Supervision and regulation authorities' impartiality and independence are conditioned to the fact that their members do not have any conflict of interest with the sector that they supervise or regulate. Such an absence of conflict of interest is necessary to guarantee a climate of trust between the authority and operators. This supposes that regulation and supervision authority members do not cumulate functions of operator and of regulator/supervision during but also after their mandate in the regulation/supervision authority because the anticipation of a future hiring can influence present decisions.
On 2nd of August 2019, the executive director of the European Banking Authority (EBA) informed the authority of its willingness to become PDG of the Association des marchés financiers en Europe, lobby of the financial sector. EBA approved this perspective. However, "Change Finance", a civil coalition, sized the European Mediator explaining that such a professional reorientation created an inevitable conflict of interest. The European Mediator reacted on 7th of May 2020 through a recommendation saying that although EBA took preventive measures, theses measures are not sufficient with regard to the risks. In this recommendation, the European Mediator also made some general propositions to manage future conflicts of interest:
The interdiction for senior managers to have positions able to create a conflict of interest for two years.
The information of senior managers and candidates to senior managers positions of the actual rules.
The implementation of internal procedures blocking access to confidential information to the member who notified its willingness to occupy later a position able to constitute a conflict of interest with its current position.
In a letter of 28th of August 2020, the president of EBA told to the European Mediator that he accepts these remarks and propositions.
In this particular case, we can draw three lessons:
The difficult articulation between independence/impartiality (necessary for trust) and regulator/supervisor expertise. The European Mediator and the ABE are agree that the interdiction to get some positions must be limited in time.
The necessity that everyone can anticipate rules correctly.
The "right to be forgotten" is an invention of the Court of Justice of the European Union during the case Google Spain in 2014. It implies that digital firms block the access to personal data of someone who asks it. This "right to be forgotten", which permits to impose secret to third parties has largely been generalized by GDPR in 2016. This new fundamental subjective right is a very political and European right. United-States which, on the contrary of Europe, did not experience nazism, links the "right to be forgotten" to the protection of consumer, conception which especially leads California Consumer Privacy Act adopted in 2018 to link this right to a situation of absence of necessity of this data for the firm which obtained it.
In Europe, this willingness to protect directly the person increases the scope of such a subjective right. Thus, in France and in Luxembourg, since 2020, a cancer survivor can thus ask that such an information is not accessible among his or her health data, especially for insurance companies which use them in their risk calculus to set premium amount. Netherlands will do the same in 2021 to fight against discrimination between banks' and insurances' clients.
The "monumental goal" is therefore not so much here the protection of individual freedoms as the protection of the vulnerable person, which is bye the way the keystone of a Compliance Law, concealing sometimes prohibition to circulate information (as here) and sometimes obligation to circulate information (in other cases, where the alert must be given) depending on whether vulnerable people are protected either by one or by the other.
Summary of the news: Through its decision of 22nd of October 2020, the Autorité de la concurrence (French Competition Authority) accepted the commitments proposed by retail sector's firms Casino, Auchan, Metro and Schiever so that their agreement by which a common body centralizes purchases from numerous retailers, allowing each to offer these products under private label, is admissible with regard to competitive requirements.
In this particular case, the Authority had self-sized in July 2018, estimating that such a purchase center could harm competition, opening immediately a large consultation on the terms of the contract. In October 2018, the law Egalim permitted to the Authority to take temporary measures to suspend such a contract, what the Authority did from September.
The convention parties' firms committed on the one hand to update their contract limiting the power on suppliers, especially small and very small suppliers, excluding totally of the field of the contract some kind of products, especially food products and reducing the share of bought products volume dedicated to their transformation in distributor brand.
The Autorité de la concurrence accepts this proposal of commitments, congratulates itself of the protection of small suppliers operating like that and observe the similarity with the contract consisting in a purchase center between Carrefour and Tesco, which will be examined soon.
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We can draw three lessons of this innovating decision, which could be a model for after:
1. The technique of Compliance Law permits to the Autorité de la concurrence to find a reasonable solution for the future.
Indeed, rather than punishing much later by a simple fine or to annihilate the performing mechanism of the purchase center, the Authority obtains contract modifications.
The contract is structured and the obtained modifications are also structural.
The commitments are an Ex Ante technique, imposed to operators, for the future, in an equilibrium between competition, operators and consumers protection and the efficacy of the coordination between powerful operators.
The nomination of a monitor permits to build the future of the sector, thanks to the Ex Ante nature of Compliance Law.
2. The retail sector finally regulated by Compliance technics.
"Distribution law" always struggle to find its place, between Competition law and Contract Law, especially because we cannot consider it as a common "sector".
The Conseil constitutionnel (French constitutional court) refused a structural injunction power to the authority because it was contrary to business freedom and without any doubt ethics of business is not sufficient to the equilibrium of the sector.
Through commitments given against a stop of pursuits relying on structuring contracts, it is by Compliance law that a Regulation law free of the condition of existence of a sector could leave.
3. The political nature of Compliance law in the retail sector
As for digital space, which is not a sector, Compliance law can directly impose to actors imperatives that are strangers to them.
In the digital space, the care for fighting against Hate and for protecting private life; here the care for small and very small suppliers.
On 31st of July 2020, the Commission de Régulation de l'Energie (CRE and French energy regulator) has examined the investment plan of the French electric network manager (RTE) as it does every year. This investment plan is an economic document but it also contains societal purposes, especially the adaptation of the electric network in order to integrate renewable energies.
The control by the CRE is not a financial control. The crucial operator (RTE) is free to decide the way it wants to manage its budget. The CRE just advices on the financial side by recommending for exemple to be more flexible in its financial strategies. The true CRE's control is about the investment plan's general orientations, the methodology of needs analysis and crucial operator's investment choices which must be aligned with those of the regulator.
Such a control leads to the emergence of an "investment doctrine" from the side of the crucial operator, mixing its own choices and the regulator's guidelines. Beyond this, the elaboration of the investment plan is the result of a true co-writing between the regulator and the firm which discuss together, exchanges points of view and methods. Such a method, expressing a kind of coregulation, could be used in other sectors.
In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors
ENGLISH
The debate on Net Neutrality faces a major difficulty, namely that of its legal status: does there exist a “legal principle”—meaning a rule somewhere within the entire body of law—with mandatory force that could be used to counter infrastructure operators’ discriminatory practices?
FRENCH
Le débat sur laneutralité du Netfait face à unedifficulté majeure, à savoir son statut juridique:existe-t-il un«principe juridique», qui exprime une règle dansl’ensemble du système juridique - avec une forceobligatoire quipourrait être utiliséepour contrerles pratiques discriminatoires des opérateurs d’ infrastructure ?
SPANISH
El debate sobre la Neutralidad de la Red se enfrenta a una gran dificultad, primordialmente en cuanto a su estatus legal: ¿realmente existe un “principio legal” – es decir, una regla que se encuentra dentro de la disciplina del derecho – con fuerza mandataria que podría ser usado para enfrentar a las prácticas discriminatorios que practican los operadores de infraestructura?
ITALIAN
Il dibattito sulla neutralità della rete si trova di fronte ad una difficoltà rilevante dal punto di vista del suo fondamento giuridico: esiste una norma giuridica obbligatoria – intesa come una norma legale – che possa essere utilizzata contro le pratiche discriminatorie degli operatori?
The European Commission, sensing potential anticompetitive behaviour in the pharmaceutical sector, conducted an inquiry into this sector, and adopted its final report on the matter on July 8th 2009. The Commission’s suspicion was that anticompetitive behaviours could be slowing down the entry of generic drugs into national markets, whereas the burden of drug spending on public finances and public health policy make rapid generic entry an important issue. The Commission concluded that delays are due in part to pharmaceutical companies’ behaviour, especially as concerns the use they make of their intellectual property rights.
However, on the other hand, one may also sustain that the strategic use of an acquired legal right is no less than legitimate, and that public health policy is a matter for national regulation. Indeed, it is for Member States, rather than European competition law, to determine the level of healthcare coverage that their society is financially willing to bear.
On June 19, 2012, the European Parliament adopted an extensively modified version of the draft text prepared by the European Commission on credit rating agencies. It does not address the issue of the concentration of the rating market, believing that this is a matter of competition and not of regulation. It reduces the scope of the rotation rule in three years and only for structured products. It requires agencies to issue a schedule of two or three dates in the year where they can change their sovereign debt notes. Next to these devices of ex ante regulation, Parliament adopts an ex post system, civil liability of agencies, in which it will be for them to demonstrate to investors that they have complied with the rules in force.
ENGLISH On July 21th 2010 was signed into law by President Obama United State’s most important legislative change to financial supervision since the 1930’s : the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. This paper suggests that the Dodd-Frank Act, notwithstanding certain flaws, reflects what the neo-realistic definition of Regulation has been proposing in regards to post-crisis reregulation. Inter alia, it takes into account markets interconnectedness, complexity and deregulation. As regulatory law suggests to do, the Act reconciles microeconomic and macroeconomic supervision as well as regulatory and prudential rules, and resorts to certain regulatory tools in order to achieve certain regulatory goals. More specifically, it revives four regulatory imperatives: oversight and systemic risk prevention, investor protection, transparency/information and prudential measures.
FRENCH Le 21 Juillet 2010, le Président Obama a, par sa signature, rendu effectif le plus important changement législatif dans le domaine de la supervision financière aux Etats-Unis depuis les années 1930: la loi Dodd-Frank pour la reforme de Wall Street et la protection du consommateur. Cet article soutient que la loi Dodd-Frank, en dépit de certaines failles, reflète ce que la définition néo-réaliste de la régulation a pu apporter au regard du mouvement de re-régulation qui a suivi la crise. Entre autres, elle prend en compte l’interconnectivité des marches, la complexité et la derégulation. Ainsi que le suggère le droit de la régulation, cette loi réconcilie les supervisions micro- et macroéconomiques, ainsi que les règles régulatoires et prudentielles, et se sert de certains outils de la régulation pour atteindre certains objectifs régulatoires. Plus particulièrement, elle ravive quatre impératifs de la régulation: la prévention systémique et la supervision, la protection de l investisseur, la transparence / l’information et les mesures prudentielles.
GERMAN Am 21. Juli 2010 hat der Präsident Obama ein Gesetz unterschrieben, und dadurch die wichtigste gesetzliche Reform der finanzielle Aufsicht seit der 30er eingeführt Das Dodd-Frank Gesetz für die Reform Wall Streets und Verbraucherschutz. Dieser Artikel zeigt, dass, trotz einigen Mangeln, das Dodd-Frank Gesetz das, was die neo-realistische Definition der Regulierung zur post-Krise Wiederregulierung mitgebracht hat, illustriert. Unter anderem, es berücksichtigt die Marktvernetzung, die Komplexität und Entregulierung. Im Gesetz wurdenMikro- und Makroaufsicht, sowie regulatorische und Aufsichtsregeln wiedereinigt. Ausserdem berührt das Gesetz auch auf regulatorischen Instrumenten, um regulatorische Ziele zu erfüllen. Es nimmt vier regulatorische Imperative wieder auf: Die systematische Prävention und Aufsicht, den Investorschutz, die Transparenz/Information und prudentielle Maßnahmen.
SPANISH La reforma Dodd-Frank Wall Street y el Acta de protección al consumidor: ¿llenará este Acta todos los requisitos de la regulación?
El 20 de julio del 2010 el Presidente Obama firmó la ley del cambio legislativo más importante de los EEUU desde los años 30: la Reforma Dodd-Frank Wall Street y el Acta de protección consumidor. Este informe sugiere que el Acta Dodd-Frank, no obstante algunos defectos, refleja lo que la definición neo-realística de la Regulación ha estado proponiendo en cuanto a la “re-regulación” post crisis económica. Entre otros, toma en cuanto la naturaleza interconectada de los mercados, la complejidad y la desregulación. Como lo sugiere la ley regulatoria, el Acta reconcilia la supervisión micro y macroeconómica tanto como las reglas regulatorias y prudenciales, y recurre a ciertos instrumentos regulatorios para poder alcanzar ciertas metas regulatorias. Más específicamente, revive cuatro imperativos regulatorios: la prevención de descuidos y riesgos sistemáticos, protección al inversor, transparencia/información y medidas prudenciales.
ITALIAN
Articolo: La riforma Dodd-Franck Wall Street ed il Consumer Act:
Il 21 luglio 2010, il Presidente degli Stati Uniti, Barack Obama, ha firmato la più importante riforma dagli anni ‘30 della supervisione finanziaria: il Dodd-Franck Wall Street ed il Consumer Protection Act. L’analisi di questo articolo tende a dimostrare che il Dodd-Franck Act, nonostante qualche difetto, riprende la definizione neo-realistica della regolazione finanziaria in materia di regolazione delle situazioni post-crisi. Tra l’altro, prende in considerazione l’interconnessione dei mercati, la loro complessità e la deregolamentazione. In linea con le leggi in materia di regolazione, la legge in questione riconcilia una supervisione microeconomica e macroeconomica, le regole prudenziali e di regolazione, e fa appello ad alcuni strumenti propri alla regolazione finanziaria per raggiungere un fine di regolazione. In modo più accurato, questa legge ridà nuova vita agli imperativi propri della regolazione finanziaria: controllo e prevenzione del rischio sistemico, protezione degli investitori, provvedimenti prudenziali e in materia di informazione e trasparenza.
PORTUGUESE A reforma Dodd-Frank Wall Street e a Lei de proteção ao consumidor: pode uma lei preencher todos os requisitos da regulação?
Em 20 de julho de 2010, o Presidente Obama sancionou a mais importante inovação legislativa nos Estados Unidos desde os anos 1930: a lei Dodd-Frank relativa à reforma de Wall Street e à proteção do consumidor. Este artigo defende que esta lei, a despeito de certas falhas, reflete aquilo que a definição neo-realista da regulação pôde trazer ao movimento de re-regulação que se afirmou depois da crise. Entre outros, ela leva em consideração a interconectividade dos mercados, a complexidade e a desregulação. Tal como sugere o direito da regulação, esta lei reconcilia as supervisões micro- e macroeconômicas, bem como as regras regulatórias e de prudência, e se vale de algumas ferramentas da regulação para atingir determinados objetivos regulatórios. Mais especificamente, ela reanima quatro imperativos da regulação: a prevenção sistêmica e a supervisão, a proteção do investidor, a transparência / informação e as medidas de prudência.
After an assessment critical rating agencies, on their role in the crisis, on the concentrated nature of the market of the notation, the report published on 18 June 2012 by the French Senate proposes a series of action to "detoxify" the system. It indicates with the same voluntarism that there is no fatality, it proposes that central banks resumed their role more firmly, that the States publish a call for tenders to encourage the emergence of a new European private actor to which the methodology will be imposed, we diversified the notes, we disciplined " ex-post" agencies by the game of responsibility, that we loosened the power of the agencies on the democratic entities, including States, that can prevent conflicts of interest.
The press and television Murdoch group is sued for getting information in an illicit manner, by violating the privacy of personalities, having established connections within the police in order to be informed, etc. Concerning, the television media, activity can be practised because of the prior allocation of a broadcasting license by the regulator. However, the British regulator Ofcom, said April 24, 2012 that he was studying the question of whether the operator could maintain its license in view of the findings made during the parliamentary investigation establishing phone tapping fixed by it.
