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Updated: Jan. 28, 2011 (Initial publication: Jan. 14, 2010)

Editorial Committee

Professor Benzoni was Full Professor at Telecom Paris-Tech (1985-1995) before becoming a Full Professor of Economics at Université Paris 2 in 1996. He is a Founding Partner of TERA Consultants (1995), a member of ERMES (Research Team on Markets, Employment and Simulation: research center associated with CNRS-National Center of Scientific Research), Member of the Administration Board: Avignon’s World Forum-Culture-Economics-Media, Member of the Scientific Committee: “Competition Workshop” of he French Finance and Economy Ministry, Scientific Director of Quantifica-OMSYC (1988-2009), Member of the Editorial Board of Communication & Strategies. He won The Industrial Economics Prize (ADEFI) for his work on Exhaustible resources and their regulation, the Harvard-Expansion Prize for the o-authored book: Energy Economics, the IREST prize (Institute for Research in Economics and Social sciences in Telecommunications) for contribution to Economics of telecommunications regulation. Nomineted as a World’s Leading Competition Economist by The Global Competition Review.

Updated: Sept. 16, 2011 (Initial publication: March 23, 2011)

Authors

Eric J. Pan is an Associate Professor of Law and the Director of The Samuel and Ronnie Heyman Center on Corporate Governance at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in New York.(...)

Updated: Sept. 25, 2012 (Initial publication: May 28, 2010)

Sectorial Analysis

 In Congo (Brazzaville), following the dissolution of the {Direction Générale de l’Administration Centrale des Postes et Télécommunications} (DGACPT — General Direction of the Central Administration of Posts and Telecommunications), two bodies have been implemented: the “Direction Générale des Postes et Télécommunications” (General Direction of Posts and Telecommunications), and the “Agence de Régulation des Postes et des Communications Electroniques” (ARPCE – Congolese Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Agency).

 

FRENCH

 

Loi n°    11-2009   du 25 novembre 2009 portant création de l’agence de régulation des postes et des communications électroniques (Arpce)

Au Congo, après la dissolution de la Direction Générale de l'Administration Centrale des Postes et Télécommunications (DGACPT), deux organismes ont été mis en place : la Direction Générale des Postes et Télécommunications et l’« Agence de régulation des postes et des communications électroniques» (ARPCE), créé par la loi du 25 novembre 2009.    

 

 

GERMAN

Kongolesisches Gesetz Nr. 11-2009 vom 25. November 2009 bezüglich auf der Durchführung der  Agence de Régulation des Postes et des Communications Electroniques (ARPCE,  Post- und elektronische Kommunikationsregulierungsagentur).


Nach der Auflösung der Direction Générale de l'Administration Centrale des Postes et Télécommunications (DGACPT - Hauptführung der Post- und Telekommunikationszentralverwaltung), wurden zwei Behörde eingefürht: die Direction Générale des Postes et Télécommunications (Hauptführung für Post- und Telekommunikationsdienst) und die Agence de Régulation des Postes et des Communications Electroniques (ARPCE,  Post- und elektronische Kommunikationsregulierungsagentur).


SPANISH
 
 Ley n° 11-2009 del 25 de noviembre del 2009 sobre la creación de la “Agence de Régulation des Postes et des Communications Electroniques” (ARPCE- una agencia de reglación de servicios postales y telecomunicaciones del Congo).
 

 En Congo (Brazzaville), después de la disolución de la Direction Générale de l’Administration Centrale des Postes et Télécommunications (DGACPT —la Dirección General de la Administración Central de servicios postales y telecomunicaciones del Congo), dos cuerpos han sido introducidos : la “Dirección Générale des Postes et Télécommunications” (la Direccion General de Servicios Postales y Telecomunicaciones) y la “Agence de Régulation des Postes et des Communications Electroniques” (ARPCE – la agencia de regulación de servicios postales y telecomunicaciones del Congo).

 

Updated: Jan. 10, 2012 (Initial publication: March 9, 2011)

Authors

Olivier Fréget is a partner at Allen & Overy Paris heading the Paris EU & Competition team. He hold a post graduate degree in Private International Law and in International Business Transactions (University of Paris I) and a degree in Economics and International Relations (ILERI). Olivier has specialised in EU and competition law since the very beginning of his career in 1990

Updated: Sept. 16, 2011 (Initial publication: Dec. 16, 2010)

Authors

Michel Riguidel is Professor Emeritus at the Ecole Nationale Supérieure des Télécommunications, which has been renamed Telecom ParisTech, where he teaches digital security and new-generation networks. (...)

Europe

http://www.eba.europa.eu/
European Banking Authority
One Canada Square (Floor 46), Canary Wharf, London E14 5AA, United Kingdom
+44 (0)207 382 1776 / info@eba.europa.eu

 

Compliance and Regulation Law Glossary

Regulation presupposes that we move from a political conception of Act (that is to say a collective Decision expressed by the State) or a civilist one (that is, a will expressed by one or several individuals in one Contract) to an economic vision of trading organizations whose action is the expression of the market. If one relies on the adjustment of supply and demand, that is to say, the meeting of desires and interests, there will be "self-regulation", which is the "Law of the Market ", referring to competition law. The act of the operators is only a reflection of this law, in action.

La Régulation est alors plus complexe car elle vise autre chose que cette rationalité mécanique, soit en raison d’une défaillance du marché (par exemple en cas de monopole naturel) soit parce qu’on veut obtenir plus que ce que le marché peut donner (par ex. l’accès de tous à des biens communs, comme la santé, même pour des demandeurs insolvables). Dans ce cas, sont élaborées des règlementations, interventions ex ante désignées en anglais par le terme regulation. La règlementation est adéquate si elle incite des agents économiques à adopter des comportements qui concrétisent le but recherché par l’auteur de la règlementation.

Regulation is then more complex because it aims at something other than this mechanical rationality, either because of a market failure (for example in the case of a natural monopoly) or because it wants to obtain more than the market can give ( Eg access to common goods by all, such as health, even for insolvent claimants). In this case, regulations are drawn up, ex ante intervention. The regulation is adequate if it encourages economic agents to adopt behaviors that concretize the aim sought by the author of the regulatory mechanisms.

This strategic use of law then requires the necessary detour through the economic analysis of law, that is to say the analysis of law in its economic effects.

This discipline created in the United States by Ronald Coase (Nobel Prize for Economics in 1991) can be merely descriptive and reveal what economic effects the law produced. This conception, which is that of Richard Posner, makes the economic analysis of law an instrument of expertise for the political decision-maker, who can take this into account if it is necessary to modify the rules. A more radical conception of the so-called "normative economic analysis of law" is to argue that the conclusions of the analysis would oblige the decision-maker to follow it.

The issue is decisive because in the first case the law and the jurists - in particular the Legislator and the judge - still have an autonomous existence, in the second case they no longer exist, they are no more than the binding and explicit form of the "Law of the market" whose nature is a-legal.

Even in its descriptive form, economic analysis of the law is generally rejected in France in that it disregards the role of the law in that it carries moral values. It is in reality to ignore its merely descriptive, instructive and useful function, and the fact that it opens instead the amplitude of the rational choice offered to political decision-makers. Moreover, regulation is not only a technical discipline, it is also a political and philosophical issue. Descriptive economic analysis is more appropriate to it than normative economic analysis of the law, which claims to vassalize or even destroy other disciplines, which are substantially unknown.

Updated: July 4, 2011 (Initial publication: Feb. 17, 2010)

I. Isolated Articles

Dec. 18, 2014

Breaking news

Virtual currency is a perfect example of the difficulties of interregulation: indeed, the bitcoins are currencies created on the Internet, usually to play games, such as poker. Thus intersect banking regulation, banking supervision, regulation and control of the game, Internet regulation itself.

In the US, the situation is complicated in that banking regulation is exercised at the state level, while the Internet is subject to intervention by federal regulators, including the Federal Communication Commission.
 
To solve this problem, the solution is to create a network of states banking regulators and supervisors, who adopt common rules. This is why the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, which is the network of state banking supervisors, created in 1902, has prepared a draft regulation of virtual currency, published December 16, 2014 and submitted for consultation for a month.

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Switzerland

http://www.finma.ch/f/pages/default.aspx

 FIMA is a Federal Authority.

It regulates not only financial markets and also insurance companies. 

It presents its mission in its website : 

"FINMA's mandate is to protect creditors, investors and policy holders and ensure the smooth functioning of the financial markets. Through consistent supervision and predictable regulation, we make an important contribution to safeguarding the stability and good reputation of the Swiss financial centre, and consequently to enhancing its competitiveness."