The Jury for Advertising Deontology ordered two of the government’s advertisements on cattle breeding to be taken off the air, because they falsely claimed that cattle breeding was mostly a family-run business run in an environmentally-friendly way. The sanction illustrates the power of self-regulation.
PORTUGUESE
Informe temático (Mídia): A Autoridade de auto-regulação em matéria de propaganda proíbe duas faltas propagandas.
O Júri para deontologia em matéria de publicidade ordenou que duas das propagandas governamentais sobre criação de gado fossem retiradas do ar, porque elas teriam difundido que a criação de gado seria um negócio familiar desenvolvido em harmonia com o meio ambiente. Esta sanção ilustra o poder da auto-regulação.
ITALIAN
Relazione tematica (Mass-media): L’autorità di autoregolazione dei pubblicitari impedisce la pubblicazione di due pubblicità menzognere.
La Jury for Advertising Deontology ha vietato la diffusione di due messaggi pubblicitari dello Stato relativi agli allevamenti animali, in quanto affermavano che l’allevamento dei bovini è praticato da aziende a gestione familiare e con sistemi che rispettano l’ambiente. Questa sanzione mostra l’impatto dell’auto-regolazione.
This article traces the development of the regulatory state in China through the case of coal mine safety and tries to find out the logic of regulatory state building in China as well as its fundamental dilemmas embodied during the process. Based on the change of the coal mine market and governmental agencies responsible for managing coal mines, the article divides the history of regulatory state building into three periods: one of totalitarian command control when production was priority; then under rapid marketization when profits became priority, government regulation began to take shape, and currently safety regulation has become the focus, the government resorts to merging and reorganization of coal mines. The track of regulatory state building embodies the following characteristics: firstly, regulatory reform lacks a clear strategy; secondly, admission control based on licensing is still the primary way of regulation; thirdly, the idea of social regulation, instead of economic regulation based on price and entrance regulation, has gradually appeared; fourthly, gradual reliance on local government on daily regulation; finally, coal mine workers did not have a say in the regulation to defend their own rights.
Artigo : O rumo e a lógica da construção do Estado Regulatório na China: estudo de caso da segurança de minas de carvão
Este artigo retraça o desenvolvimento do Estado Regulatório na China a partir do caso da segurança nas minas de carvão e procura identificar a lógica do Estado Regulatório na China, bem como os problemas fundamentais surgidos durante o processo. Baseado na mudança do mercado de minas de carvão e das agências governamentais responsáveis pela administração de minas de carvão, o artigo divide a história da construção do Estado Regulatório em três períodos: o primeiro de controle de comando totalitário, quando a produção era a prioridade; depois, sob rápida “mercadorização”, quando o lucro se tornou prioridade, a regulação de governo começou a desenhar-se; e atualmente o foco deslocou-se para a regulação de segurança, levando o governo a mesclar e reorganizar as minas de carvão. O rumo da construção do Estado Regulatório contém as seguintes características: em primeiro lugar, a reforma regulatória padece de uma estratégia clara; em segundo lugar, o controle de admissões baseado em demissões ainda é o modo preferido de regulação; em terceiro lugar, a ideia de regulação social, no lugar de regulação econômica baseada na regulação do preço e da entrada, aparace gradualmente; em quarto lugar, confiança gradual em governos locais para regulações quotidianas; finalmente, trabalhadores de minas de carvão não costumavam ter algo a dizer, em matéria de regulação, para defender seus próprios direitos. Palavras-chave: Estado Regulatório; Mina de carvão; mercado; governo.
SPANISH
Artículo: El rumbo y la lógica en la construcción del Estado Regulatoria de China: Un estudio de caso de la seguridad en las minas de carbón.
El artículo traza el desarrollo de del estado regulatorio en China a través de la seguridad de las minas y trata de encontrar la lógica de la construcción del estado chino al igual sus dilemas fundamentales que se permean el proceso. Basado en el cambio del mercado de las minas de carbón y la responsabilidad del manejo del carbón por las agencias gubernamentales, el artículo divide la historia del estado regulatorio en tres periodos: una de control totalitario cuando el énfasis era en la producción; después bajo una “mercaderización” acelerada las ganancias eran la prioridad, la regulación gubernamental comenzó a formarse y la regulación ha sido el enfoque, el gobierno se dedica a unir y reorganizar las minas de carbón. La trayectoria de construcción del estado regulatoria tiene las características siguientes: primero, la reforma regulatoria no posee una estrategia clara; segundo, el control de admisión es basado en la entrega de licencias permanece siendo la manera preferida de la regulación; tercero, la idea de la regulación social, en vez de la regulación económica basada en el precio y la regulación de entrada, ha emergido gradualmente; cuarto, una mayor dependencia sobre el gobierno local para las cuestiones de regulación diaria; y finalmente, los trabajadores de las minas de carbón no podían influenciar la regulación para defender sus propios derechos.
This is currently the great battle and no one knows the outcome.
By its jugdment Grande Stevens of 4 March 2014, the European Court of Human Rights held that a state can't punish a person for a criminal penalty and administrative penalty for the same fact, criticized in market matters.
In the movement of the "dialogue of judges," the Conseil d'Etat (French State Council) asked 27 July 2014 the Conseil constitutionnel (French Constitutional Counci) l the question of compliance from this addition to the French Constitution for financial penalty in the use of public funds. By a decision of 24 October 2014, the Constitutional Council considered that this combination was consistent with the Constitution, mainly because the administrative sanction would be a "different kind" as punishment, because each pursues a different objective.
In turn, by a judgment of 17 December 2014, the Cour de cassation (French Judicial Supreme Court) decided to refer to the Constitutional Council two priority issues of constitutionality.
The presentation of the problem by the Cour de Cassation is the following. By its terms, it shows the hostility of the Court of Cassation to the doctrine hitherto developed by the State Council and the Constitutional Council.
First, the interpretation of French law provides penal proceedings against a person for facts on which it has been exonerated by the financial regulator by the Sanctions Committee thereof. This may contradict the constitutional principle of res judicata, as incurred administrative penalties are comparable to penal sanctions.
Second, this possibility could also contradict the constitutional principles of equality, necessity of criminal law and respect of non bis in idem mechanism.
Certainly, cleverly, the Supreme Court asks not accumulated penalties but of double jeopardy, which when one went out to "turn" the other.
Will the Constitutional Council get easier in accordance with European design without recant ? For example, it could estimate that the cumulative sentences is eligible as soon as proportionality is respected, but the extinction of a case before a judge removes the ability to exercise the other?
Or shouLawopen the wound? Finally decide to open rather multiple sides bear claw blows?
The Finance Committee of the Senate works to think in a more consistent way sanctioning powers of financial regulators need. Indeed, sanctions are tools that must be thought at first hand according to the goals that must be provided in the second part in relation to other tools the financial regulator has, in the third part in relation to the purposes and powers other authorities are responsible and have (supervisory authorities, European bodies, foreign and international judges, professional authorities).
It is in this overall vision that this storm that exceeds the glass of water must be replaced.
On the paper the "Autorité de Régulation du Secteur de la Microfinance» - ARSM" (the Regulatory Authority of the Microfinance Sector), established by law in Niger, is both original and powerful. Indeed, it is rare that this financing mechanism be regulated by a body that is its own and the Decree of 27 March 2007 that created gives it the powers to deliver licenses, permits to exercise, to disseminate information, to monitor the " Systèmes Financiers Décentralisés"- SFD (Decentralised Financial Systems), to conduct inspections and sanction. But in reality, the economic culture of savings failed in Niger and political instability made goes away a few foreign cooperative banks which had supplemented the lack of conventional banks. The Authority also requests that the public authorities, managers of the structures of micro-credit clean up the sector, before injecting any new money.
