Supervision and regulation authorities' impartiality and independence are conditioned to the fact that their members do not have any conflict of interest with the sector that they supervise or regulate. Such an absence of conflict of interest is necessary to guarantee a climate of trust between the authority and operators. This supposes that regulation and supervision authority members do not cumulate functions of operator and of regulator/supervision during but also after their mandate in the regulation/supervision authority because the anticipation of a future hiring can influence present decisions.
On 2nd of August 2019, the executive director of the European Banking Authority (EBA) informed the authority of its willingness to become PDG of the Association des marchés financiers en Europe, lobby of the financial sector. EBA approved this perspective. However, "Change Finance", a civil coalition, sized the European Mediator explaining that such a professional reorientation created an inevitable conflict of interest. The European Mediator reacted on 7th of May 2020 through a recommendation saying that although EBA took preventive measures, theses measures are not sufficient with regard to the risks. In this recommendation, the European Mediator also made some general propositions to manage future conflicts of interest:
The interdiction for senior managers to have positions able to create a conflict of interest for two years.
The information of senior managers and candidates to senior managers positions of the actual rules.
The implementation of internal procedures blocking access to confidential information to the member who notified its willingness to occupy later a position able to constitute a conflict of interest with its current position.
In a letter of 28th of August 2020, the president of EBA told to the European Mediator that he accepts these remarks and propositions.
In this particular case, we can draw three lessons:
The difficult articulation between independence/impartiality (necessary for trust) and regulator/supervisor expertise. The European Mediator and the ABE are agree that the interdiction to get some positions must be limited in time.
The necessity that everyone can anticipate rules correctly.
In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors
ENGLISH
On 16 November 2011, Moody’s downgraded twelve public-sector German banks, after regulatory changes in Germany and the EU.
FRENCH
Le 16 novembre 2011, Moody"s a dégradé douze banques publiques allemandes, après des changements dans la régulation financière en Allemagne et dans l’Union Européenne.
SPANISH
El 16 de noviembre del 2011, Moody’s degradó doce bancos del sector público alemán, después de cambios regulatorios en Alemania y la UE.
ITALIAN
Il 16 novembre 2011, Moody’s ha declassato dodici banche tedesche del settore pubblico, dopo dei cambiamenti nella regolazione finanziaria in Germania e nell’Unione europea.
Chaque année, en France, la Haute Autorité de Santé (French National Autority for Health) établi un "projet d'établissement". Le 18 septembre 2013, son président a indiqué ce qui sera la ligne de force du projet pour 2013.
En effet, le "seul objectif sera de faire de la qualité un outil de la régulation".
On comprend ainsi que tous les outils techniques à la disposition de l'autorité, évaluation, certifications, accréditions, sont utilisés de cette façon.
On peut se réjouir de l'unicité de l'outil, alors que la régulation souffre souvent de poursuivre plusieurs buts.
Mais l'expression même selon laquelle la qualité peut être un "outil de régulation" est difficile à comprendre, car la qualité paraît davantage pouvoir être un critère qu'un outil.
Le projet de loi sur la réforme de la régulation bancaire et financière en France qui vient d'être déposé devant le Conseil des ministres du 19 décembre 2012 était très attendu. Il essaie de faire la part des choses. Il ne "casse" pas les banques, mais il leur interdit un certain nombre d'activités, en ce qu'elles sont très spéculatives et dangereuses pour le système, ou en ce qu'elles n'ont pas d'utilité pour l'économie. Pour le reste, les banques ont l'obligation de séparer en leur sein les activités de banques de détail et les activités de banques d'investissement, à placer dans des filiales. Enfin le projet confie à l'autorité de supervision, devenue l'Autorité de Contrôle Prudentielle et de Résolution (ACPR) la charge de prévenir et de gérer les défaillances bancaires. Il accroît ses pouvoirs, notamment de police.
Manifestation organisée par The Journal of Regulation en partenariat avec Lextenso éditions, sous la responsabilité scientifique de Marie-Anne Frison-Roche, directeur du Journal of Regulation (JR) 25 janvier 2010 | Siège du Conseil Economique, Social et Environnemental, 9, Place d’Iéna, 75016 Paris
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced on August 5, 2010, that it will cooperate more closely with the Department of Justice (DoJ) in merger reviews in the telecommunications sector. This measure is intended to foster reconciliation of potentially divergent goals for mergers set forth by both authorities.
GERMAN
Die Federal Communications Commission (FCC, die amerikanische Bundeskommunikationsbehörde), wird im Bereich Fusionenüberwachung enger mit dem Department of Justice (das amerikanische Justizministerium) arbeiten.
Die FCC hat am 5. August 2010 bekannt gemacht, dass sie enger mit dem Department of Justice (das amerikanische Justizministerium) im Bereich Fusionenüberwachung in der Telekombranche. So wird die Annäherung von beide Behörde, die oft unterschiedliche Zielen bei Fusionen unterstützen, gefördert.
SPANISH
La American Federal Communications Commission (FCC – La Comisión americana de comunicaciones federales) anuncia cooperación más cercana con el Department of Justice (DoJ – El Departamento americano de justicia) en la revisión de fusiones.
La Federal Communicatins Commission (FCC – La Comisión americana de comunicaciones federales) anunció el 5 de agosto 2010 que tomará pasos para aumentar su operatividad con el Department of Justice (DoJ – El Departamento americano de Justicia) en la revisión de fusiones en el sector de telecomunicaciones. Esta medida sirve para fomentar la reconciliación entre objetivos potencialmente divergentes puesto en marcha por estas dos autoridades.
Cass R. Sunstein is a prominent Law & Economics teacher (first at the University of Chicago, then at Harvard). Not only has he written reference handbooks on Regulation, he was also the one who inspired the Regulation policies of Obama. In his 2013 book Simpler, he expresses his stance: to be better, public policies need to be simpler.
In this essay, Sunstein explores how behavorial economics might lead to improve public decision-making processes. He bases its stances upon his experience as the Administrator, from 2009 to 2012, of the US Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs; that is why anyone who cares about Regulation should read it and ask themselves if simplicity, as the author states, may or may not be an actual leading principle for an effective government.
The OIRA, under the supervision of the Office of Management and Budget placed within the Executive Office, reviews the draft Regulations that are prepared by the cabinets of various rulemaking agencies. In this view, the OIRA can be regarded as a sort of custodian of the quality of Regulation throughout the US; conversely to the mainly consultative functions granted to the Conseil d'Etat in France, the OIRA's opinions are binding. Hence, a draft project shall not be issued nor be enforced without its prior consent. Part of OIRA's defining mission is also to centralize all the information held by diverse people within the executive branch, as to enable its access and circulation between all the rulemaking agencies responsible for elaborating and producing binding regulations.
Simpler is dedicated to the detailed study of the main decisions taken under Sunstein's decisive influence by the OIRA in the Regulation field during Obama's first mandate (2009-2012). Before taking up government functions, Sunstein focused part of his academic work on the interactions that are the most likely to occur between behavioral economics, law and public policy. To him, "a general lesson is that small, inexpensive policy initiatives, informed by behavioral economics, can have big benefits" (p. 41). He namely provides that "without a massive reduction in its current functions, government can be far more effective, far less confusing, far less counterproductive, and far more helpful if it opts, wherever it can, for greater simplicity" (p. 11).
This reference to 'simplicity', from which the name of Sunstein's essay stems, aims at translating all the efforts done by public authorities, under the supervision of the OIRA, to issue rules that were clearer and more accessible than before and that provided their subjects (whether they are citizens, companies, or federal administrations) a greater freedom in the choices they were able to make.
Throughout his book and with a little help from the various situations he had to face during his term at the OIRA, Sunstein shows that there is a virtuous relationship between a better information of the agents (whether they are the authors or the subjects of the norms at stake), a greater simplicity in public decision-making process and a better quality of the regulations meilleure qualité de la réglementation in force in a State. This paper hence aims to sum up the main points of the essay (I.), before making a few comments about it (II.).
