The Regulator itself issued the amount of the award to a whistleblower for having providing it with information. Why is that? One would usually take a lower profile when awarding this much money ($17m) to an informer… Conversely, the Regulator immediately and publicly announced it in a press release, which pretty looked like a tender offer for further denunciations. It even included a link for everyone to access the whistleblower program—which is easily funded, since the awards are charged on the fines imposed on the convicted operators thanks to the information given.
The reason for this is that information from whistleblowers is not merely indicative, nor a second-best option; it is central to Regulation, since it leads the Regulator to get information people within the system (i.e., insiders) deliberately chooses to ‘blow’ (in fact, not only do informers blow the whistle—they often immediately provide the Regulator with substantial information).
The press release includes justifications for the Regulator’s behaviour, as the SEC openly considers that rewarding whistleblowers is the most efficient way for the Regulator to open or to resolve investigations. The Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement stated indeed that “company insiders are uniquely positioned to protect investors and blow the whistle on a company’s wrongdoing by providing key information to the SEC so we can investigate the full extent of the violations”.
This highlights the ambivalence of insiders. Accordingly, they need to be ‘inside’ the system to be ‘knowledgeable’ and, consequently, obtain privileged information. On the one hand, should they use this information for themselves, then they would face prosecution for market abuse; on the other hand, however, if they use it to stir up the Regulator and shift its attention towards the whistle they’re blowing, then they may earn just as much money, if not more, than if they had behaved in a way that would have led them to prison.
The stage is thus set for the "business of virtue" to thrive.
In order to properly conceive the role of law in the economic sphere, a problem that is usually designated as “good regulation”, it can be instructive to confront what such a concept denotes to one of the most prominent theories of the rule of law in modern societies, the theoryof F. A. Hayek.
FRENCH
Article: Régulation et politique. Réflexions sur l’état de droit.
Afin d’appréhender adéquatement le rôle de la loi dans la sphère économique – un problème habituellement désigné comme relevant de la « bonne régulation » - il peut être instructif de mettre en relief ce qu’un tel concept apporte à l’une des théories les plus marquantes de l’état de droit dans les sociétés modernes: celle de F. A. Hayek.
GERMAN
Artikel : Regulierung und Politik : Überlegungen über den Rechtsstaat.
Um die Rolle des Gesetzes im wirtschaftlichen Sphäre vollständig erfassen zu können – ein Problem normalerweise mit dem Begriff “good regulation” benennt wird –ist es nützlich zu betonen, was solch einen Begriff zu einer der wichtigsten Theorie des Rechtstaates im modernen Gesellschaften mit sich bringen kann – und zwar die, von F. A. Hayek.
SPANISH
Artículo: Regulación y política: reflexiones sobre el imperio de la ley.
Para poder correctamente concebir el rol de la ley in la esfera económica, un problema que es usualmente designado como ‘buena regulación,’ puede ser instructivo confrontarse a lo que tal concepto denota a una de las teorías más prominentes del imperio de la ley en las sociedades modernas, la teoría de F. A. Hayek.
ITALIAN
Articolo: Politica e regolazione finanziaria: riflessioni sulla norma giuridica
Per concepire una norma giuridica in campo economico, problema denominato della “buona regolazione”, può essere interessante riflettere sul contenuto di questo concetto nella teoria di F. A Hayek, una delle più elaborate teorie dello stato di diritto moderno.
PORTUGUESE
Artigo: Regulação e política: reflexões sobre o Estado de Direito.
Para poder conceber corretamente o papel da lei na esfera econômica (questão usualmente conhecida como “boa regulação”), pode ser instrutivo colocar em relevo o que este conceito revela sobre uma das teorias mais proeminentes do Estado de Direito nas sociedades modernas, a teoria de F. A. Hayek.
As soon as Regulation assumes independence of the operator who manages the essential infrastructure, ex ante conditions of such independence must be met.
Europe doesn't require legal autonomy of the essential infrastructure manager, probably because such autonomy, it would be both too ask the Policy, which may want more integrated organizations as soon as public transportation is a mix of public policies and that to public funds are used. But it would also be too little to ask the Policy because no matter the legal autonomy, the key is the real independence of the manager, that is under the control of the Regulator.
The Loi portant réforme ferroviaire (Railway Reform Act) of August 4, 2014 has made the integration of the company that manages the rail network, which the new name is SNCF Réseau (SNCF Network) in a public group, which also includes the SNCF, public transportation operator, in competition with new entrants in a newly opened sector to competition.
The Competition Authority in its opinion of 4 October 2013 had expressed reluctance towards the bill, to the influence that such corporate organization offers to the public operator, to the detriment of its competitors and the opening of the railway sector to competition.
The Competition Authority issues its opinion as a real essay on what should be the Regulation of the railway sector through the "governance" of the network manager. Indeed, the first part of the opinion relates to "the independent management of railway infrastructure" while the second focuses on the integration of railway network in the public group built par the law. The third part of this Opinion draws conclusions to measure whether we can consider that the Autorité de Régulation des Activités Ferroviaires (French Regulatory Authority of Railways Activities) shall have the capacity to ensure this independence by governance or not.
This review, in its construction itself, demonstrates the dialectic between Regulation and Governance (I), which is an observation and stresses the role of the regulator in the effectiveness of governance (II), which is more a question .
After two years of implementation of France, the 2004 Directive on markets in financial instruments is to be reviewed at the European level in 2010. The French report, elaborated by Pierre Fleuriot, examines whether or not the directive’s main objectives –the deregulation of markets and the lowering of trading costs- were achieved in an efficient way.
In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors
ENGLISH
On December 20, 2011, the European Commission adopted a decision based on the Almark ruling that expounds upon the four conditions necessary so that compensation paid by a State to any state-owned or private company entrusted with the operation of a public service not require prior notification of the European Commission, despite the general prohibition on State Aids. Each state has a wide margin of discretion in the definition of services that could be classified as being services of general economic interest. A communication and de minimis regulation will complete this decision.
FRENCH
Par une décision du 20 décembre 2011, la Commission Européenne, s’appuyant sur l’arrêt Almark , développe les 4 conditions pour que les compensations versées par un Etat à une entreprise, qu’elle soit publique ou privée, pour qu’elle assure un service public, ne donne pourtant pas lieu à notification à la Commission européenne, malgré la prohibition des aides d’Etat. Les Etats sont légitimes à définir les activités qui relèvent de l’intérêt économique général. Une communication et un règlement de minimis complèteront cette décision.
SPANISH
El 20 de diciembre del 2010, la Comisión Europea adoptó una decisión basada en la decisión Almark que trata de las cuatro condiciones necesarias para que una compensación pagada por el Estado a cualquier empresa pública o privada no requiera de una notificación previa a la Comisión Europea, a pesar de la prohibición general sobre Asistencias Estatales. Cada estado tiene un gran margen de discreción en la definición de servicios que podrían ser clasificados como servicios de interés económico general. Una comunicación y regulación de minimis completará la decisión.
ITALIAN
Il 20 dicembre 2011, la Commissione europea, sulla base della decisione Almark, ha identificato le quattro condizioni in presenza delle quali gli aiuti dati dallo Stato ad un’azienda, pubblica o privata, per far assicurare un servizio pubblico, non sarà necessario fare una notifica alla Commissione, nonostante il divieto di procedere con degli aiuti di Stato. Ogni Stato avrà un ampio margine di manovra nella definizione dei servizi che possono essere qualificati come servizi di interesse generale. Una comunicazione ed un regolamento de minimis completeranno questa decisione.
ARABIC
في قرار مؤرّخ يوم 20 ديسمبر2011’ اللّجنة الأوروبية* تعتمد على قرار الحكم ألمارك* لوضع أربع شروط للتّعويضات التّي تدفعها الدّولة للشركة سواء كانت عامة أو خاصة’ لأنّه يوفّر خدمة عمومية’ ومع ذلك’ لا يؤدّي في الإخطار إلى اللّجنة الأوروبية على الرّغم من حظر المعاونة الدّولية. الدّول غير المشروعة يحدّدون الأنشطة الّتي تندرج في إطار الاقتصادية العامة. اتصال و تنظيم سوف يستكملني الحد الأدنى للقرار.
On July 23, 2010 was published the awaited European-wide stress test, a mechanism designed by regulators to restore trust in markets through the mean of transparency. This paper examines the effect of trust on market from an economic perspective as well as from a sociological one. The paper demonstrated how trust, because it aims at achieving transparency which is Regulation’s number one tool, is not only necessary to economic growth but also participates to fulfilling regulatory objectives, such as market stability, risk prevention and consumer protection. Indeed, because Regulation is a mechanism aiming at preventing market failures, it needs as many tools, such as sociological ones (e.g. incentives) it may use to achieve such aim. The paper suggests that transparency is a tool for Regulation since it acts as a communicating vessel between regulatory objectives (microprudential) and supervisory ones (macroprudential), which both contribute to Regulation’s broader objective: the stability of a system.
FRENCH
Article: la régulation par la confiance: l'exemple des stress tests
Le 23 juillet 2010 a été publié le très attendu stress test à l'échelle européenne, un mécanisme conçu par les régulateurs pour restaurer la confiance dans les marchés par la transparence. Cet article examine les effets de la confiance sur les marchés dans une perspective économique et sociologique. L'article démontre en quoi la confiance, parce qu'elle a pour but d'installer la transparence, premier objectif de la Régulation, n'est pas seulement nécessaire à la croissance économique, mais participe également à l'accomplissement d'objectifs régulatoires, comme la stabilité du marché, la prévention du risque et la protection du consommateur. En effet, parce que la Régulation est un mécanisme visant à empêcher les défaillances de marché, elle a besoin d'autant d'instruments, y compris sociologiques (p.ex. les incitations), dont elle peut avoir usage pour atteindre cet objectif. L'article suggère que la transparence est un outil pour la Regulation puisqu'elle joue le rôle de transmetteur entre des objectifs régulatoires (micro-prudentiels) et des objectifs de supervision (macro-prudentiels), qui tous deux contriibuent à l'objectif plus large de la Régulation: la stabilité d'un système.
GERMAN
Artikel: Durch Vertrauern regulieren: das Beispiel den Stress Tests
Am 23. Juli 2010 wurden die erwarteten Ergebnisse den europaweiten Stress Tests bekanntgegeben. Diese Tests wurden von den Regulierungsbehörden dazu erfasst, um das Vertrauern auf Märkten durch Transparenz wiederherzustellen. Dieser Artikel erforscht die Auswirkung von Vertrauern auf Märkten auf einer ökonomischen und soziologischen Perspektive. Er zeigt, inwieweit Vertrauern, das den ersten Ziel der Regulierung, die Transparenz, einsetzen soll, nicht nur notwendig für die Wachstum ist, sondern auch für die Durchsetzung von Regulierungsziele, wie Marktstabilität, Riskverhütung, und Verbraucherschutz. Zwar ist Regulierung ein Mechanismus, das darauf zielt, Marktversagen zu vermeiden, sie braucht so viele Instrumente, einschliesslich soziologische Instrumente (z.B. Anreize), die sie brauchen könnte. Der Artikel deutet an, dass Transparenz ein Instrument der Regulierunh ist, da sie die Übertragung von Regulierungsziele (mikroprudentiel) und Überwachungsziele (makroprudentiel) erlaubt, was zum breiten Ziel der Regulierung beiträgt, und zwar die Systemstabiliserung.
SPANISH
La regulación a base de confianza: el ejemplo del estudio del estrés
El 23 de julio del 2010 fue publicado el muy esperado estudio del estrés, que se llevó a cabo a través de toda Europa, lo cual es un mecanismo diseñado por reguladores para restaurar la confianza en los mercados utilizando el valor medio de la transparencia. Este informe examina el efecto de la confianza sobre el marcado desde una perspectiva económica al igual que desde una perspectiva sociológica. El informe demuestra que la confianza, precisamente porque su objetivo es la transparencia que es el instrumento primordial de la Regulación, no sólo es necesaria para el crecimiento económico, sino que también contribuye a la realización de los objetivos regulatorios, como la estabilidad del mercado, la prevención del riesgo y la protección al consumidor. Por lo tanto, ya que la Regulación es un mecanismo cuyo objetivo es prevenir los fallos del mercado, necesita de la mayor cantidad de instrumentos posibles, como instrumentos sociológicos (por ejemplo, los incentivos), para cumplir con su meta. El informe sugiere que la transparencia es un instrumento para la Regulación ya que actúa como una nave comunicativa entre los objetivos regulatorios (microprudencial) y los objetivos de supervisión (macroprudencial), que juntos contribuyen al objetivo más amplio de la Regulación: la estabilidad del sistema.
ITALIAN
Articolo: Regolazione attraverso la fiducia: l’esempio degli stress test
Il 23 luglio 2010 é stato pubblicato il tanto atteso stress test a livello europeo, un meccanismo ideato dai regolatori al fine di rassicurare i mercati attraversola trasparenza. Tale studio esamina gli effetti della fiducia sul mercato da un punto di vista economico e sociologico. Lo studio dimostra come la fiducia, puntando a raggiungere una maggiore trasparenza, meccanismo primario della regolazione finanziaria, non é solamente necessaria per la crescita economica ma contribuisce inoltre a raggiungere gli obiettivi dei regolatori come la stabilità del mercato, la prevenzione del rischio e la protezione dei consumatori. Inoltre, poiché la regolazione é un meccanismo che vuole evitare i mancati funzionamenti del mercato, sono necessari per raggiungere tale scopo diversi strumenti, tra cui quelli sociologici (ad esempio gli incentivi). Questo studio suggerisce che la trasparenza é uno strumento di regolazione dal momento in cui costituisce il vaso comunicante tra gli obiettivi della regolazione (micropudenziale) e quelli della supervisione (macroprudenziale). Entrambi questi obiettivi contribuiscono al più ampio obiettivo della regolazione: la stabilità di un sistema.
The Autorité de la régulation des communications électroniques et des postes (ARCEP — French Telecommunications and Posts Regulator) organized Le colloque sur la neutralité des réseaux [The Colloquium on Network Neutrality], which took place on April 13, 2010. Each actor uses the generality of the term ‘neutrality’ in an interpretation that best suits his opinions. However, neutrality means that there should be no discrimination between Internet users; however, it does not mean that they have the right to everything for free: because there has to be some sort of traffic and bandwidth management, consumer and copyright protection, it is necessary to strike a balance between these contradictory rights in order to allow the network to develop. Therefore, a regulator is necessary. The future development of the Internet depends upon it. For the moment, nobody knows who these legitimate regulators are, and how they would be able to regulate these competing forces, organize information transparency, and encourage long-term investment, while preserving competition at the same time.
FRENCH
L’Autorité de Régulation des Communications Electroniques et des Postes – ARCEP a organisé le 13 avril 2010 un colloque sur « La neutralité des réseaux » (Network neutrality).
L’Autorité de Régulation des Communications Electroniques et des Postes – ARCEP a organisé le 13 avril 2010 un colloque sur « La neutralité des réseaux » (Network neutrality).Le colloque sur la neutralité des réseaux qui s’est tenu le 13 avril 2010 à l’Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes (ARCEP) présente la question de la neutralité des réseaux au travers de quatre questions : quelles sont les problématiques liées au principe de neutralité des réseaux ? Comment gérer les questions de gestion du trafic, de tarification et de partage de la valeur ? Comment articuler accès aux contenus et aux services et protection des droits des consommateurs ? Quels sont les besoins de régulation sur l’Internet ? Ces questions sont l’occasion pour l’ensemble des acteurs de l’Internet de s’exprimer et de présenter ainsi l’idée fondamentale qui soutient les évolutions de la régulation de l’Internet : l’obligation de non discrimination. Une pleine compréhension de cette idée implique une transparence accrue de l’information, afin que les problématiques techniques auxquelles Internet est confronté ne soient pas l’occasion d’une distorsion de l’offre aux consommateurs.
GERMAN
Die Autorité de Régulation des Communications Electroniques et des Postes (ARCEP - die französische Post- und Telekommunikationsaufischtsbehörde) hat am 13. april 2010 ein Symposium über die Frage der Netzneutralität organisiert.
Die Autorité de Régulation des Communications Electroniques et des Postes (ARCEP - die französische Post- und Telekommunikationsaufsichtsbehörde) hat am 13. April 2010 ein Symposium über die Netzneutralität organisiert. Bei dieser Gelegenheit wurden vier Themen ausführlich diskutiert: welche sind die Problemen, die aus dieser Prinzip der Netzneutralität entstehen. Wie können den Verkehr-, Tarifgestaltung- sowie Wertteilungsfragen verwaltet werden? Wie liegt den Ausgleich zwischen Schutz der Verbraucher und Zugang zu den Inhalte und Diensten? Was braucht die Regulierung des Internets? Dank der Erforschung diesen Fragen von verschiedenen Aktoren des Internets kann die Hauptidee hinter der Regulierung des Internets im vordegrund entstehen: das Prinzip der Diskriminierungslosigkeit. Dieses Prinzip bedeutet, dass die Information immer mehr transparent wird, damit die technische Bedigungen des Internets dazu nicht führen, die Angebot zu verzerren.
SPANISH
La «Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des Postes » (ARCEP— el regulador francés de telecomunicaciones y servicios postales) organizó un coloquio, el 13 de abril del 2010 sobre “La neutralité des réseaux » (la neutralidad de la red).
La Autorité de la régulation des communications électroniques et des postes (ARCEP — el regulador francés de telecomunicaciones y servicios postales) organizó Le colloque sur la neutralité des réseaux (el Coloquio sobre la neutralidad de la red), que fue llevado a cabo el 13 de abril del 2010. Cada actor generalmente utiliza el término “neutralidad” de la forma que más le convenga. No obstante, la neutralidad significa que no se debería discriminar entre los usuarios del Internet; pero esto no quiere decir que todos tengan el derecho a servicios gratuitos: precisamente porque se debe tener un manejo del tráfico y del ancho de banda, una protección del consumidor y del derecho de reproducción, es importante poder establecer un equilibrio entre estos derechos contradictorios para fomentar el desarrollo de la red. Evidentemente, es necesario introducir el elemento del regulador. El desarrollo futuro del Internet depende de nosotros. Por el momento, nadie sabe quiénes son estos reguladores legítimos y cómo podrían regular estas fuerzas oponentes, organizar la transparencia de la información y fomentar la inversión a largo plazo… y al mismo tiempo preservar la concurrencia.
PeruRail, the operator of Peru’s famous railway line, providing service between Cuzco and Machu Picchu, was sanctioned USD$800,000 on May 10, 2010 by the {‘Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual’} (INDECOPI- Peru’s national institute for the defense of competition and protection of intellectual property) for having restricted competitors’ market entry. An appeal is underway.
After two years of implementation of France, the 2004 Directive on markets in financial instruments is to be reviewed at the European level in 2010. The French report, elaborated by Pierre Fleuriot, examines whether or not the directive’s main objectives –the deregulation of markets and the lowering of trading costs- were achieved in an efficient way.
In August 2020, Marriott International, online hotel room booking platform, has be sued before an English court by a consulting firm through a "class action" technic. The firm ask to Marriott International compensates the clients whose personal data jas been hacked while Marriott International which was in charge of this data, did not implement all it could to protect these data. According to the plaintiff firm, making the online platform responsible in Ex Ante of the clients' data security and constraint it to compensate injured clients in case of failure is a more important incentive for the firm to do its best to protect this data than a simple fine.
Many similar actions are ongoing, especially during English Courts where the practice of "class action" is more developed. The question is therefore to know whether it is interesting to encourage the development of this kind of process in France. Concretly, a substantial subjective right (here the right to have its data protected) exists only if it is accompanied by a procedural right to size the judge in order to he or she activates it. The right to ask for a compensation in case of violation of these Compliance obligations but also is therefore not only a strong incentive for firms but also a condition of effectivity of these same obligations, knowing that the effectivity is the major care of Compliance Law.
