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Compliance Law, like Regulatory Law, of which it is an extension, is an Ex Ante Law.

It translates into a set of obligations that companies must perform to ensure that harmful behavior does not occur, such as bribery, money laundering, pollution, etc.

This results in "structural" obligations, such as the establishment of a risk map, a third-party vigilance system, internal controls, the adoption of codes.

The practical question that arises is whether to punish a company, it is necessary but it is sufficient that the company has not adopted these structural measures, or if it is also necessary that within it or through the persons whom it must be accountable (through the corporate officers and the employees, but also the suppliers, the sub-contractors, the financed operators, etc.) there were behaviors that Compliance Law prohibits, for example corruption, money laundering, pollution, safety-related accident, etc.

The question is probative. Its practical stake is considerable.

Because to obtain the conviction the prosecuting authority will have to demonstrate not only a failure in the structural device but also a behavioral failure.

Si l'on considère que le Droit de la Compliance est à la fois sur l'Ex Ante et sur l'Ex Post, alors l'autorité de poursuite qui requiert une sanction doit démontrer qu'il y a un comportement reprochable (Ex Post) et qu'à cela correspond une défaillance structurelle (par exemple le compte bancaire anormal n'a pas été signalé) ; si l'on considère que le Droit de la Compliance est purement en Ex Ante, alors même s'il n'y a pas de comportement reprochable en Ex Post, la seule défaillance structurelle suffit pour que l'entreprise qui doit l'organiser en son sein soit sanctionné.

If we consider that Compliance Law is both on the Ex Ante and the Ex Post, then the prosecuting authority that requires a sanction must show that there is a reprehensible behavior (Ex Post ) and that this corresponds to a structural failure (for example the abnormal bank account has not been reported); if we consider that Compliance Law is purely Ex Ante, then even if there is no reprehensible behavior in Ex Post, the only structural failure is enough for the company to be sanctioned, even if it does its best efforts, even if no prohibited behavior will have accured in Ex Post.  

The second system, which is much more repressive and places a considerable burden on companies, even if there is no proven illicit behavior, is that of French Law, probably because of a tendency towards Ex Ante organization. ..

Mais il faut garder mesure. Et cette mesure est probatoire.

But we must keep measure. And this measure is probative.

This is what the Commission des Sanctions of the Agence Française Anticorruption -AFA (French Anti-Corruption Agency's Sanctions Committee) has just said, in its decision of 4 July 2019, SAS S. et Madame C.,(written in French) contradicting the position of its director, who acted as the prosecuting authority. This is yet another general proof of the autonomy of the Sanctions Committee vis-à-vis to the Administrative Authority of which it is a part, and in relation to its director, who nevertheless governs it. But, jurisdictional model obliges, he has here the status of prosecuting authority, is subject to the regime of this one and not to the regime of head of the entity. Demonstration of the "functional autonomy" of the sanctioning bodies within the administrative regulatory and compliance authorities.

Indeed, this important decision expresses with precision and reason the distribution of the "burden of the allegation" and the "burden of proof" on the prosecuting body and on the company pursued, as well as the role of presumption that the recommendations issued by the French Anti-corruption Authority can play.

Read the analysis below.

 

Translated summaries

The translated summaries are done by the Editors and not by the Authors.

ENGLISH

The main theme of the eighth issue of The Journal of Regulation is that of Neutrality in systems of economic regulation in accordance with the conference that the Journal organized around this issue. This question is essential for a number of reasons: on one hand, companies sometimes demand that regulation be ‘neutral’ in the impact it has on their economic activities. On the other hand, States have other reasons for believing that regulation palliates market failure by using price-fixing to restore neutrality in certain sectors of the economy that are incapable of producing a fair market price. Still others believe that Regulation is not neutral because it intervenes against the neutrality of the market by imposing access to common goods, social policy concerns, etc.

FRENCH

Le principal thème du 8° numéro du Journal of Regulation est la question de la neutralité dans les systèmes de régulation économique, telle qu’elle avait été examinée dans le colloque annuel du Journal. Cette question est essentielle pour un certains nombres de raisons. D’une part, les entreprises exigent parfois que les régulation soient "neutres" dans les activités économiques des entreprises. D’autre part, les Etats peuvent avoir d’autres raisons d’adopter des régulations que de palier des défaillances de marchés, lesquelles sont incapables de produire des prix. Les Etats restaurent alors par leurs interventions une neutralité que les marchés ne peuvent pas techniquement engendrer. D’autres croient encore que la Régulation n’est pas neutre parce qu’elle intervient précisément contre la neutralité du marché, en imposant l’accès pour tous à des biens communs, décisions politiques adoptées pour des considérations de politique sociale.

ITALIAN

Il tema principale di questo ottavo numero de The Journal of Regulation è la Neutralità nei sistemi di regolazione economica in linea con la conferenza organizzata dalla rivista relativamente a tale tema. Tale tema riveste un’importanza fondamentale per diverse ragioni: da un lato, le società talvolta richiesto che tale regolazione sia neutrale rispetto all’impatto provocato sulle loro attività economiche. Inoltre, gli Stati hanno diverse ragioni per considerare che la regolazione riduca il rischio di disfunzioni del mercato usando il potere di fissazione del prezzo garantendo così la neutralità che certi settori sono incapaci di raggiungere in quanto incapaci di stabilire un prezzo equo di mercato. Infine, altri ritengono che la Regolazione non sia neutrale in quanto interviene sulla neutralità del mercato ed impone l’accesso ai beni comuni, obiettivi di politica sociale, ecc.

ESPAGNOL

El tema principal del 8º volumen del Journal of Regulation es a cuestión de la neutralidad en los sistemas de regulación económica, tal como ha sido examinada en coloquio anual del Journal. Esta cuestión es esencial por varias razones. De una parte, las empresas a veces exigen que las regulaciones sean “neutras” en las actividades económicas de las empresas. Por otra parte, los Estados pueden tener otras razones para adoptar regulaciones , a parte de lidiar con los fallos de los mercados, los cuales son incapaces de producir precios. Los Estados restauran, a través de sus intervenciones, una neutralidad que los mercados no pueden engendrar. Algunos siguen pensando que la Regulación no es neutra porque interviene precisamente en contra de la neutralidad del mercado, al imponer el acceso universal a bienes comunes, decisiones políticas adoptadas por consideraciones de política social.

ARABIC

الموضوع الرّئيسي للطبعة الثامنة لمجلة التنظيم هو الحياد في النّواضم الاقتصادية وفقا للمؤتمر أللذي انتظم حول هذه القضية. هذا السّؤال ضروري لأسباب متعدّدة : أوّلا، الشّركات تطلب في بعض الأحيان "محايدة" اللّوائح في تأثير على أنشطتها الاقتصادية. من ناحية أخرى، فإن الدول الأخرى يعتقدون أن التّنظيم يخفّف من فشل السوق بمساعدة استخدام التسعير من أجل استعادة الحياد في القطاعات الاقتصاد غير القادرة على إنتاج سعر السوق العادل. لا يزال البعض يعتقد أن التنظيم ليس محايدا لأنّه يأتي ضدّ الحياد السوق عن طريق اشتراط الحصول على الملكية المشتركة، والمخاوف من السياسة الاجتماعية، الخ

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Other translations forthcoming.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) published a proposition to regulate speculation through futures and option contracts on the over-the-counter energy market on January 26, 2010. This proposition is being challenged by the CME Group (the principal American futures market operator), which claims that the CFTC does not have a legal mandate to regulate over-the-counter trading in energy, because such action would have to be authorised by a specific law.

FRENCH

 

 

La “Commodity Futures Trading Commission — CFTC” (l’autorité de tutelle américaine des bourses de commerce) publie le 26 janvier 2010 un projet visant à réguler la spéculation sur le marché de gré-à-gré énergétique. Cette proposition est vivement contestée par le CME Group (la principale bourse de commerce américaine), qui conteste que la CFTC n’est pas fondée légalement à réguler les échanges de gré-à-gré sur le marché de l’énergie, et qu’une telle compétence ne peut être accordée que par une loi spécifique.

SPANISH

El Grupo CME (operador principal de la bolsa de comercio americano)  desafía la propuesta de la “Commodity Futures Trading Commission – CTFC” (la autoridad de tutela americana de la bolsa de valores) del 26 de enero del 2010 de regular la especulación sobre energías futuras, contratos de opciones y derivados. 

La “Commodity Futures Trading Commission” - CFTC (la autoridad de tutela americana  de la bolsa de valores) publicó el día 26 de enero del 2010 una propuesta para regular la especulación sobre el mercado extrabursátil de energía a través de contratos a futuro y a opciones. Esta propuesta está siendo fuertemente refutada por el Grupo CME (el operador principal de la bolsa de valores americano) quien declara que la CFTC no tiene la competencia legal para regular las operaciones extrabursátiles de energía, ya que tal acción tendría que ser autorizada por una ley específica. 

GERMAN

Translated summaries

The translated summaries are done by the Editors and not by the Authors.

ENGLISH

The European Commission’s initiatives towards a Single Market in energy, transport and electronic communications should aim to further regulatory transparency and not market homogenisation. The article provides a quantitative and qualitative assessment of indiscriminating homogenisation of the mobile telecommunications market. The potential impacts on market power and the loss of consumer welfare are by no means negligible and imply important policy considerations

FRENCH

Les initiatives de la Commission européenne en vue d’un marché unique des communications de l’énergie, de transport et électroniques devraient viser à une plus grande transparence réglementaire et non pas à l’homogénéisation du marché. Le présent article fournit une évaluation quantitative et qualitative de l’homogénéisation inconsidérée du marché des télécommunications mobiles. Les impacts potentiels sur le pouvoir de marché et la perte de bien-être des consommateurs ne sont nullement négligeables et impliquent des considérations politiques importantes.

 

ENGLISH

 

ITALIAN

 

 

 

Articolo: Quando regolazione fa rima con supervisione: l’esempio della nuova organizzazione europea di supervisione.

 

 

 

L’articolo suggerisce che la teoria neorealista della regolazione racchiude sia norme legali di regolazione che una supervisione della loro applicazione da parte degli operatori del mercato. Inoltre, la supervisione non dovrebbe semplicemente includere una supervisione microeconomica quanto piuttosto introdurre un’interconnessione (finanza, banca e assicurazioni) del mercato finanziario, cosa che implica una riforma dell’organizzazione attuale, al fine di proteggere il sistema nel suo complesso da un mancato funzionamento del mercato. La regolazione é trasversale e non dovrebbe essere intesa come un meccanismo di settore ma piuttosto come un meccanismo globale di governance.

  

The Arguments for and Against Ownership Undunbling of Energy Transmission Networks

ENGLISH

On May 12, 2011, both Neelie Kroes, the European Commissioner for the digital agenda within the European Commission, and Larry Strickling, Assistant Commissioner for Communications and Information within the United States Department of Commerce, sent a notification to the ICANN, a private association that manages Internet domain names. First of all, they agreed with the principle of self-regulation of Internet domain names by the ICANN. But, they requested a reform of its “governance” to improve its transparency and better take into account public authorities’ recommendations.

Association - Conflict resolution - Domain name - European commission - Internet - Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers (ICANN) - Memorandum - Power - Private regulator - Regulatory Authority - Self regulation - Soft law - Transparency - United Nations (UN) *

* In The Journal of Regulation, these keywords are done by the Editor and not by the Author.

 

PORTUGUESE

Informe bibliográfico (Internet): Autoridades europeias e norte-americanas notificaram a ICANN, uma associação privada encarregada da auto-regulação de nomes de domínio na Internet, que ela deve adotar uma governança mais transparente e também adotar as recomendações de estruturas públicas.

Em 12 de maio de 2011, tanto Neelie Kroes, o Comissário Europeu para a agenda digital dentro da Comissão Europeia, quanto Larry Strickling, Comissário Assistente para Comunicações e Informação dentro do Departamento de Comércio dos Estados Unidos da América, enviaram uma notificação para a ICANN, uma associação privada que gerencia nomes de domínio na internet. Em primeiro lugar, eles concordaram com o princípio da auto-regulação dos nomes de domínio na Internet pela ICANN. No entanto, eles solicitaram uma reforma em sua governança para melhorar sua transparência e melhor levar em consideração as recomendações de autoridades públicas.

Associação – Resolução de conflitos – Nome de domínio – Comissão Europeia – Internet - Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers (ICANN) – Memorandum – Poder – Regulação privada – Autoridade de regulação – Auto-regulação – Soft law – Transparência – Nações Unidas (ONU)*

* No Journal of Regulation, as palavras-chave são fornecidas pelo Diretor, e não pelo Autor.

ITALIAN

Relazione bibliografica (Internet): Le autorità europee e nord americane hanno indicato che l’ICANN, una società privata che ha lo scopo di auto-regolare i nomi a dominio di internet, dovrà aumentare la trasparenza della gestione ed adottare le raccomandazioni delle strutture pubbliche

Il 12 maggio 2011, Neelie Kroes, Commissario europeo per l’agenda digitale della Commissione europea, e Larry Strickling, Commissario assistente per le comunicazioni e l’informazione del Dipartimento del Commercio degli Stati Uniti, hanno entrambi dichiarato che l’ICANN, una società privata che gestisce i nomi a dominio di Internet, deve riformare il proprio sistema di gestione migliorando la sua trasparenza e deve prendere in debita considerazione le raccomandazioni provenienti dalle autorità pubbliche.

Associazione - Autorità di regolazione - Autorità privata di regolazione - Auto-regolazione - Commissione Europea - Internet - Internet Corporation for Assigned Names & Numbers (ICANN) - Memorandum - Nazioni Unite (ONU) - Nomi di dominio - Potere - Risoluzione di controversie - Soft law - Transparenza *

* In The Journal of Regulation, le parole chiave sono responsabilità dell’Editore e non dall’Autore.

 

 Other translations fortcoming.