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Regulation presupposes that we move from a political conception of Act (that is to say a collective Decision expressed by the State) or a civilist one (that is, a will expressed by one or several individuals in one Contract) to an economic vision of trading organizations whose action is the expression of the market. If one relies on the adjustment of supply and demand, that is to say, the meeting of desires and interests, there will be "self-regulation", which is the "Law of the Market ", referring to competition law. The act of the operators is only a reflection of this law, in action.

La Régulation est alors plus complexe car elle vise autre chose que cette rationalité mécanique, soit en raison d’une défaillance du marché (par exemple en cas de monopole naturel) soit parce qu’on veut obtenir plus que ce que le marché peut donner (par ex. l’accès de tous à des biens communs, comme la santé, même pour des demandeurs insolvables). Dans ce cas, sont élaborées des règlementations, interventions ex ante désignées en anglais par le terme regulation. La règlementation est adéquate si elle incite des agents économiques à adopter des comportements qui concrétisent le but recherché par l’auteur de la règlementation.

Regulation is then more complex because it aims at something other than this mechanical rationality, either because of a market failure (for example in the case of a natural monopoly) or because it wants to obtain more than the market can give ( Eg access to common goods by all, such as health, even for insolvent claimants). In this case, regulations are drawn up, ex ante intervention. The regulation is adequate if it encourages economic agents to adopt behaviors that concretize the aim sought by the author of the regulatory mechanisms.

This strategic use of law then requires the necessary detour through the economic analysis of law, that is to say the analysis of law in its economic effects.

This discipline created in the United States by Ronald Coase (Nobel Prize for Economics in 1991) can be merely descriptive and reveal what economic effects the law produced. This conception, which is that of Richard Posner, makes the economic analysis of law an instrument of expertise for the political decision-maker, who can take this into account if it is necessary to modify the rules. A more radical conception of the so-called "normative economic analysis of law" is to argue that the conclusions of the analysis would oblige the decision-maker to follow it.

The issue is decisive because in the first case the law and the jurists - in particular the Legislator and the judge - still have an autonomous existence, in the second case they no longer exist, they are no more than the binding and explicit form of the "Law of the market" whose nature is a-legal.

Even in its descriptive form, economic analysis of the law is generally rejected in France in that it disregards the role of the law in that it carries moral values. It is in reality to ignore its merely descriptive, instructive and useful function, and the fact that it opens instead the amplitude of the rational choice offered to political decision-makers. Moreover, regulation is not only a technical discipline, it is also a political and philosophical issue. Descriptive economic analysis is more appropriate to it than normative economic analysis of the law, which claims to vassalize or even destroy other disciplines, which are substantially unknown.

The theme of the relationship between regulation and innovation finds every day new illustrations. The example of the drone is particularly noteworthy.

Indeed, the drone is a technical object that moves in the air without being driven in an immediate way by the hand of man.

The legal mechanism of qualification brought the drone in the category of "aircraft" and submit it to the regulatory power of the civil aviation regulator.

The regulation of civil aviation is primarily a safety regulation, not a regulation of the sector's economic deployment.

This is why regulators have taken restrictive positions on drones used for commercial purposes, to the extent that the presence of human beings, most the pilots, are the condition for the safety of people. The fact that the drones fly with "no one" led to consider as a danger a prior, which led regulators to take restrictive measures on flying drones for commercial purposes, restricton consistent with the regulator's intervention criteria, without taking into account external rules, such as the protection of privacy.

But whatever the sector, regulators see themselves increasingly as economic regulators. If we adopt this perspective, a restrictive approach appears to be nonsense.

In the interests of balance in both approaches, the safety of people and the economic development through innovation, the US civil aviation regulator, the Federal Aviation Administration is developing new rules.

February 11, 2015, Federal Aviation Administration raised the need for a legal framework for commercial drones. The reason for this is economic. As it writes: "It is anticipated that this activity will result in significant economic benefits".  Indeed, Article 333 of the 2012 ACT of modernization and reform  imposes registration procedure for every commercial unmanned flying object in the sky!footnote-28. But this hinders business development, and therefore the incentive to technical innovation drone.

It was necessary to find a balance between security of persons and lifting of barriers to economic development. This is why the FAA will distinguish between "small" and other drones. The former are particularly useful in agriculture. To the extent that the former do not constitute danger to persons, an exemption from this procedure (Article 333 exemption) may be given concerning them.

One can analyze this evolution of air Regulation in two ways. First, it is for air regulator to take into account fundamental innovation of flying machines with "no one": innovation will be the base of a huge market for which strict regulatory rules could have been the troublemaker. The consideration of the safety of people remains since only drones "small" are allowed. In addition, they will have to remain at low level and away from airports and housing.

Second, the Regulator reacts by pragmatism. The ban on commercial flight drones hasn't prevented investment in this area. So far, the regulator had instead chosen not to react to the open violations of the standards, from the moment that the safety of the people wasn't in danger. The idea of the new conception is to promote this new market by putting the rules protecting the physical safety of people.

Translated summaries

 

 

 

The translated summaries are done by organizers

 

ENGLISH

Traditionally regulated sectors, such as energy and telecommunications, have a very strong local roots, which made ​​them at first dominated by the States even if they were developed by companies, because of the link between the State and territory. Furthermore, the market, which is a space defined by the activities and not necessarily by a territory, was superimposed on the overall economic. When observing the phenomena taking place in new territories, for example the euro area, but more what looks like spaces without territoriality, such as the Internet, or finance, geography seems to disappear. The dynamism of operators led by its own strength to the formation of new geographies which owe nothing to the kind or normative power of the States, as in energy infrastructure. However, to date, there have been in a regulatory report with respect to geography or based on geography. Could we diagnose the disappearance of geography or processing thereof such that the regulations themselves must be radically transformed? It is this question which is the subject of this symposium.

 

FRENCH

Les secteurs régulés traditionnellement, par exemple l’énergie ou les télécommunications, ont un ancrage territorial très fort, ce qui les a rendus à première vue dominés par les Etats même s’ils étaient développés par des entreprises, en raison du lien entre l’Etat et le territoire. En outre, les Etats ont avec l’espace aérien un rapport consubstantiel car le contrôle de l’air par l’Etat assure la sécurité de celui-ci et de la population ; pourtant, l’Etat vend aujourd’hui des fréquences à des opérateurs privés. En outre, à la notion de territoire, le marché, qui est un espace défini par des activités et non plus nécessairement par un territoire, s’est superposé sur l’ensemble du droit économique, bouleversant notamment la notion et le rôle des frontières. Lorsqu’on observe les phénomènes en cours dans de nouveaux territoires, par exemple la zone euro, mais plus encore ce qui semble être des espaces sans territorialité, comme Internet, voire la finance, la géographie semble disparaître. Le dynamisme des opérateurs conduit par sa seule force à la constitution de nouvelles géographies qui ne doivent rien à la nature ni au pouvoir normatif des Etats, comme en matière d’infrastructure énergétique. Or, jusqu’ici, il n’y a eu de régulation que dans un rapport à l’égard d’une géographie ou s’appuyant sur une géographie. Pourrait-on diagnostiquer la disparition de la géographie ou une transformation telle de celle-ci que les régulations elles-mêmes doivent se transformer radicalement ? C’est cette interrogation même qui est l’objet de ce colloque.

 

SPANICH

Los sectores regularmente regulados, por ejemplo los de energía y telecomunicaciones, poseen un anclaje muy fuerte, por lo que parecen ser a primera vista dominados por el Estado aunque fueron desarrollados por empresas, por el lazo que existe entre el Estado y el territorio. Los Estados tienen una relación substancial en lo que concierne el espacio aéreo, ya que el control del aire por el Estado asegura la seguridad de él mismo y de la población; y por consiguiente, el Estado vende frecuencias a operadores privados. En cuanto a la noción del territorio, el mercado, que es un espacio definido por actividades y no necesariamente por un territorio, se ha superpuesto sobre el conjunto del derecho económico, y ha transformado la noción y el rol de las fronteras. Mientras que uno observa los fenómenos en marcha en diferentes territorios, por ejemplo la euro zona, pero más aún lo que semeja ser espacios sin territorio, como el Internet y la finanza, la geografía parece desaparecer. El dinamismo de los operadores conducidos por su propia fuerza hacia la constitución de nuevas geografías, que no responden ni a la naturaleza ni al poder normativo de los Estados, como en materia de infraestructura energética. Hasta el presente, la regulación se había limitado a la geografía o se había apoyada en ella de una forma u otra. ¿Podríamos diagnosticar la desaparición de la geografía o una transformación tal que las regulaciones mismas también tendrían que transformarse radicalmente? Esta interrogación será el objetivo del coloquio.

 

 

 

 

ARABIC

 

القطاعات المنضمة تقليديا مثل الطاقة والاتصالات السلكية، لديها جذور قوية جدا التي جعلتهم تحت سيطرة الدولة في البداية حتى لو تم تطويرها من قبل مع الشركات، وذلك بسبب الارتباط بين الدولة و الإقليم. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، الدول التي لديها مع المجال الجوي تقرير الجوهر لأن سيطرة الدولة عليه يضمن سلامته و سلامة الشعب، ومع ذلك فإن الدولة تبيع ترددات إلى المشغلين القطاع الخاص وعلى ذلك، تم فرضه على مفهوم الأرض، والسوق، الذي هو مساحة محددة من خلال الأنشطة وليس بالضرورة من الأراضي، في القانون الاقتصادي العام ، بما في ذلك فكرة مروعة وحدود الدور. عندما نلاحظ الظواهر التي تحدث في مناطق جديدة، على سبيل المثال في منطقة اليورو، ولكن أكثر ما يشبه الأماكن دون الإقليمية، مثل شبكة الإنترنت، أو التمويل، الجغرافية تبدو أنها تختفي. نشاطية المشغلين تقيد قوة خاصة بها لتشكيل مناطق جغرافية جديدة والتي لديها أي شيء لهذا النوع أو القوة المعيارية للدول، كما هو الحال في البنية التحتية للطاقة. لكن، حتى هناك، كان تقريرا تنظيميا فيما يتعلق بالجغرافية أو على أساس الجغرافية. هل يمكننا تشخيص اختفاء الجغرافية أو تحولها مثل ذلك يجب أن الانضمة تتغير كليا ؟ هذا هو سؤال الموضوع لهذه الندوة.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Other translations forthcoming.

People playing online can pay by payment card or credit card. Licensed gambling operators created cards for prepaid usage, likely to be sold in advance to the players. On 18 April 2012, The Autorité française de régulation des jeux en ligne (ARJEL — French Online gambling regulatory authority) examined this practice. The regulator has relied on article 17 of the Act of May 12, 2010, law that organises the system of online games. It specifies that the player account cannot be supplied by the owner by an instrument of payment issued by a "payment service provider". The regulator noted that games operators are not payment service providers and concluded, in a restrictive interpretation, that this practice must be stopped immediately. The regulator confines itself in its decision to "remember this point" to the operators. This is sufficient because if they overlook, the Commission of the sanction of the Autorité française de régulation des jeux en ligne (ARJEL — French Online gambling regulatory authority) online, examined this practice will be there to raise the voice.

In Spain, the liberalization and legalizalisation of online games, provided by the Act for January 2012, was postponed in June 2012. The licensing by the regulator is in preparation. These licenses may relate to all kinds of games including sports betting and casino games, excluding slot machines. But the Spanish tax services informed that an implied condition of approval of an operator candidate for obtaining a licence existed: payment of taxes due in Spain. However, many companies, whose headquarters is located in another country, have high arrears of taxes calculated by the administration. It can be noticed that the fiscal interests of the States is a key element in the regulation of the games, that can interfere with the mechanism, which appears however distinct from the approval by the regulator.

Les services d'intérêt économique général et le marché intérieur : régimes nationaux et cadre juridique européen

This is currently the great battle and no one knows the outcome.

By its jugdment Grande Stevens of 4 March 2014, the European Court of Human Rights held that a state can't punish a person for a criminal penalty and administrative penalty for the same fact, criticized in market matters.

In the movement of the "dialogue of judges," the Conseil d'Etat (French State Council) asked 27 July 2014 the Conseil constitutionnel (French Constitutional Counci) l the question of compliance from this addition to the French Constitution for financial penalty in the use of public funds. By a decision of 24 October 2014, the Constitutional Council considered that this combination was consistent with the Constitution, mainly because the administrative sanction would be a "different kind" as  punishment, because each pursues a different objective.

In turn, by a judgment of 17 December 2014, the Cour de cassation  (French Judicial Supreme Court) decided to refer to the Constitutional Council two priority issues of constitutionality.

The presentation of the problem by the Cour de Cassation is the following. By its terms, it shows the hostility of the Court of Cassation to the doctrine hitherto developed by the State Council and the Constitutional Council.

First, the interpretation of French law provides penal proceedings against a person for facts on which it has been exonerated by the financial regulator by the Sanctions Committee thereof. This may contradict the constitutional principle of res judicata, as incurred administrative penalties are comparable to penal sanctions.

Second, this possibility could also contradict the constitutional principles of equality, necessity of criminal law and respect of non bis in idem mechanism.

Qualification is the key operation in Law.

For example, if one says what a bitcoin is, then one assigns to it the regime which corresponds to this "nature" that one has thus said;

One could say that the "token" that it constitutes corresponds to nothing of what it existed before. In this case, their creation, storage, management, sale, loan, purchase does not correspond to any particular category that pre-existed. They therefore come under what is called "the category unnamed".

It is then in a liberal system the vacuum of liberty that applies to it. In a system of liberty, it is contractual freedom, freedom which attaches to the property right, the articulation between the contract and the property being sufficient. Technology can establish such a qualification, because the risk inherent in a system of freedom is also borne by the blockchain mechanism. Indeed, by the spread of risk on the one hand, and the safety of machines on the other, there would be no need to worry, and the principle of freedom could give credence to the idea that the "token" would be a sui generis category.

But central banks and financial regulators are probably not convinced and prefer to qualify by bringing the "token" to a pre-existing category, which automatically triggers the legal regime. It is well known that the art of qualification consists in choosing from among the attainable qualifications the one which will allow the application of the regime which is the most adequate to satisfy the aim which one wishes to attain. In terms of regulation, governed entirely by goals, qualification is therefore primarily a matter of strategy.

Now, to affirm that the bitcoin is a sui generis object amounts to not regulating its emission, usages and intermediations, not to control those who make use of it. It amounts to taking away the merits of self-regulation.

This was excluded.

First of all by the Central Banks. Bitcoins and other tokens, based on the mechanical security of the blockchain, can be described as "money" when it is a matter of their acquisition to allow people to  access other goods. The central bankers retained the qualification of "currency", which does not prohibit their issuance but which justifies the application of banking Regulation.

Then by the Financial Regulators. Indeed, the same tokens of securities and financial instruments can be described when they are issued by persons who issue them to raise funds, buyers bringing money not to acquire other things but in consideration of  the future value of the undertaking which issued them. On July 25, 2017, the SEC therefore classified them as securities and applied all of the financial law in order to protect these investments and the capital markets.

Once again, we measure that the norm of the Regulation resides in these aims and that on the other hand its main tool is in the qualification of the various activities which are "new" only if the Regulator wants it

Full reference: Frison-Roche, M.-A., Being obliged by Law to unlock telephone is not equivalent to self-incrimination: Cour de cassation, Criminal Chamber, Dec. 19, 2019, Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation, 21st of August 2020

Read by freely subscribing the other news of the Newsletter MAFR - Law, Compliance, Regulation

 

Summary of the news

The Cour de Cassation (French Supreme Judicial Court) made a decision on 19th of December 2019 about a case concerning a refusal to communicate his mobile phone's unlock code to the police while the police found him with a significant quantity of narcotic and a lot of cash and that there was a certain probability that this mobile phone get proofs of culpability of its owner. The individual was indicted not for narcotic trafficking but for not having communicate its unlock code which constitute an offense to article 434-15-2 of code pénal, from the loi du 3 juin 2018 renforçant la lutte contre la criminalité organisée, et le terrorisme et leur financement (law reinforcing organized crime, terrorisme and their financing).

The accused invokes before the court its right to not incriminate oneself. Indeed, the configuration face to policemen was such that if he refused to communicate its unlock code, he will be punished because of this obligation to communicate his code and that if he accepted, he will also be sanctioned because of the proofs contained into the mobile phone. Such a configuration therefore offered him no alternative to confessing, which is contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights and to European and national jurisprudence.

Face to such a case, the Cour de Cassation chose to segment the information and proposed the following solution: if the researched information cannot be obtained regardless of the suspect willingness, it is not possible to constraint this person to communicate this information without violating its procedural rights, but if the information can be obtained regardless of the suspect willingness then the individual is obliged to communicate his code. In the current case, as it was possible for policemen to obtain information contained in the phone by technical means, longer but existent, then the refuse of communication of the unlock code by the suspect constitute an obstruction that should be sanctioned. 

Such a decision is an exemple of the conciliation by the judge of two fundamental but contradictory "monumental goals" of Compliance Law: transparency of information towards public authorities and very sensible personal data protection. 

​To go further, read Marie-Anne Frison-Roche's working paper: Rethinking the world from the notion of data

 

 

On 2 March 2018, Koen Lenaerts came to an amphitheater at the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2) to inaugurate the series of conferences organized by the Journal of Regulation & Compliance (JoRC), a cycle that has the general title: Pour une Europe de la Compliance (For the Europe of Compliance). The School of Public Affairs of Sciences Po, the Department of Economics of Sciences Po, the Ecole doctorale de droit privé  (Doctoral School of Private Law) at the Université Panthéon-Assas- Paris 2 (Panthéon-Assas University - Paris 2) and the School of Law of the University Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris I), are associated with this cycle. Many personalities will take the floor. They will give contributions for the book that will be published in the Régulations & Compliance Series edited by Marie-Anne Frison-Roche at Éditions Dalloz.

After an admirable lecture offered by Koen Lenaerts, Antoine Garaponfootnote-94, secrétaire générale de l'Institut des Hautes Études pour la Justice (Secretary General of the Institute of Higher Studies for Justice), reacted perfectly in "premier discutant", stressing as everyone his great interest in listening to the demonstration made by the President of the Court of Justice.

He felt that it was hardly possible to speak of "Compliance Law"!footnote-91, because it is above all a Law that ceases to be "prescriptive" to become "relational" ", companies organizing themselves to put goals that are reached in relation with the public authorities. Companies thus develop a "systemic Law" that develops on its own, with alert mechanisms put in place directly by companies that care before the continuity of their economic activities. The notion of third parties disappears, a sort of "direct government" takes the place of the "indirect government" represented by the "third party", the companies having integrated this third party into their own organization, which upsets their relation to time and puts in place a "metajuridic" system.

Antoine Garapon then asks the question of how such a "conversion" could take place, that is to say, this transition of control systeme from the Ex Post mode to the Ex Ante, resulting in companies internalize the task of effective rules!footnote-92. He believes that on the one hand, the system that advocates it has the "market power to impose it and, on the other hand, those who demand it in this system make a" vision of the world "explicit. Antoine Garapon adds the need for a "moral ambition".

However, Antoine Garapon pointed out the United States have met these three conditions.

In his discussion, Antoine Garapon, on the other hand, felt that Europe did not bring them together and that Europe "starts with a handicap", because it does not consider worlwide, because it has no vision of the world, because it has not operated on moral integration.

He insisted that the Court of Justice can carry these three conditions, especially with regard to personal data. Because this is about the digital that Europe has a market power. It is about personal data that the Court of Justice is the place where Europe is both a market and values!footnote-93.

This is why the Court of Justice of the European Union does have a central role for this construction.

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These very constructed, very instructive remarks of Antoine Garapon, thanks to him, perfectly showed, in mirror of the conference of the President of the Court of Justice, the stake: the future.

Beyond the disputatio around the definitions, it is indeed the question of whether or not Europe will build its own compliance mechanisms.

By finding a vocabulary of its own. Not only in French, because the Law is made of words, but also with new words, which leave us "translated-glued" and which will carry European ambitions, as it was the case for the "right to be forgotten" ", very often quoted in the discussion.

Of course, this presupposes "power". But we must already pretend. And the Law has always claimed to pretend. It is in this that it is an Order. This is probably why President Koen Lenaerts insisted on the "juridicization" of compliance, as does the hand of Law that arises on an object.