On the one hand, economic structures, i.e., the centers of economic power, are relevant data for the functioning of the economy, since, especially in the countries in the Southern Hemisphere, they account for important characteristics in the underdevelopment process. On the other hand, as we have observed, these structures are the only ones from which any kind of presumption can be made about the probable behavior of economic agents.
What has yet to be defined is the kind of instruments that can be used to define the orientation and behavior of these structures. Economic instruments are worth little as they do not supply concrete economic results that are susceptible to empirical verification. Standing in the way of the use of legal instruments, however, is the apparent difficulty in applying social policy to the economic sphere. For many years, decisions that have affected the economic order have been left primarily to economic theories to which the discussion of values is unfamiliar. It is time therefore, for a legal theory of economic behavior, based on legal procedural values and on the restriction of economic power structures.
The implementation of the Transfer Matching System (TMS) on October 1, 2010 was announced by the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) as a first step to regulate international player transfers through an increased transparency of these human and financial flows.
This collective work describes the contours of French, European, and International healthcare regulation, and explores past, present, and future evolutions and tendencies in this sector. Original French title: Annales de la régulation, 2009, volume 2, sous la direction de Thierry Revet et Laurent Vidal, collection Bibliothèque de l'Institut de Recherche Juridique de la Sorbonne (IRJS) – André Tunc. (LGDJ)
This collective work describes the contours of French, European, and International healthcare regulation, and explores past, present, and future evolutions and tendencies in this sector. Original French title: Annales de la régulation, 2009, volume 2, sous la direction de Thierry Revet et Laurent Vidal, collection Bibliothèque de l'Institut de Recherche Juridique de la Sorbonne (IRJS) – André Tunc. (LGDJ)
As soon as Regulation assumes independence of the operator who manages the essential infrastructure, ex ante conditions of such independence must be met.
Europe doesn't require legal autonomy of the essential infrastructure manager, probably because such autonomy, it would be both too ask the Policy, which may want more integrated organizations as soon as public transportation is a mix of public policies and that to public funds are used. But it would also be too little to ask the Policy because no matter the legal autonomy, the key is the real independence of the manager, that is under the control of the Regulator.
The Loi portant réforme ferroviaire (Railway Reform Act) of August 4, 2014 has made the integration of the company that manages the rail network, which the new name is SNCF Réseau (SNCF Network) in a public group, which also includes the SNCF, public transportation operator, in competition with new entrants in a newly opened sector to competition.
The Competition Authority in its opinion of 4 October 2013 had expressed reluctance towards the bill, to the influence that such corporate organization offers to the public operator, to the detriment of its competitors and the opening of the railway sector to competition.
The Competition Authority issues its opinion as a real essay on what should be the Regulation of the railway sector through the "governance" of the network manager. Indeed, the first part of the opinion relates to "the independent management of railway infrastructure" while the second focuses on the integration of railway network in the public group built par the law. The third part of this Opinion draws conclusions to measure whether we can consider that the Autorité de Régulation des Activités Ferroviaires (French Regulatory Authority of Railways Activities) shall have the capacity to ensure this independence by governance or not.
This review, in its construction itself, demonstrates the dialectic between Regulation and Governance (I), which is an observation and stresses the role of the regulator in the effectiveness of governance (II), which is more a question .
Through the publication of a new regulatory framework by Postcomm, the British Postal Services Commission, on May 27, 2010, Postcomm outlines its plans for regulating the postal sector in the years following 2012. This framework plans to adapt postal regulation to allow {Royal Mail} to profitably fulfill its Universal Service Obligations faced with drastically declining mail volumes and increased competition.
This article provides an economic perspective on the role played by
competition policy in the development of competition in various
transport sectors. After a brief reminder of some economic features that
are shared by different transport modes, it mainly examines the
principles and practical underpinnings of merger control as it is
implemented in the present context of rapid consolidation in some
transport sectors. Thereby, it stresses some potential shortcomings of
the traditional merger regula tion approach in the particular context of
transportation services, pointing to an excessive attention paid to
potential competition issues on overly narrow relevant markets while
largely ignoring global efficiency-enhancing effects of mergers and
alliances.
ITALIAN
Articolo: Trasporti, concorrenza e politica in material di concorrenza.
Questo articolo delinea una prospettiva economica del ruolo della politica in materia di concorrenza nello sviluppo della libera concorrenza in vari settori dei trasporti. Dopo un breve richiamo ad alcuni aspetti economici, comuni a diversi tipi di trasporto, l’articolo passa in esame i principi e le pratiche fondamentali del controllo delle concentrazione cosi come applicato nell’attuale contesto di consolidamento di alcuni settori dell’industria dei trasporti. Tuttavia, l’articolo mette in rilievo ugualmente alcune carenze potenziali di un approccio classico della regolazione delle concentrazioni nello specifico settore dei trasporti, tra cui l’eccessiva attenzione data alle questioni di concorrenza potenziale su mercati di dimensioni ridotte e la noncuranza generalizzata degli effetti di alleanze e fusioni in materia di efficacia e di progresso.
SPANISH
Artículo: Transporte, competencia y política competitiva
Este artículo da una perspectiva económica sobre el rol jugador por la política de la competencia y el desarrollo de la competencia en varios sectores de transporte. Después de un breve recordatorio sobre las características económicas compartidas por diferentes modales de transporte, examina principalmente los principios y detalles prácticos de la implementación de control de uniones en el contexto presente de consolidación rápida en algunos sectores de transporte. El artículo pone énfasis algunos de los defectos potenciales del la regulación tradicional de uniones, particularmente en el contexto de los servicios de transporte, indicando un enfoque excesivo a cuestiones de competencia potencial en mercados demasiado estrechos y a la vez ignorando los efectos del mejoramiento de eficacia global de las uniones y las alianzas.
PORTUGUESE
Artigo: Transporte, concorrência e política concorrencial
Este artigo fornece uma perspectiva econômica sobre o papel exercido pela política concorrencial no desenvolvimento da concorrência em diversos setores de transporte. Após uma breve retomada de conceitos econômicos compartilhados por modos de transporte diferentes, ele examina principalmente os princípios e os problemas práticos do controle como implementado no contexto presente de rápida consolidação em alguns setores de transporte. Assim, ele sublinha alguns potenciais conflitos no enfoque da regulação tradicional no contexto particular de serviços de transporte, apontando para uma atenção excessiva concedida para problemas de concorrência potencial em muito relevantes mercados enquanto são amplamente ignorados os efeitos na eficiência global.
Transporte aéreo – Avião – Aeroporto – Aliança – Comportamento anti-concorrencial – Falência – Concorrência – Autoridade de concorrência – Política de concorrência – Concentração – Contrato – Subsídios cruzados – Economia de escala – Eficiência – Ganho de eficiência – Barreiras de entrada – Equilíbrio – Comissão Europeia – Custo fixo – França – Londres – Incentivo – Operador incumbente – Infraestrutura – Interconexão – Investimento – Monopólio legal – Liberalização – Rede de longa distância – Estrutura de mercado – Controle – Firma de multiprodução – Rede – Mercado oligopolístico – Concorrência potencial – Preço – Elasticidade de preço – Trilho – Transporte por trilhos – Mercado relevante – Transporte rodoviário – Segmento – Serviço – Tempo – Transporte – Reino Unido – Comunidade urbana – Veículo.*
* Em The Journal of Regulation, estas palavras-chave são fornecidas pelo Editor e não pelo Autor.
The Autorité de la régulation des communications électroniques et des postes - ARCEP (French Telecommunications and Posts Regulator) organized the Colloquium on "la neutralité des réseaux" The Network Neutrality), which took place on April 13, 2010. Each actor uses the generality of the term ‘neutrality’ in an interpretation that best suits his opinions. However, neutrality means that there should be no discrimination between Internet users; however, it does not mean that they have the right to everything for free: because there has to be some sort of traffic and bandwidth management, consumer and copyright protection, it is necessary to strike a balance between these contradictory rights in order to allow the network to develop. Therefore, a regulator is necessary. The future development of the Internet depends upon it. For the moment, nobody knows who these legitimate regulators are, and how they would be able to regulate these competing forces, organize information transparency, and encourage long-term investment, while preserving competition at the same time.
The “Conseil économique, social et environnemental – CESE” (French Economic, Social and Environmental Council) expressed its approval of the “Stratégie nationale de développement durable SNDD” (new French National Strategy for Sustainable Development), on January 27 2010, which has been drawn up by the Government for the period 2009-2013. This national strategy is to become the tool for establishing a new model of economic development.
