In the Unites States, the Federal Act, the Interstate Wire Act, is now performed by the Department of Justice as that only prohibiting sports betting and not poker online. In addition, States have to make arrangements if they want to liberalize the game of poker online. In February 2012, there is that many States have explicitly maintained the ban, only having liberalized and permits issued for Nevada.
Edited by Roger J. Van den Bergh, Professor of Law and Economics, Alessio M. Pacces, Professor of Law and Finance,University Rotterdam, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI).
Snd ed., Elgar Publisher, 2012, 800 p.
Richard A. Posnor presents this collective book : "This book of essays on the economics of regulation is comprehensive and authoritative, and is particularly noteworthy for its emphasis on European as well as American regulatory methods. The international perspective is important because of the long history of regulatory failures on both continents, the increasing integration of the economies of both continents, and the resulting need of both regulatory cultures to learn from each other.".
After the close of financial markets , the Charmain of JP Morgan, Jamie Dimon, announced on 10 may 2012, the loss of 2 billion dollars on hedging activities. The announcement was carried out by a conference call, the Chairman saying the past that this is the result of errors of assessment and in the future that losses may increase. Commentators have pointed out that it made less legitimate criticism that this Chairman has always made on the regulation of banking of the Dodd-Frank Act and the ban of trading for own account, the press considered moreover that the manager has more shown by such a result the need of constraint to exercise in the future on banks. But should we have to confuse ad hoc case and the general rule to adopt? Is relevance of a critic and special case in which is described that is one was critical can be remain relevant?
The European Directive of September 16th 2009 introduces a clear definition of electronic money and establishes a new prudential supervisory regime of the business of electronic money institutions.
In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors
ENGLISH
While financial regulation aims at achieving market stability, regulating markets can sometimestake an ironic turn when regulations end up having consequencesthat differ from their original regulatory purpose. The article provides such an example of regulation’s irony: how a regulatory change in Germany led Moody’s to downgrade 12 banks, therefore weakening such institutions and consequently enhancing the current issues of market volatility and credit cost.
FRENCH
Bien que la réglementationfinancière vise àassurer la stabilitédu marché, la régulation des marchéspeut parfoisprendre une tournureironique quandla régulation finit par avoirdes conséquencesqui diffèrent deson objectifde régulationd’origine.L’article fournitun exemplede l’ironie de la régulation : commentun changement de réglementationen Allemagne a conduitMoody’sà déclasser12 banques allemandes,, donc à affaiblirces institutions etpar conséquentà accroître les problèmes actuels dela volatilité du marchéet le coûtdu crédit.
ITALIAN
Quando la regolazione è volta ad ottenere la stabilità del mercato, l’evoluzione di questi mercati oggetto di tale regolazione può essere particolarmente ironica quando la regolazione ha delle conseguenze ben differenti da quelle originariamente prepostesi. Questo articolo cerca quindi di mettere in evidenza un esempio di questa ironia: in effetti, un cambio di regolatore in Germania ha portato Moody’s a tagliare il rating di 12 banche, indebolendo ancora di più tali istituzioni ed aumentando si conseguenza le questioni relative alla volatilità del mercato e del costo del credito.
A "Chambre régionale de discipline des commissaires aux comptes" (Auditors’ regional chamber of discipline) had imposed a penalty on one of these professionals, who formed a retrial before this chamber. His action is dismissed for lack of text, that confirms the "Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux Comptes (French High Council of the Commissioner of Account). The "Conseil d’Etat" (French Council of State) invalidates the decision, demanding that retrial is open, even without special text, if the applicant claims that the decision was not adopted on the relevant documents.
FRENCH
Une chambre régionale de discipline des commissaires aux comptes avait infligé une sanction à un de ces professionnels, qui forme un recours en révision devant cette chambre. Le recours est rejeté faute de texte, ce que confirme le Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux Compte. Le Conseil d’Etat invalide la décision, en posant qu’un recours en révision est ouvert, même sans texte spécial, si le requérant prétend que la décision n’a pas été adoptée sur des pièces pertinentes.
The original spirit of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was to think of agriculture as a sector unfolding in time, subject to natural hazards, including actors, both farmers and the population that is fed, having interests on which national states shall ensure.
The spirit of the new Common Agricultural Policy is different, even opposite, which explains the length of its gestation. Indeed, competition becomes the principle guarantor of innovation, fair prices for consumers and competitiveness of the European agricultural industry facing global competition, which leads to assist agricultural enterprises, to worry about products quality, away from the subtraction of these products of the principle of competition.
It points out that the agricultural sector is subject to competition law only if the Community legislature didn't stipulate differently!footnote-16. The Regulation almost affirms the opposite principle: "It should be provided that the rules on competition relating to the agreements, decisions and practices referred to in Article 101 TFEU and to abuse of a dominant position apply to the production of, and the trade in, agricultural products, provided that their application does not jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the CAP.". The Regulation details: A special approach should be allowed in the case of farmers' or producer organisations or their associations, the objective of which is the joint production or marketing of agricultural products or the use of joint facilities, unless such joint action excludes competition or jeopardises the attainment of the objectives of Article 39 TFEU.
On 15 January 2015 the European Commission launches a consultation on the "joint salling of olive oil, beef and veal livestock and arable crops, cases covered by the Regulation.
How the new balance will be between competition and regulation?!footnote-20
It is likely that future guidelines will be the place of expression of this balance.
France and Italy had subsidized rail alpine highway, but the project was behind schedule. Thus, an prolongation of governments support was necessary. The European Commission admittedit in its decision of 11 June 2012, because States are committed the concession will be effective on June 30, 2013 and mostly because this mode of transport will be an alternative to transporting goods.
FRENCH
La France et l’Italie avaient subventionné l’autoroute ferroviaire alpine, mais le projet a pris du retard. Ainsi, une prolongation du soutien des gouvernements était nécessaire. La Commission européenne l'a admis dans sa décision du 11 Juin 2012, parce que les États se sont engagés et que la concession sera effective le 30 juin, 2013, surtout parce que ce mode de transport sera une alternative au transport routiers par camions des marchandises.
PeruRail, the operator of Peru’s famous railway line, providing service between Cuzco and Machu Picchu, was sanctioned USD$800,000 on May 10, 2010 by the {‘Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual’} (INDECOPI- Peru’s national institute for the defense of competition and protection of intellectual property) for having restricted competitors’ market entry. An appeal is underway.
The European Banking Union is based on supervision as much as on regulation: it concerns the operators as much as the structures of the sector, because the operators "hold" the sector.
This is why the "regulator - supervisor" holds the operators by the supervision and is close to them.
He meets them officially and in "soft law" relations. This is all the more necessary since the distinction between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post must be nuanced, in that its application is too rigid, in that it involves a long time (first of all the rules, then to apply them, then to notice a gap between rules and behaviors, then to repair it) is not appropriate if the system aims at the prevention of systemic crises, whose source is inside the operators.
This is why the body in charge of solving the difficulties of the systemic banks for the salvation of the systeme meets the banking sector itself, to ensure that they are permanently "resolvable", so that the hypothesis of their resolution never arises. This is the challenge of this system: that it is always ready, for never be applying.
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In the European Banking Union, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) is in charge of "resolve" the difficulties of European systemic banks in difficulty. It is the public body of the second pillar of the Banking Union. The first pillar is the prevention of these difficulties and the third is the guarantee of deposits. The resolution is therefore more like an Ex Post mechanism.
But in this continuum through these three pillars between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post, the SRB does not wait passively - as would a traditional judge do - that the file of the troubled bank reaches it. Like a supervisor - which brings it closer to the first public in the system (Single Supervisory Board -SSB), which supervises all the banks, it is in direct contact with all the banks, and it approaches the hypothesis of a bank in trouble by a systemic perspective: it is therefore to the entire banking system that the SRB addresses itself.
As such, it organizes meetings, where he is located: in Brussels.
To resolve in Ex Post the difficulties of a bank, it has to present a quality (a little known concept in Bankruptcy Law): "resolvability". How build it? Who build it ? In its very design and in its application, bank by bank.
For the resolution body vis-à-vis all players in the banking and financial sector, it's clear: "Working together" is crucial in building resolvability ".
In the projection that is made, it is affirmed that there can be a successful resolution only if the operator in difficulty is not deprived of access to what makes to stay it alive, that is to say the banking and financial system itself, and more specifically the "Financial Market Infrastructures", for example payment services.
Does the Single Resolution Board expect spontaneous commitments from the FMIs for such a "right of access"? In this case, as the Single Resolution Board says, this right of access corresponds to "critical functions" for a bank, the resolution situation can not justify the closure of the service.
By nature, these crucial operators are entities that report to regulators who oversee them. Who enforces - and immediately - this right of access? When one can think that it is everyone, it risks being nobody .... That is why the resolution body, relaying in this a concern of the Financial Stability Board, underlines that it is necessary to articulate the supervisors, regulators and "resolvers" between them.
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To read this program, since it is a proposed program of work for the banking sector, four observations can be made:
1. We are moving more and more towards a general "intermaillage" (which will perhaps replace the absence of a global State, but it is an similar nature because it is always to public authorities that it refers and not to self-regulation);
2. But as there is no political authority to keep these guardians, the entities that articulate all these various public structures, with different functions, located in different countries, acting according to different temporalities, these are the companies themselves that internalize the concern that animates those who built the system: here the prevention of systemic risk. This is the definition of Compliance, which brings back to companies, here more clearly those those which manage the Market Infrastructures, the obligations of Compliance (here the management of systemic risk through the obligation of giving access).
3. Even without a single systemic guard, there is always a recourse. That will be the judge. There are already many, there will probably be more in a system of this type, more and more complex, the articulation of disputes is sometimes called "dialogue". And it is undoubtedly "decisions of principle" that will set the principles common to all of these particular organisms.
4. We then see the emergence of Ex Ante mechanisms for the solidity of the systems, and the solidity of the players in the systems, and then the Ex Post resolution of the difficulties of the actors according to access to the solidity of the infrastructures of these systems, which ultimately depend on judges (throughout the West) facing areas where all of this depends much less on the judge: the rest of the world.
