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Updated: Dec. 20, 2011 (Initial publication: Dec. 20, 2011)

Doctrine

La régulation dans un État de droit

Updated: Oct. 27, 2011 (Initial publication: Oct. 27, 2011)

Authors

Jean-Michel Roy is a professor of philosophy and epistemology at the Ecole Normale Supérieure Lyon (ENS-Lyon). He provides academic guidance for the Master Recherche en Sciences Cognitives at the Ecole Normale Supérieur de Paris (ENS-Cachan). (...)

Updated: April 4, 2012 (Initial publication: Feb. 23, 2012)

Sectorial Analysis

Main information

On February 1st, 2012, the European Commission rejected proposed merger between the NYSE-Euronext and Deutsche Boerse. The Commission did it, considering that, on the relevant market of financial derivatives, the concentration would give the new firm almost monopoly and that the proposed remedies, notably the access for competitors to the clearing house, are Insufficient.

Updated: July 4, 2011 (Initial publication: Dec. 16, 2009)

I. Isolated Articles

On the one hand, economic structures, i.e., the centers of economic power, are relevant data for the functioning of the economy, since, especially in the countries in the Southern Hemisphere, they account for important characteristics in the underdevelopment process. On the other hand, as we have observed, these structures are the only ones from which any kind of presumption can be made about the probable behavior of economic agents. What has yet to be defined is the kind of instruments that can be used to define the orientation and behavior of these structures. Economic instruments are worth little as they do not supply concrete economic results that are susceptible to empirical verification. Standing in the way of the use of legal instruments, however, is the apparent difficulty in applying social policy to the economic sphere. For many years, decisions that have affected the economic order have been left primarily to economic theories to which the discussion of values is unfamiliar. It is time therefore, for a legal theory of economic behavior, based on legal procedural values and on the restriction of economic power structures.

Updated: Aug. 28, 2012 (Initial publication: Aug. 24, 2012)

Breaking news

The "Conseil constitutionnel" (French Constitutional Council), on the occasion of the control of the "Loi de finance rectificative" (amending finance law) adopted, may make rules relating to the regulation. Thus, a Senate amendment had slipped into legislation a tax of 5% on the resale of a television channel, when it had been obtained by the purchaser on account of the assignment for the benefit of a licence conferred by the State free of charge. The provision is considered non-compliant with the Constitution in that it does not have enough in connection with the organization of the finances of the State and that it pursues another goal: here to avoid that an operator plays with the mechanisms of regulation for purely financial purposes. This struggle by the Council against the "legislative cavaliers" didn’t mean that a measure of this type is later taken by a law, since such concern can be justified.

Updated: Dec. 8, 2011 (Initial publication: Sept. 4, 2011)

Neutrality in Systems of Economic Regulation

Translated Summaries

In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors


ENGLISH

Article: What does it mean to be neutral ? Socrates in the land of regulators

Should regulatory agencies, as we define them in today’s economic and cultural world, be obligated to be neutral in accomplishing their regulatory activities? What would the meaning of such an obligation be?


ITALIAN

Articolo: Cosa vuol dire essere neutrale? Socrate nella terra dei regolatori


Le autorità di regolazione, come sono denominate oggigiorno nel mondo economico e culturale, dovrebbero essere obbligate ad essere neutrali quando compiono le loro attività di regolazione? Quale sarebbe il significato di un tale obbligo?

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Other translations forthcoming.

Updated: Feb. 10, 2011 (Initial publication: Feb. 8, 2011)

I. Isolated Articles

 

ENGLISH 
The European Commission published a Green Paper in September 2010 on Audit Policy, in order to give its opinion on the Lessons from the Crisis.From a systemic perspective of financial markets' stability, the Commission analyzes the role of the auditor, the internal structure of audit firms, the concentration of the audit market, and the possibility of a European market for auditing. But, what the Commission presents as a neutral description is actually a series of ideological stances, which are tenable, but also debatable. Thus, the Green Paper makes auditing out to be a structural element of financial markets, which shatters auditing's uniqueness, while attributing it a structural and systemic role, which is questionable. It then requires regulatory tools to open the auditing market to more competition, which will, in reality, expose it to the pressures of demand and lower the efficiency of auditing missions. It would be better to reinforce regulatory mechanisms towards security and conflicts of interest, rather than towards competition, which corresponds to the traditional French model of audit regulation.

FRENCH
 
La Commission européenne a lancé en septembre 2010 un Livre vert  la Politique de l’audit, pour que soient tirée à son propos les Leçons de la Crise.  C’est donc dans une perspective systémique de stabilité des marchés financiers que les questions sont posées par la Commission, concernant l’auditeur, l’organisation des sociétés d’audit, la concentration du marché de l’audit et l’hypothèse d’un marché européen de l’audit. Mais ce que la Commission présente comme une description neutre est une réalité une série de prises de positions idéologiques, soutenables mais aussi discutables. Ainsi, le Livre Vert présente l’audit comme un élément structurel des marchés financiers, ce qui brise l’unicité de l’audit, tandis qu’elle lui confère un rôle structurel et systémique, ce qui est discutable. Elle requiert ensuite des outils de régulations pour ouvrir à une plus forte concurrence le marché de l’audit, ce qui va en réalité l’exposer à la pression de la demande et abaisser l’effectivité des missions de l’audit, alors qu’il faut renforcer les outils de régulations, non pas par rapport à  la concurrence mais par rapport à la sécurité et aux conflits d’intérêts, ce à quoi correspond le modèle traditionnel français.
 
 
 
GERMAN

Artikel: Kritische Analyse des Grünbuches der Europäischen Kommission im Bereich Abschlussprüfung: Eine problematische Definition vom systemrelevanten Agent und eine Illustration des Gegensatzes zwischen Regulierung und Wettbewerb.



Die Europäische Kommission hat im September 2010 ein Grünbuch zur Rolle der Abschlussprüfung veröffentlicht, um ihre Stellungnahme über die Lehre der Krise zu verbreiten. Die Kommission analysiert die Rolle des Abschlussprüfers, die innere Struktur von Abschlussprufüngsunternehmen, die Marktkonzentration des Prüfungsmarktes und die Möglichkeiten der Entstehung eines europäischen Abschlussprüfungsmarktes aus der systemischen Perspektive der Finanzmarktstabilität. Aber was die Europäische Kommission als eine neutrale Schilderung darstellt trägt eher mit sich eine Reihe von ideologischen Einstellungen, die zwar haltbar aber auch strittig sind. So stellt das Grünbuch die Abschlüssprufung als Strukturelement für die Finanzmärkte, was die Einheit der Abschlussprüfung zerbricht. Laut des Grünbuches spielt sie auch eine systemische und strukturelle Rolle, was auch fragwürdig ist.   Der Prufüngsmarkt sollte auch zu mehr Wettbewerb durch Regulierungsmassnahmen eröffnet werden, was in der Tat dem Markt dem Drück der Anfrage aussetzen wird, und die Effizienz von Abschlussprüfungsaufträgen einschränken wird. Es wäre besser, Regulierungsmechanismen mit Hinsicht auf Sicherheit und Interessenkonflikten
, eher als Wettbewerb, zu verfestigen, was eigentlich dem französichen Modell der Prüfungsregulierung entsprechen würde.
  

 
 

 

 
ITALIAN
 
Articolo: Analisi critica del Libro verde della Commissione europea sulla politica in materia di revisione dei conti: una definizione problematica dell'agente sistemico ed un'illustrazione dell'opposizione tra regolazione e concorrenza.
 
Nel mese di settembre 2010, la Commissione europea ha pubblicato un libro verde sulla politica in materia di audit (revisione dei conti) per emettere il suo parere sulle "Lezioni dalla crisi". Con una prospettiva sistemica della stabilità dei mercati finanziari, la Commissione analizza il ruolo del revisore dei conti, la struttura interna degli studi di revisione dei conti, la concentrazione del mercato dell'audit e la possibilità di strutturare un mercato europeo della revisione dei conti. Tuttavia, quello che la commissione presenta come un dato di fatto, in realtà è il frutto di una riflessione ideologica, sostenibile ma sicuramente discutibile. Il Libro verde rende la revisione dei conti, un'attività strutturale dei mercati finanziari, la cui unicità è quindi frazionata, e gli attribuisce un ruolo strutturale e sistemico, di per sé discutibile. Inoltre auspica con l'intervento di meccanismi di regolazione, un'apertura del mercato dell'audit al fine di garantire una concorrenza maggiore, che sarà esposta alle pressioni della domanda e diminuirà l'efficienza degli incarichi di revisione dei conti. Sarebbe meglio rafforzare i meccanismi di regolazione al fine di raggiungere una sicurezza maggiore ed evitare conflitti d’interessi, invece di auspicare una maggiore concorrenza, cosa che corrisponde al modello francese tradizionale della regolazione del mercato della revisione dei conti.

SPANISH

Artículo: Análisis crítico del Libro Verde de la Comisión Europea sobre su política de auditoría: una definición problemática sobre el agente del sistema y una ilustración sobre la oposición entre regulación y competencia.

 

En septiembre del 2010, la Comisión Europea publicó El Libro Verde sobre la política de auditoría para proveer su opinión sobre Las Lecciones de la Crisis. Desde una perspectiva sistemática de la estabilidad de los mercados financieros, la Comisión analiza el papel del auditor, la estructura interna de empresas de auditoría, la concentración del mercado de auditoría y la posibilidad de un mercado europea de auditoría. Pero, lo que la Comisión presenta como una descripción neutral es, de hecho, una serie de declaraciones ideológicas, que son defendibles, pero también discutibles. Por lo tanto, el Informe Verde describe a la auditoría como un elemento estructural de los mercados financieros, lo cual destruye la cualidad única de la auditoría, mientras que le atribuye un rol estructural y sistemático, lo cual es cuestionable. También requiere de instrumentos regulatorios para abrir el mercado de auditoría a una competencia más substancial, lo cual, en realidad, lo expone a las presiones de demanda y disminuye la eficacia de las misiones de auditoría. Sería mejor reforzar los mecanismo regulatorios hacia la seguridad y conflicto de intereses, y no hacia la competencia, lo cual corresponde al modelo tradicional francés de la regulación de auditoría.

CHINESE
 
记事:对于欧盟委员会审计政策绿皮书的批判性分析:系统性因素定义及竞争与规制间冲突说明
 
欧盟委员会于2010年9月发布了目的在于总结经济危机相关教训的审计政策绿皮书。欧盟委员会通过以稳定金融市场为目的的系统化视角,分析了审计人员职责、公司内部审计结构、审计市场整合以及建立欧洲统一审计市场的可能性。但是欧盟委员会所公布的中立性表述,事实上却是站在一系列意识形态立场上作出的,有事实依据但却会引发争议。尽管审计对于金融市场具有结构性和系统性的调节作用,但绿皮书将审计行为归为金融市场的一个结构性组成元素其便会破坏审计的单一性,这是值得商榷的。欧盟委员会随之要求相关规制性政策工具进一步强化审计市场竞争,此举事实上一方面将审计至于诉讼的压力之下,另一方面也将削弱审计工作的有效性。对于规制性政策工具的强化不仅相关与竞争,而且更相关与市场安全和利益协调。惟有如此,才能够与法国传统审计监管规范保持一致。

Updated: June 8, 2010 (Initial publication: May 18, 2010)

Sectorial Analysis

Main information

A series of decisions handed down by the European Court of Justice on March 9, 2010 reduces the burden of proof for environmental damages, in order to facilitate the application of the 'polluter pays' principle, and provides national regulatory authorities broad powers in enforcing environmental liability.

Updated: June 8, 2010 (Initial publication: May 19, 2010)

Sectorial Analysis

Main information

The national register of trusts has finally become a reality thanks to a decree published on March 2, 2010. It only use will be to inform various government administrations, in order to reinforce the tools available for fighting tax evasion, money laundering, and terrorism financing.

Updated: June 22, 2010 (Initial publication: June 1, 2010)

Symposiums

The Autorité de la régulation des communications électroniques et des postes - ARCEP (French Telecommunications and Posts Regulator) organized the Colloquium on "la neutralité des réseaux" The Network Neutrality), which took place on April 13, 2010. Each actor uses the generality of the term ‘neutrality’ in an interpretation that best suits his opinions. However, neutrality means that there should be no discrimination between Internet users; however, it does not mean that they have the right to everything for free: because there has to be some sort of traffic and bandwidth management, consumer and copyright protection, it is necessary to strike a balance between these contradictory rights in order to allow the network to develop. Therefore, a regulator is necessary. The future development of the Internet depends upon it. For the moment, nobody knows who these legitimate regulators are, and how they would be able to regulate these competing forces, organize information transparency, and encourage long-term investment, while preserving competition at the same time.