Some says that defining Compliance is a theoretical and non useful exercice that should be left aside to tackle the study of concrete technical cases. However, to be able to use Compliance tools, it is first necessary to have a clear, firm and simple idea of what is Compliance. Moreover, the future of this new branch of law intensely depends on the definition we choose to use.
Compliance Law gives to some crucial private firms new responsibilities such as the one to fight against global dangers or the one of saving the planet. In this, Compliance Law can be perceived as a kind of new deal between the private sector and public authorities, with the only difference that this time the consent of the private sector is not required.
Some would say that the concretization of such projects is the duty of the State and that private firms, if they must respect the rules, do not have to find a way to concretize a "monumental goal". However, the world face new and systemic dangers in the face of which the State alone is powerless, technically or geographically, and against which crucial companies can act.
It is not about, as some advocate to put human being aside of Compliance Law by letting machines decide. It is about placing the human being and its protection at the heart of Compliance Law. In this, Compliance Law can become a new humanism.
Available in several languages, the document is titled: Dynamic telecoms market requires modern legal bases.
End of the document, the Confederation reports that it raises that State presence in the capital of Swisscom is legitimate (information that hasn't perhaps belong in a consultation document).
The consultation document intends to proceed with a progressive review". A first step of review will take place late 2015.
First, it will focus on international roaming, for which Swiss prices are too high but for which the ceiling price technique is rejected, the protection of youth or the need for market participants to register including Internet players.
In addition, the consultation focuses on increasing access to networks, including passive infrastructure, to increase competition. It is envisaged to grant the Federal Communications Commission (ComCom) ex officio powers.
Other issues will be discussed after 2015, for example universal service and neutrality in order to "not to break the dynamics of investment."
Operators have already protested about the narrowness of the consultation, in particular because the issue of optical fiber is not asked!footnote-5.
The Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes (ARCEP — French Telecommunications and Postal Regulatory Authority) published a document on September 30, 2010—the fruit of one years work—in which it outlines ten recommendations and suggestions for network and Internet neutrality.
FRENCH
Fiche Thématique (Télécommunications, Internet): l'ARCEP publie 10 recommandations et propositions pour la neutralité du réseau et de l'Internet.
L'Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes, l'ARCEP, a publié un document le 30 Septembre 2010, au terme d'un an de travail, dans lequel elle dégage dix recommandations et suggestions pour la neutralité du réseau et de l'Internet.
GERMAN
Thematischer Bericht (Telekom, internet): die ARCEP hat 10 Empfehlungen und Vorschläge im Bereich Netz- und Internetneutralität verkündigt.
Die Autorité de Régulation des communications électroniques et des postes, (ARCEP - die französische Telekommunkations- und Postbehörde) hat am 30. September 2010, nach einem Jahr Arbeit, seine zehn Empfehlungen und Vorschläge im Bereich Netz- und Internetneutralität verkündigt.
SPANISH
El ARCEP publica 10 recomendaciones y proposiciones para la Red y la Neutralidad del Internet.
La Autorité de régulation des Communications électroniques et des postes (ARCEP – la Autoridad francesa de la regulación de telecomunicaciones y servicios postales) publicó el 30 de septiembre del 2010 un documento – fruto de un año de labor – en donde delinea diez recomendaciones y sugerencias para la red y la neutralidad del Internet.
The European Banking Union is based on supervision as much as on regulation: it concerns the operators as much as the structures of the sector, because the operators "hold" the sector.
This is why the "regulator - supervisor" holds the operators by the supervision and is close to them.
He meets them officially and in "soft law" relations. This is all the more necessary since the distinction between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post must be nuanced, in that its application is too rigid, in that it involves a long time (first of all the rules, then to apply them, then to notice a gap between rules and behaviors, then to repair it) is not appropriate if the system aims at the prevention of systemic crises, whose source is inside the operators.
This is why the body in charge of solving the difficulties of the systemic banks for the salvation of the systeme meets the banking sector itself, to ensure that they are permanently "resolvable", so that the hypothesis of their resolution never arises. This is the challenge of this system: that it is always ready, for never be applying.
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In the European Banking Union, the Single Resolution Board (SRB) is in charge of "resolve" the difficulties of European systemic banks in difficulty. It is the public body of the second pillar of the Banking Union. The first pillar is the prevention of these difficulties and the third is the guarantee of deposits. The resolution is therefore more like an Ex Post mechanism.
But in this continuum through these three pillars between the Ex Ante and the Ex Post, the SRB does not wait passively - as would a traditional judge do - that the file of the troubled bank reaches it. Like a supervisor - which brings it closer to the first public in the system (Single Supervisory Board -SSB), which supervises all the banks, it is in direct contact with all the banks, and it approaches the hypothesis of a bank in trouble by a systemic perspective: it is therefore to the entire banking system that the SRB addresses itself.
As such, it organizes meetings, where he is located: in Brussels.
To resolve in Ex Post the difficulties of a bank, it has to present a quality (a little known concept in Bankruptcy Law): "resolvability". How build it? Who build it ? In its very design and in its application, bank by bank.
For the resolution body vis-à-vis all players in the banking and financial sector, it's clear: "Working together" is crucial in building resolvability ".
In the projection that is made, it is affirmed that there can be a successful resolution only if the operator in difficulty is not deprived of access to what makes to stay it alive, that is to say the banking and financial system itself, and more specifically the "Financial Market Infrastructures", for example payment services.
Does the Single Resolution Board expect spontaneous commitments from the FMIs for such a "right of access"? In this case, as the Single Resolution Board says, this right of access corresponds to "critical functions" for a bank, the resolution situation can not justify the closure of the service.
By nature, these crucial operators are entities that report to regulators who oversee them. Who enforces - and immediately - this right of access? When one can think that it is everyone, it risks being nobody .... That is why the resolution body, relaying in this a concern of the Financial Stability Board, underlines that it is necessary to articulate the supervisors, regulators and "resolvers" between them.
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To read this program, since it is a proposed program of work for the banking sector, four observations can be made:
1. We are moving more and more towards a general "intermaillage" (which will perhaps replace the absence of a global State, but it is an similar nature because it is always to public authorities that it refers and not to self-regulation);
2. But as there is no political authority to keep these guardians, the entities that articulate all these various public structures, with different functions, located in different countries, acting according to different temporalities, these are the companies themselves that internalize the concern that animates those who built the system: here the prevention of systemic risk. This is the definition of Compliance, which brings back to companies, here more clearly those those which manage the Market Infrastructures, the obligations of Compliance (here the management of systemic risk through the obligation of giving access).
3. Even without a single systemic guard, there is always a recourse. That will be the judge. There are already many, there will probably be more in a system of this type, more and more complex, the articulation of disputes is sometimes called "dialogue". And it is undoubtedly "decisions of principle" that will set the principles common to all of these particular organisms.
4. We then see the emergence of Ex Ante mechanisms for the solidity of the systems, and the solidity of the players in the systems, and then the Ex Post resolution of the difficulties of the actors according to access to the solidity of the infrastructures of these systems, which ultimately depend on judges (throughout the West) facing areas where all of this depends much less on the judge: the rest of the world.
The activity of money laundering is detrimental not only in itself but also because it permits the development and the sustainability of other criminal activities such as drug trafficking, weapon trafficking or human beings selling. Fighting against money laundering could permit to indirectly fight against these underlying activities, by the way very difficult to fight. Thus, the fight against money laundering has become a "monumental goal", which justifies the adoption of tools sometimes much more powerful than those used by classical criminal Law. For the sake of efficiency, the legal obligation to prevent money laundering is given to every body able to do it, as banks, real estate agents or gaming society, under the penalty of sanction.
On 10th of August 2020, the Luxembourgish financial market supervisor convicts the International Bank of Luxembourg to pay a fine of 4,5 millions of euros because of weaknesses detected in its process of fight against money laundering. However, when the sanction has been pronounced, the bank had already remedied the weaknesses identified. It is important to observe that what is important for Compliance Law, it is not that a non compliant behavior is punished but rather that the crucial firm modifies its behavior in order to being more efficient in the realization of the "monumental goal", only concern of the public authority. Thus, an Ex Post sanction against the crucial operator is not an end in itself and can be justified only if it permits to incite the crucial operator to act or rather to desincite to do anything. Compliance Law is an Ex Ante legal system.
This book is written in French. Its topic is about New Regulations in Electricity Sector
Complete reference : LAPEYRE, M. (dir.), Les nouvelles régulations électriques, 2 tomes, Lavoisier, Paris, 2012, 314 p.
The principle of "open internet" enshrined in the European regulation of 30th of April 2016 guaranteeing a non discriminatory access to Internet contents and services. However, there is no European regulator to implement such a principle. Is it possible to guarantee the effectivity of this principle without a central regulator in charge of this principle?
On 11st of June 2020, the BEREC (Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications) adopted guidelines concerning the application of the open internet principle. The BEREC is not a European regulator but a network of national regulators aiming to coordinate their actions. This body is only a consultative body but its recommendations are taken into account by national authorities which have deep legal power, as Osborne-Clarke said about the technical implementation of the European principle of open internet at the national level.
It is thus non necessary to have a central regulator to ensure the effectivity of a principle since the moment when there is a local regulators network able to coordinate their actions through soft law.
As soon as Legislation is case management, it becomes a matter of time, good timing, and efficiency.
Because the figure of the Law has changed its terms should change. The most appropriate law then appears the "experimental law", the "trial law." This ephemeral legislation as regulatory bodies promote, can claim to be part of the future only if it has "successful". Operators must be good students if they want to conserve the Law!footnote-14.
Thus, the law is only a draft and it is its success that allows the standard access to the status that was natural: the Act that applies to the future.
These precarious laws that certains authors and regulatory bodies present as the right model, challenge the constitutional principles, the Constitution itself being the supreme law governing the future.
This book shows the extent to which notions of efficiency, testing, flexibility, can attack the very idea of Parliament Law and Constitution. It is true that in regulatory systems everything becomes simple regulations, including laws but it is also true that constitutional courts are restive to admit "experimental laws".
Cet ouvrage montre jusqu'à quel point les notions d'efficacité, de test, de flexibilité, peuvent attaquer l'idée même de Loi et de Constitution. Il est vrai qu'en Régulation, tout ne deviendrait que réglementation, y compris la loi et il est vrai que les cours constitutionnelles sont rétives à admettre les "lois expérimentales".
In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors
ENGLISH
While financial regulation aims at achieving market stability, regulating markets can sometimestake an ironic turn when regulations end up having consequencesthat differ from their original regulatory purpose. The article provides such an example of regulation’s irony: how a regulatory change in Germany led Moody’s to downgrade 12 banks, therefore weakening such institutions and consequently enhancing the current issues of market volatility and credit cost.
FRENCH
Bien que la réglementationfinancière vise àassurer la stabilitédu marché, la régulation des marchéspeut parfoisprendre une tournureironique quandla régulation finit par avoirdes conséquencesqui diffèrent deson objectifde régulationd’origine.L’article fournitun exemplede l’ironie de la régulation : commentun changement de réglementationen Allemagne a conduitMoody’sà déclasser12 banques allemandes,, donc à affaiblirces institutions etpar conséquentà accroître les problèmes actuels dela volatilité du marchéet le coûtdu crédit.
ITALIAN
Quando la regolazione è volta ad ottenere la stabilità del mercato, l’evoluzione di questi mercati oggetto di tale regolazione può essere particolarmente ironica quando la regolazione ha delle conseguenze ben differenti da quelle originariamente prepostesi. Questo articolo cerca quindi di mettere in evidenza un esempio di questa ironia: in effetti, un cambio di regolatore in Germania ha portato Moody’s a tagliare il rating di 12 banche, indebolendo ancora di più tali istituzioni ed aumentando si conseguenza le questioni relative alla volatilità del mercato e del costo del credito.
