in 2000 for electricity), benefit (sometimes referred to as grandfather clause), in particular because they have all the clients or all the know-how or all the patents, and that, in fact, the competitors can not enter the market. It is then necessary to establish a regulator also a priori temporary itself to establish to forceps the competition, by an asymmetrical regulation.
Asymmetric regulation, particularly applied in Great Britain at the time of the liberalization of the aforementioned sectors, means that the regulator will systematically favor new entrants, for example by dispossessing the incumbents for their benefit to make them on the market. Today, in the telecommunications sector, competition, notably on mobiles, is established, but the regulator does not intend to leave its place to disappear and today supports "symmetric regulation" .... Instead, it acts as a specialized competition authority.
Asymmetry may not be temporary but definitive, when inequality between operators, regardless of merit, does not come from a context of liberalization but from a structural failure of the market. For example, there are transport networks, transport of passengers or goods, railways or airstrip for airplanes, data or voice communication networks, pipes where gas or electricity circulate, etc., which belong to a single operator because they constitute economically natural monopolies. Under these conditions, the competitors of the monopoly must nevertheless have fair and effective access to this service and a regulator must necessarily be established for the effectiveness of that right (see Access).
Moreover, the Nobel Prize of Joseph Stiglitz (2001) was justified by his work on the asymmetry of information on certain markets, in particular the financial markets on which companies offer securities. Through the theory of the agency, it appears that the ordinary partners or ordinary investors have less information than the managers, even though the latter have the function of making decisions that bring the most to the former. But information asymmetry offers managers an "information rent" that allows them to offer many benefits and transfer risks to others. Regulators, in particular banking and financial regulators, are needed to combat information asymmetry. Transparency is one of the procedural means to combat this asymmetry. The financial and banking crisis of 2008 showed the extent of this asymmetry and, in fact, the inability of regulators to remedy it, for example, the British government estimated in 2010 that it was the financial regulator itself that was responsible for the crisis for not having sufficiently watched over conflicts of interest. In general, the global financial crisis was often later characterized as a crisis of regulators and regulation.
Stephen Haddrill was educated at Trinity School of John Whitgift from 1967 to 1974, and then studied history and economics at New College, Oxford. In 1978, he joined the Department of Energy of the United Kingdom where he rose to the rank of Principal Private Secretary to the Energy Minister. (...)
David J. Dickinson is an Attorney-Advisor for the Office of Transportation and Air Quality within the Office of Air and Radiation of the United States Environmental Protection Agency in Washington, DC.
He received his J.D from George Washington University, National Law Center in Washington, D.C., and his B.A. in History and Political Science from the University of California, San Diego.
Season 2 Episode 3 of the British version of the series "Criminals" features the character of Danielle. Danielle is a mother which has decided to hunt down pedophiles on social networks in order to trap them and show to the world their acts. Danielle insists on the efficiency of her action with regard to the police and justice that she finds unproductive. In the episode, Danielle is accused of defamation by the police. While policemen try to explain to Danielle the importance of using a regular procedure and to respect the Rule of Law aiming to prove its accusations, she makes efficiency her only principle. According to her, her methods get results (on the contrary of those used by the police which respect procedures) and those she accuses to be pedophiles do not deserve defense rights.
We can learn three lessons from Danielle's story:
If Compliance Law is just a process of application of mechanical rules, then Rule of Law is not salient face to the principle of efficiency. But, if Compliance Law is defined by its "monumental goals" and that the respect of Rule of Law is erected in "monumental goal", then efficiency and Rule of Law become compatible and congruent.
The digital space must be disciplined by crucial digital firms supervised by public authorities, like in France or Germany for hate speeches and disinformation.
Compliance Law, and Law in general, must be pedagogue towards individuals as Danielle which do not understand why their behaviors are reproachable.
Fleur Herrenschmidt is Counsel in the EU Competition department at Allen & Overy Paris. She has a post graduate degree in European Law (College of Europe) and in European Legal Studies (University of Paris X) and an LL.M. from the London School of Economics. (...)
This conference aims to better understand the legal mechanisms for international regulatory mechanisms of water, especially in view of climate change, to articulate the role of states and private investment contracts, to understand the legal nature of water as a "resource" but also as "human right" especially in view of the determination of its price, and to mesure the legal consequences of globalization on the matter.
Professor Hervé Causse released a book of over 800 pages: Droit bancaire et financier (Banking and Financial Law).
Typically, there are "Banking Law" on one side and "Financial Law" on the other, each giving rise to separate books, Banking Law having long since detached from the Commercial Law and do having never really left Civil Law, Financial Law being more subject recently of books.
Typically, there are the "Banking Law" on one side and the "Financial Law" on the other, each giving rise to separate books, banking, having long since detached from the Commercial Law and do having never really left the Civil Law, financial law being more subject recently of books.
In the books of "Banking Law", we find the contracts, transactions (credit), mechanisms (like money), institutions (such as the National Central Bank) and sometimes specific repressive rules.
In the books of "financial law", first of all, we meet financial market, financial transactions (like all securities transactions or takeovers bids), the economy is much more present, the US Law being at home because of extraterritoriality as either model, repressive rules slipping everywhere, to the heart of what appears to be today a branch of law.
The important work of Hervé Causse goes further and corresponds to reality: it merges the Banking and Financial Law.
He does it because his work is based on the life of the sector, that is to say the professionals. In fact, professionals work in banks. Then he describes those who admit and control their activities, that is to say the authorities of supervision and regulation. He goes on to describe to the reader the instruments, financial prowess that the bankers invent.
Thus sucked by financial reality, what is left of the civil commitment of Banking Law? To take just one example, when the author discusses the concept of "banking service" from that of "financial service", he finds the uncertainty of this notions. The Banking Law is thus trying to forget the Civil Code, the “deposition” techniques being one example.
Thanks to the book of Hervé Causse, the reader understands that the rules now being written by those designing financial regulation, these rules must find their bones in the financial regulatory system.
Chairman of the Board of Directors of KPMG S.A. (KPMG France). Jean-Luc Decornoy graduated from the ESSEC and is also an accountant and auditor.
Jean-Luc Decornoy became part of KPMG in 1977. He became a partner in 1988. He was nominated Director-General in 1993, and has been the Chairman of the Board since 2001. (...)
Mara Cameran holds a diploma from Bocconi University (Milan) and a doctorate in business management. She is an associate professor of financial accounting at Bocconi University (Milan) and teaches lectures on accounting and auditing within the accounting department. (...)
