The regulator of telecommunications and media in United Kingdom (Ofcom) published on, June 6, 2012 a report to measure media pluralism. In response, the State Secretary Jeremy Hunt writes on June 18 letter to the chairman of Ofcom, Colette Bow, for him make comments, astonishments, suggestions and remind him of the prerogatives of the Secretary of State in the matter. The set is made with the friendliness that fits between friends that are written and signed by their first names, formulas are in conditional tense in being enveloped in a respectful classicism, which is the form taken by the confrontation between the executive and the regulator. Tension is always high, whatever form it takes, when it comes to media.
This article will be printed soon in a book ouvrage of collection "Droit et Economie" de LGDJ (Lextenso édition), CONCURRENCE, SANTE PUBLIQUE, INNOVATION ET MEDICAMENT
The European Parliament, which according to the co decision procedure, must vote the text of directive, until the Council of European Ministers doing it, examined the draft of the Directive on Basel III standards on May 14, 2012. On prudential standards, he planned to leave the States free to adopt higher minimum requirements. In addition, it imposed that the bonus paid to the CEO didn't attain a higher price than their fixed compensation.
But, and the Compliance Mechanism has often been brought closer to the contractual mechanism, this is only relevant if both parties are willing to do so. This is technically true, for example for the Deferred Prosecution, which requires explicit consent. This is true in a more general sense that the company wants to choose itself how to structure its organization to achieve the goals politically pursued by the State. Conversely, the compliance mechanisms work if the State is willing to admit the economic logic of the global private players and / or, if there are possible breaches, not to pursue its investigations and close the file it has opened, at a price more or less high.
But just say No.
As in contractual matters, the first freedom is negative and depends on the ability to say No.
The State can do it. But the company can do it too.
The company sets out in a warning to the market that it is the object of a requirement on the part of the German Motor Authority (Kraftfahrt-Bundesamt) of an allegation of fraud, by the installation of a software, aimed at misleading instruments for measuring emissions of greenhouse gases on cars using diesel.
It is therefore an environmental compliance mechanism that would have been intentionally countered.
On this allegation, the Regulator both warns the company of what it considers to be a fact, ie compliance fraud, and attaches it to an immediate measure, namely the removal of the circulation of 42,000 vehicles sold or proposed by Daimler with such a device.
And the firm answers : "No".
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Which is probably only beginning, since a No ends the dialogue of Ex Ante to project in the Ex Post sanction procedures, calls 6 observations:
1. No doubt Daimler, a German car manufacturing company, has it in mind in this allegation of fraud calculating pollution of its diesel cars what happened to his competitor Volkswagen: namely a multi-billion dollar fine, for lack of compliance in a similar hypothesis (so-called dieselgate). The strategic choice that is then made depends on education through the experience of the company, which benefits as such from a previous case that has had a very significant cost. Thus educated, the question is to measure the risk taken to refuse any cooperation, when the company can anticipate that it will still result in such an amount ....
2. In addition, we find the difficulty of the distinction of Ex Ante and Ex Post. Indeed, saying No will involve for the company a cost of confrontation with the Regulator, then the peripheral jurisdictions or review courts. But in Germany, the Government itself, concerning a bank threatened with compliance proceedings and almost summoned by the US regulator to pay "of its own free will" a transactional fine, felt that this was not normal, because it must be the judges who punish, after a contradictory procedure with due process and after established facts.
3. However, this is only an allegation, of probable assertions, of what legally allows to continue, but which does not allow to condemn. The confusion between the burden of proof, which presupposes the obligation to prove the facts before being able to sanction, and the burden of the allegation, which only supposes to articulate plausibility before being able to prosecute, is very damaging, particularly if we are committed to the principles of Repressive Law, such as the presumption of innocence and the due process. This distinction between these two probationary charges is at the heart of the probatory system in the Compliance Law. Because Compliance Law always looks for more efficiency, tends to go from the first to the second, to give the Regulator more power, since businesses are so powerful ....
4. But the first question then arises: what is the nature no so much of the future measure to be feared, namely a sanction that could be taken later, against Daimler, if the breach is proven, or which will not be applied to the firm if the breach is not established; but what is the nature of the measure immediately taken, namely the return of 42,000 vehicles?
This may seem like an Ex Ante measurement. Indeed, the Compliance assumes non-polluting cars. The Regulator may have indications that these cars are polluting and that the manufacturer has not made the necessary arrangements for them to be less polluting (Compliance) or even organized so that this failure is not detected ( Compliance fraud).
This allegation suggests that there is a risk that thiese cars will polluting. They must immediately be removed from circulation for the quality of the environment. Here and now. The question of sanctions will arise after that, having its procedural apparatus of guarantees for the company that will be pursued. But see the situation on the side of the company: having to withdraw 42,000 vehicles from the market is a great damage and what is often called in Repressive Law a "security measure" taken while the evidence is not yet met could deserve a requalification in sanction. Jurisprudence is both abundant and nuanced on this issue of qualification.
5. So to withdraw these cars, it is for the company to admit that it is guilty, to increase itself the punishment. And if at this game, taken from the "cost-benefit", as much for the company immediately assert to the market that this requirement of Regulation is unfounded in Law, that the alleged facts are not exacts, and that all this the judges will decide. It is sure at all whether these statements by the company are true or false, but before a Tribunal no one thinks they are true prima facie, they are only allegations.
And before a Court, a Regulator appears to have to bear a burden of proof in so far as he has to defend the order he has issued, to prove the breach which he asserts exists, which justifies the exercise he made of his powers. The fact that he exercises his power for the general interest and impartially does not diminish this burden of proof.
6. By saying "No", Daimler wants to recover this classic Law, often set aside by Compliance Law, classic Law based on burden of proof, means of proof, and prohibition of punitive measures - except imminent and future imminente and very serious damages - before 'behavior could be sanctioned following a sanction procedure.
Admittedly, one would be tempted to make an analogy with the current situation of Boeing whose aircraft are grounded by the Regulator in that he considers that they do not meet the conditions of safety, which the aircraft manufacturer denies , Ex Ante measurement that resembles the retraction measure of the market that constitutes the recall request of cars here operated.
But the analogy does not work on two points. Firstly, flight activity is a regulated activity that can only be exercised with the Ex Ante authorization of several Regulators, which is not the case for offering to sell cars or to drive with. This is where Regulatory Law and Compliance Law, which often come together, here stand out.Secundly, the very possibility that planes of which it is not excluded that they are not sure is enough, as a precaution, to prohibit their shift. Here (about the cars and the measure of the pollution by them), it is not the safety of the person that is at stake, and probably not even the overall goal of the environment, but the fraud with respect to the obligation to obey Compliance. Why force the withdrawal of 42,000 vehicles? If not to punish? In an exemplary way, to remind in advance and all that it costs not to obey the Compliance? And there, the company says: "I want a judge".
The European Commission conducted a competition inquiry on the competitiveness of European energy markets, because it believed that these markets functioned poorly, especially because they are insufficiently open to competition and their prices are too high. Proceedings were begun in December 2009 against E.ON, and were closed by this corporation’s May 4, 2010 legally-binding commitments to the European Commission to improve its competitors’ access to its natural gas transportation network. Access to transportation networks, which are essential facilities, is the heart of any regulatory system, and if access was not organized beforehand (ex ante), it can be arranged afterwards (ex post), as is the case in this affair, via an alliance between Competition Law and Contract Law, wherein the commitments take on the form of a sort of co-regulation (cf. infra brief summary)
FRENCH
Par une décision du 4 mai 2010, la Commission Européenne a accepté le les engagements proposés par la société énergétique allemande E.ON d’ouvrir davantage à ses concurrents l’accès à son réseau de transport de gaz.
La commission européenne a mené en 2007 une enquête sectorielle sur le fonctionnement concurrentiel des marchés énergétiques européens en estimant que ceux-ci fonctionnent mal, notamment puisqu’ils sont peu ouverts et leurs prix trop élevés. Une procédure ouverte en décembre 2009 contre E.ON est ici close par l’engagement de celle-ci envers la commission européenne d’ouvrir à ses concurrents son réseau de transport de gaz. L’accès au réseau de transport, facilité essentielle, est le cœur du système de régulation et s’il ne se fait pas {ex ante} il peut se faire alors {ex post}, comme on le voit dans cette affaire, par une alliance entre le droit de la concurrence et le droit du contrat, l’engagement devenant une sorte de corégulation (voir infra dans le bref commentaire).
GERMAN
Die Europäische Kommission hat am 4. Mai 2010 ein Beschluss veröffentlicht, in dem sie die Zusage des deutschen Energiekonzerns E.ON, der Konkurrenz effektiven Zugang zu seinen Gasleitungen zu öffnen, für verbindlich erklärt.
Die Europäische Kommission hat eine kartellrechtliche Untersuchung im Energiesektor durchgeführt, da sie die europäischen Energiemärkte für ineffizient hielt, vor allem aufgrund mangelnden Wettbewerbs und zu hohen Preisen.Mit dem Beschluss vom 4. Mai 2010 werden die von E.ON angebotenen Verpflichtungen, den Zugang zu den Gasnetzwerken für potentielle Konkurrenten zu öffnen, für rechtlich bindend erklärt. Zugang zu Transportnetzen, die als wesentliche Einrichtungen ({Essential Facilities}) zählen, ist zentral für jedes Regulatierungssystem. Wenn dieser Zugang nicht im Voraus ({ex ante}) organisiert ist, kann er trotzdem im Nachhinein ({ex post}) etabliert werden, wie es hier den Fall ist, durch ein Bündnis zwischen Wettbewerbsrecht und Vertragsrecht, indem das Unternehmen durch seine Verpflichtungen quasi mitregulierend wirkt (siehe unten {Brief Summary})
SPANISH
En una decisión del 4 de mayo 2010, la Comisión Europea acepta los compromisos de la corporación alemana de energía, E.ON, para mejorar el acceso de competidores a la red de transporte del gas natural.
La Comisión Europea llevó a cabo una encuesta sectorial sobre la concurrencia en los mercados europeos de energía, ya que sea cree que estos mercados no funcionan de manera eficaz, especialmente porque no son los suficientemente abiertos a la competencia y sus precios son demasiado altos. Los trámites comenzaron en diciembre del 2009 contra la E.ON y fueron cerrados por ésta ante sus compromisos vinculantes ante la Unión Europea del 4 de mayo 2010 de mejorar el acceso de competidores a la red de transporte de gas natural. El acceso a las redes de transporte, que son facilidades esenciales, se encuentra al centro de cualquier sistema regulatorio, y si el acceso no fue organizado anteriormente (ex ante), puede ser organizado posteriormente (ex post), como en este caso a través de un alianza entre la Ley de la Concurrencia y la Ley de Contrato, donde los compromisos actúan de manera ‘co-regulatoria’ (VER. Infra para resumen breve).
On the one hand, economic structures, i.e., the centers of economic power, are relevant data for the functioning of the economy, since, especially in the countries in the Southern Hemisphere, they account for important characteristics in the underdevelopment process. On the other hand, as we have observed, these structures are the only ones from which any kind of presumption can be made about the probable behavior of economic agents.
What has yet to be defined is the kind of instruments that can be used to define the orientation and behavior of these structures. Economic instruments are worth little as they do not supply concrete economic results that are susceptible to empirical verification. Standing in the way of the use of legal instruments, however, is the apparent difficulty in applying social policy to the economic sphere. For many years, decisions that have affected the economic order have been left primarily to economic theories to which the discussion of values is unfamiliar. It is time therefore, for a legal theory of economic behavior, based on legal procedural values and on the restriction of economic power structures.
The European Medicine Agency (Agence européenne du Médicament - EMA) launched on May 31, 2012 a database, available on an Internet site, indicating "suspicious side effects" of drugs allowed on European Union markets. The information comes both of the different authorities of national regulation of drugs and pharmaceutical companies who spontaneously reported these side effects.
In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors
ENGLISH
Article: What does it mean to be neutral ? Socrates in the land of regulators
Should regulatory agencies, as we define them in today’s economic and cultural world, be obligated to be neutral in accomplishing their regulatory activities? What would the meaning of such an obligation be?
ITALIAN
Articolo: Cosa vuol dire essere neutrale? Socrate nella terra dei regolatori
Le autorità di regolazione, come sono denominate oggigiorno nel mondo economico e culturale, dovrebbero essere obbligate ad essere neutrali quando compiono le loro attività di regolazione? Quale sarebbe il significato di un tale obbligo?
