The translated summaries are done by the Editors and not by the Authors.
ENGLISH
The Autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni (or “AgCom” – the Italian Regulatory Authority for electronic communications) issued a decision on January 11, 2012, setting regulatory remedies applicable to the Italian incumbent’s fixed next generation networks (NGN).
Italian next generation networks’ regulation complies with pro-competitive and pro-investment objectives provided for by EU sectoral law.
FRENCH
La Autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni (ou “AgCom” - Autorité italienne de régulation pour les communications électroniques) a adoté une décision le 11 janvier 2012, imposant des engagements applicables à l’entreprise italienne de télécommunication, opérateur historique, en vue d’organiser la prochaine génération des réseaux.
Cette régulation italienne de la prochaine génération des réseaux de télécommunications est conforme aux objectifs retenus par les textes sectoriels de l’Union Européenne, dont les objectifs sont de favoriser la concurrence et l’investissement en la matière.
In May 2011, Nasdaq OMX and its partner Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) were authorized by their respective boards of directors to perform a tender offer on the stock market operator NYSE Euronext. The American Department of Justice was worried about the consequences that this operation would have on competition, and despite the remedies proposed by the two companies, notified them that it would refuse the merger. On May 16, 2011, this potential refusal was enough for Nasdaq OMX and ICE to abandon their plan. This game of signals demonstrates the power of interregulation between merger review and the regulation of tender offers.
Capital market - Competition - Concentration - Financial market - Initial Public Offering (IPO) - Regulator - Self regulation - United States *
* In The Journal of Regulation, these keywords are done by the Editor and not by the Author.
Capital market - Competition - Concentration - Financial market - Initial Public Offering (IPO) - Regulator - Self regulation - United States *
* In The Journal of Regulation, these keywords are done by the Editor and not by the Author.
ITALIAN
Relazione tematica (Finanza): Il Dipartimento di giustizia americano ha informato Nasdaq eIntercontinental Exchange che rifiuterà la loro offerta pubblica iniziale su NYSE Euronext a ragione degli effetti anticoncorrenziali e le due società hanno quindi abbandonato il progetto.
Durante il mese di maggio 2011, Nasdq OMX ed il suo partner Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) erano stati autorizzati dai propri consigli di amministrazione a fare un’offerta sull’operatore di mercato NYSE Euronext. Il dipartimento di giustizia americano era preoccupato delle conseguenze che tale operazione avrebbe avuto sulla libera concorrenza e, malgrado i provvedimenti proposti dalle due società, aveva informato le società che avrebbe rifiutato la fusione. Il 16 maggio 2011, questo potenziale rifiuto bastò a Nasdaq OMX e ICE a far abbandonare il loro progetto. Questo gioco di segnali mette in rilievo il potere dell’interregolazione tra il controllo delle concentrazioni e la regolazione delle offerte all’asta.
Autoregolazione – Concorrenza - Concentrazione – Mercato finanziario – Mercato dei capitali – Offerta Pubblica Iniziale (IPO) – Regolatore – Stati Uniti d’America *
* In The Journal of Regulation, le parole chiave sono responsabilità dell’Editore e non dall’Autore.
SPANISH
Informe temático (Finanza): El Departamento americano de justicia informó a Nasdaq y ICE que rechazó su IPO sobre el NYSE Euronext a causa de sus efectos anticompetitivos, y que las dos compañías deben por lo tanto abandonar su plan. NYSE Euronext y Deutsche Börse han decidido merge.
En mayo del 2011, Nasdaq OMX y su partidario, Interncontinental Exchange (ICE), obtuvieron la autorización por sus respectivas juntas directivas para extender una oferta en el operador del mercado de valores, NYSE Euronex. El Departamento americano de justicia comenzó a preocuparse sobre las consecuencias que esta operación tendría sobre la competencia, y a pesar de algunos remedios propuestos por las dos compoañías, notificó que rechazaría la unión. El 16 de mayo del 2011, esta rechazo potencial fue suficiente para que Nasdaq OMX y ICE abandonaran su plan. Este juego de señales demuestra el poder de la inter-regulación entre el proceso de revisión de uniones y la regulación de ofertas públicas de adquisición.
PORTUGUESE
Informe temático (Finanças): O Departamento de Justiça dos Estados Unidos da América informou Nasdaq e ICE que ele iria rejeitar o IPO em NYSE Euronext por causa de seus efeitos anti-concorrenciais, assim as duas empresas abandonaram seu plano.
Em maio de 2011, Nasdaq OMX e seu parceiro Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) foram autorizados por suas respectivas diretorias a realizar uma oferta no operador do mercado de estocagem NYSE Euronext. O Departamento de Justiça dos Estados Unidos da América ficou preocupado com as conseqüências que esta operação teria na concorrência, e apesar dos contrapesos indicados pelas duas empresas, informou que ele iria recusar a operação. Em 16 de maio de 2011, esta recusa potencial foi suficiente para Nasdaq e OMX e ICE abandonarem seu plano. Este jogo de sinais demonstra o poder da interregulação entre revisão de operações e regulação de ofertas.
The European Medicine Agency decided to open its archives on the totalities of clinical trials conducted by pharmaceutical companies, work that led to the authorization of drugs market.
In this, the Authority operates a fundamental change in regulation, replacing the principle of information by the principle of transparency, to the detriment of business confidentiality.
The European Commission, sensing potential anticompetitive behaviour in the pharmaceutical sector, conducted an inquiry into this sector, and adopted its final report on the matter on July 8th 2009. The Commission’s suspicion was that anticompetitive behaviours could be slowing down the entry of generic drugs into national markets, whereas the burden of drug spending on public finances and public health policy make rapid generic entry an important issue. The Commission concluded that delays are due in part to pharmaceutical companies’ behaviour, especially as concerns the use they make of their intellectual property rights.
However, on the other hand, one may also sustain that the strategic use of an acquired legal right is no less than legitimate, and that public health policy is a matter for national regulation. Indeed, it is for Member States, rather than European competition law, to determine the level of healthcare coverage that their society is financially willing to bear.
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced on August 5, 2010, that it will cooperate more closely with the Department of Justice (DoJ) in merger reviews in the telecommunications sector. This measure is intended to foster reconciliation of potentially divergent goals for mergers set forth by both authorities.
GERMAN
Die Federal Communications Commission (FCC, die amerikanische Bundeskommunikationsbehörde), wird im Bereich Fusionenüberwachung enger mit dem Department of Justice (das amerikanische Justizministerium) arbeiten.
Die FCC hat am 5. August 2010 bekannt gemacht, dass sie enger mit dem Department of Justice (das amerikanische Justizministerium) im Bereich Fusionenüberwachung in der Telekombranche. So wird die Annäherung von beide Behörde, die oft unterschiedliche Zielen bei Fusionen unterstützen, gefördert.
SPANISH
La American Federal Communications Commission (FCC – La Comisión americana de comunicaciones federales) anuncia cooperación más cercana con el Department of Justice (DoJ – El Departamento americano de justicia) en la revisión de fusiones.
La Federal Communicatins Commission (FCC – La Comisión americana de comunicaciones federales) anunció el 5 de agosto 2010 que tomará pasos para aumentar su operatividad con el Department of Justice (DoJ – El Departamento americano de Justicia) en la revisión de fusiones en el sector de telecomunicaciones. Esta medida sirve para fomentar la reconciliación entre objetivos potencialmente divergentes puesto en marcha por estas dos autoridades.
The European Commission, sensing potential anticompetitive behaviour in the pharmaceutical sector, conducted an inquiry into this sector, and adopted its final report on the matter on July 8th 2009. The Commission’s suspicion was that anticompetitive behaviours could be slowing down the entry of generic drugs into national markets, whereas the burden of drug spending on public finances and public health policy make rapid generic entry an important issue. The Commission concluded that delays are due in part to pharmaceutical companies’ behaviour, especially as concerns the use they make of their intellectual property rights.
However, on the other hand, one may also sustain that the strategic use of an acquired legal right is no less than legitimate, and that public health policy is a matter for national regulation. Indeed, it is for Member States, rather than European competition law, to determine the level of healthcare coverage that their society is financially willing to bear.
Summary of the news: Through its decision of 22nd of October 2020, the Autorité de la concurrence (French Competition Authority) accepted the commitments proposed by retail sector's firms Casino, Auchan, Metro and Schiever so that their agreement by which a common body centralizes purchases from numerous retailers, allowing each to offer these products under private label, is admissible with regard to competitive requirements.
In this particular case, the Authority had self-sized in July 2018, estimating that such a purchase center could harm competition, opening immediately a large consultation on the terms of the contract. In October 2018, the law Egalim permitted to the Authority to take temporary measures to suspend such a contract, what the Authority did from September.
The convention parties' firms committed on the one hand to update their contract limiting the power on suppliers, especially small and very small suppliers, excluding totally of the field of the contract some kind of products, especially food products and reducing the share of bought products volume dedicated to their transformation in distributor brand.
The Autorité de la concurrence accepts this proposal of commitments, congratulates itself of the protection of small suppliers operating like that and observe the similarity with the contract consisting in a purchase center between Carrefour and Tesco, which will be examined soon.
_____
We can draw three lessons of this innovating decision, which could be a model for after:
1. The technique of Compliance Law permits to the Autorité de la concurrence to find a reasonable solution for the future.
Indeed, rather than punishing much later by a simple fine or to annihilate the performing mechanism of the purchase center, the Authority obtains contract modifications.
The contract is structured and the obtained modifications are also structural.
The commitments are an Ex Ante technique, imposed to operators, for the future, in an equilibrium between competition, operators and consumers protection and the efficacy of the coordination between powerful operators.
The nomination of a monitor permits to build the future of the sector, thanks to the Ex Ante nature of Compliance Law.
2. The retail sector finally regulated by Compliance technics.
"Distribution law" always struggle to find its place, between Competition law and Contract Law, especially because we cannot consider it as a common "sector".
The Conseil constitutionnel (French constitutional court) refused a structural injunction power to the authority because it was contrary to business freedom and without any doubt ethics of business is not sufficient to the equilibrium of the sector.
Through commitments given against a stop of pursuits relying on structuring contracts, it is by Compliance law that a Regulation law free of the condition of existence of a sector could leave.
3. The political nature of Compliance law in the retail sector
As for digital space, which is not a sector, Compliance law can directly impose to actors imperatives that are strangers to them.
In the digital space, the care for fighting against Hate and for protecting private life; here the care for small and very small suppliers.
The Jury for Advertising Deontology ordered two of the government’s advertisements on cattle breeding to be taken off the air, because they falsely claimed that cattle breeding was mostly a family-run business run in an environmentally-friendly way. The sanction illustrates the power of self-regulation.
PORTUGUESE
Informe temático (Mídia): A Autoridade de auto-regulação em matéria de propaganda proíbe duas faltas propagandas.
O Júri para deontologia em matéria de publicidade ordenou que duas das propagandas governamentais sobre criação de gado fossem retiradas do ar, porque elas teriam difundido que a criação de gado seria um negócio familiar desenvolvido em harmonia com o meio ambiente. Esta sanção ilustra o poder da auto-regulação.
ITALIAN
Relazione tematica (Mass-media): L’autorità di autoregolazione dei pubblicitari impedisce la pubblicazione di due pubblicità menzognere.
La Jury for Advertising Deontology ha vietato la diffusione di due messaggi pubblicitari dello Stato relativi agli allevamenti animali, in quanto affermavano che l’allevamento dei bovini è praticato da aziende a gestione familiare e con sistemi che rispettano l’ambiente. Questa sanzione mostra l’impatto dell’auto-regolazione.
The European Commission conducted a competition inquiry on the competitiveness of European energy markets, because it believed that these markets functioned poorly, especially because they are insufficiently open to competition and their prices are too high. Proceedings were begun in December 2009 against E.ON, and were closed by this corporation’s May 4, 2010 legally-binding commitments to the European Commission to improve its competitors’ access to its natural gas transportation network. Access to transportation networks, which are essential facilities, is the heart of any regulatory system, and if access was not organized beforehand (ex ante), it can be arranged afterwards (ex post), as is the case in this affair, via an alliance between Competition Law and Contract Law, wherein the commitments take on the form of a sort of co-regulation (cf. infra brief summary)
FRENCH
Par une décision du 4 mai 2010, la Commission Européenne a accepté le les engagements proposés par la société énergétique allemande E.ON d’ouvrir davantage à ses concurrents l’accès à son réseau de transport de gaz.
La commission européenne a mené en 2007 une enquête sectorielle sur le fonctionnement concurrentiel des marchés énergétiques européens en estimant que ceux-ci fonctionnent mal, notamment puisqu’ils sont peu ouverts et leurs prix trop élevés. Une procédure ouverte en décembre 2009 contre E.ON est ici close par l’engagement de celle-ci envers la commission européenne d’ouvrir à ses concurrents son réseau de transport de gaz. L’accès au réseau de transport, facilité essentielle, est le cœur du système de régulation et s’il ne se fait pas {ex ante} il peut se faire alors {ex post}, comme on le voit dans cette affaire, par une alliance entre le droit de la concurrence et le droit du contrat, l’engagement devenant une sorte de corégulation (voir infra dans le bref commentaire).
GERMAN
Die Europäische Kommission hat am 4. Mai 2010 ein Beschluss veröffentlicht, in dem sie die Zusage des deutschen Energiekonzerns E.ON, der Konkurrenz effektiven Zugang zu seinen Gasleitungen zu öffnen, für verbindlich erklärt.
Die Europäische Kommission hat eine kartellrechtliche Untersuchung im Energiesektor durchgeführt, da sie die europäischen Energiemärkte für ineffizient hielt, vor allem aufgrund mangelnden Wettbewerbs und zu hohen Preisen.Mit dem Beschluss vom 4. Mai 2010 werden die von E.ON angebotenen Verpflichtungen, den Zugang zu den Gasnetzwerken für potentielle Konkurrenten zu öffnen, für rechtlich bindend erklärt. Zugang zu Transportnetzen, die als wesentliche Einrichtungen ({Essential Facilities}) zählen, ist zentral für jedes Regulatierungssystem. Wenn dieser Zugang nicht im Voraus ({ex ante}) organisiert ist, kann er trotzdem im Nachhinein ({ex post}) etabliert werden, wie es hier den Fall ist, durch ein Bündnis zwischen Wettbewerbsrecht und Vertragsrecht, indem das Unternehmen durch seine Verpflichtungen quasi mitregulierend wirkt (siehe unten {Brief Summary})
SPANISH
En una decisión del 4 de mayo 2010, la Comisión Europea acepta los compromisos de la corporación alemana de energía, E.ON, para mejorar el acceso de competidores a la red de transporte del gas natural.
La Comisión Europea llevó a cabo una encuesta sectorial sobre la concurrencia en los mercados europeos de energía, ya que sea cree que estos mercados no funcionan de manera eficaz, especialmente porque no son los suficientemente abiertos a la competencia y sus precios son demasiado altos. Los trámites comenzaron en diciembre del 2009 contra la E.ON y fueron cerrados por ésta ante sus compromisos vinculantes ante la Unión Europea del 4 de mayo 2010 de mejorar el acceso de competidores a la red de transporte de gas natural. El acceso a las redes de transporte, que son facilidades esenciales, se encuentra al centro de cualquier sistema regulatorio, y si el acceso no fue organizado anteriormente (ex ante), puede ser organizado posteriormente (ex post), como en este caso a través de un alianza entre la Ley de la Concurrencia y la Ley de Contrato, donde los compromisos actúan de manera ‘co-regulatoria’ (VER. Infra para resumen breve).
As soon as Regulation assumes independence of the operator who manages the essential infrastructure, ex ante conditions of such independence must be met.
Europe doesn't require legal autonomy of the essential infrastructure manager, probably because such autonomy, it would be both too ask the Policy, which may want more integrated organizations as soon as public transportation is a mix of public policies and that to public funds are used. But it would also be too little to ask the Policy because no matter the legal autonomy, the key is the real independence of the manager, that is under the control of the Regulator.
The Loi portant réforme ferroviaire (Railway Reform Act) of August 4, 2014 has made the integration of the company that manages the rail network, which the new name is SNCF Réseau (SNCF Network) in a public group, which also includes the SNCF, public transportation operator, in competition with new entrants in a newly opened sector to competition.
The Competition Authority in its opinion of 4 October 2013 had expressed reluctance towards the bill, to the influence that such corporate organization offers to the public operator, to the detriment of its competitors and the opening of the railway sector to competition.
The Competition Authority issues its opinion as a real essay on what should be the Regulation of the railway sector through the "governance" of the network manager. Indeed, the first part of the opinion relates to "the independent management of railway infrastructure" while the second focuses on the integration of railway network in the public group built par the law. The third part of this Opinion draws conclusions to measure whether we can consider that the Autorité de Régulation des Activités Ferroviaires (French Regulatory Authority of Railways Activities) shall have the capacity to ensure this independence by governance or not.
This review, in its construction itself, demonstrates the dialectic between Regulation and Governance (I), which is an observation and stresses the role of the regulator in the effectiveness of governance (II), which is more a question .
