This is the drama of the summer and the case of the Mistigri: in what game drag one that will drop the player? Indeed, it pretends to discover that the purely declarative Libor system works by the good of those who declare, namely the banks. If one day a child said that the King is naked... This day was June 28, 2012, when the Financial Services Authority condemned the Barclays for manipulation of course. Since then, is the head, the bulk of support as the other? Thus, the FSA condemns. Well takes it, since the Government asked him to consider a reform of the Libor.
On 10 August, the FSA makes first conclusions, to an increase in the powers of the FSA. But the English Parliament responded on 18 August, stating that if the FSA had a little more control this before, nothing would have occurred. Oh, what beautiful summer...
Net Neutrality first became news in the United States just after the year 2000. The issue arose when the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) took decisions regarding conflicts between Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and cable operators. The FCC's decisions focused on ensuring non discriminatory conditions for ISP's access to the Internet communications market using existing cable networks. These issues became the basis of the debate on Internet users' rights, namely their right to freely access the content and services of their choice. On September 25, 2005 the FCC published a policy statement recognizing these issues, and clearly defined four main principles for Network Neutrality.
FRENCH
La Neutralité du Net : une perspective économique
La neutralité du Net apparu aux États-Unis au tout début des années 2000. Les problèmes ont surgi lorsque la "Federal Communications Commission -FCC" (Commission fédérale en charge des communications) a dû prendre des décisions concernant les conflits entre les fournisseurs d'accès Internet (ISP) et les opérateurs de réseaux cablés. Les décisions de la FCC étaient axées sur la garantie du caractère non discriminatoire des conditions d'accès des fournisseurs de services sur le marché des communications sur Internet via les réseaux câblés. Ces questions ont servi de base au débat sur les droits des utilisateurs d'Internet, à savoir leur droit d'accès aux contenus et aux services de leur choix. Le 25 Septembre 2005, la FCC a publié une déclaration de principe reconnaissant ces questions, et clairement définie autour de quatre grands principes.
GERMAN
Die Netzneutralität: eine wirtschaftliche Perspektive
Die Netzneutralität ist in den Vereinigten Staaten im Beginn den Jahren 2000 entstanden. Die erste Problemen sind entstanden, als die Federal Communications Commission (FCC - die amerikanische Bundeskommunikationsbehörde) Entscheidungen über Widerstreite zwischen Internetdienstanbieter und Kabeloperatoren treffen sollte. Diese Entscheidungen bestanden darauf, dass die Internetdienstanbieter durch Kabelnetzwerke Zugang zum Markt ohne Benachteiligung erhalten. Diese Fragen haben zufolge die Diskussionen über den Zugang den Internetsverbrauchern zu bestimmten Inhalten und Diensten hervorgebracht. Am 25. September 2005 hat die FCC eine Grundsatzerklärung über diese Fragen veröffentlicht, und hat vier Hauptprinzipien für die Netzneutralität dargelegt.
GREEK
Άρθρο: Ουδετερότητα του Δικτύου: μια οικονομική προοπτική
Η ουδετερότητα των δικτύων έγινε για πρώτη φορά γνωστή στις ΗΠΑ αμέσως μετά το 2000. Το ζήτημα ανέκυψε όταν η Ομοσπονδιακή Επιτροπή Τηλεπικοινωνιών (FCC) έλαβε αποφάσεις σχετικά με διαφορές μεταξύ των Παρόχων Υπηρεσιών Internet και των φορέων καλωδιακής τηλεόρασης. Οι αποφάσεις της Ομοσπονδιακής Επιτροπής Τηλεπικοινωνιών έδωσαν έμφαση στη διασφάλιση ύπαρξης μη διακριτικών όρων πρόσβασης των παρόχων υπηρεσιών Διαδικτύου στην αγορά τηλεπικοινωνιών Internet, με τη χρήση των υπαρχόντων καλωδιακών δικτύων. Τα θέματα αυτά αποτέλεσαν τη βάση της συζήτησης αναφορικά με τα δικαιώματα των χρηστών Internet, και συγκεκριμένα του δικαιώματός τους για ελεύθερη πρόσβαση στο περιεχόμενο και τις υπηρεσίες της επιλογής τους. Στις 25 Σεπτεμβρίου 2005, η Ομοσπονδιακή Αρχή Τηλεπικοινωνιών δημοσίευσε μια δήλωση πολιτικής, αναγνωρίζοντας τα θέματα αυτά και ορίζοντας παράλληλα ξεκάθαρα τέσσερις γενικές αρχές σχετικά με την Ουδετερότητα του Δικτύου.
POLISH
Neutralność Internetu : Perspektywa ekonomiczna
Neutralność Internetu pojawiła się jako nowy temat w Stanach Zjednocznych w 2000 roku. Problemy dały o sobie znać w momencie, kiedy « Federal Communications Commission –FCC » (amerykańska federalna komisja do spraw komunikacji) musiała podjąć decyzje rozwiązujące spory pomiędzy dostawcami dostępu do internetu (ISP) i operatorami sieci kablowych. Decyzje FCC dotyczyły zagwarantowania warunków, które nie dyskryminują dostawców usług na rynek kommuikacji internetowej, korzystających z dostępu do internetu za pomocą sieci kablowych. Te kwestie stały się podłożem debaty o prawach użytkowników Internetu ; mianowicie o prawie do wolnego dostępu do wybranych treści i usług. W dniu 25 września 2005 roku FCC opublikowałapodstawową deklarację rozwiązując i uznając te kwestie, określając przy tym wyraźnie cztery główne zasady neutralności Internetu.
SPANISH
La neutralidad al acceso a la red: una perspectiva económica
La neutralidad al acceso a la red se trajo al primer plano por primera vez en los EEUU en el año 2000. Este tema surgió cuando la “Federal Communications Commission” (FCC – la Comisión americana de comunicaciones federales) tomó decisiones concerniendo los conflictos entre los “Internet Service Providers” (ISPs – los proveedores americanos de servicios de Internet) y los operadores de cables. Las decisiones de la FCC tenían el objetivo de asegurar condiciones no discriminatorias para el acceso de los ISPs al mercado de comunicaciones en Internet. Estos temas se volvieron la base del debate sobre los derechos de los usuarios de Internet, especialmente su derecho al acceso libre al contenido y a los servicios de su preferencia. El 25 de septiembre del 2005, la FCC publicó un programa que reconoce estas cuestiones y que define claramente cuatro principios esenciales para la Neutralidad sobre la red.
Published by Oxford University Press (OUF), the collective book, Public Accountability, edited by Mark Bovens, Robert Goodin and Thomas Schillemann, consists of 43 contributions.
Few strictly focus on issues of regulatory matters. One can still quote the article by Colin Scott on Independent Regulators or those of Christie Hayne, Steven E. Salterio and Paul L. Posner and Shahan Asif on auditing (Accounting and Auditing; Audit Institutions).
The subject of most of the contributions is rather the necessary renewal of the management of the State, public governance incorporating this new way of "accountability," which explains the book title : itself: Public Accountability. But as we know that the line between public and private is more porous than ever, we can appreciate that the bookk extends its thoughts to the governance of private organizations or non-profit private sector by some contributions.
Indeed, the fact that Accountability is what is common to the Regulation and Governance. This is the first sentence of the book : "Accountability is the buzzword of modern governance".
Probably because of accountability has become a central concept, as shown in the introductory contribution, these are the articles that confront the most general elements such as "time" (Accountability and Time), "crisis" (Accountability for Crise) or "trust" (Accountability and trust), which are the most instructive for the future.
Thus, despite its collective character, the book is very consistent and often takes a critical tone about this invasion of public space by the will of accoutability, the authors emphasizing the "deficits", the failures and especially thet prohibitively expensive of this mechanism.
It would come to regret the simple mechanism of hierarchical rule to which a nostalgic contribution is devoted, which describes how operated the State before we apply to it the State the agency theory.
So it is a practical book, complete, critical and prospective, of great interest.
In Belgium, the Flemish Region had adopted the Decree of 23 December 2010 to exemp those providing electricity with a renewable source to pay the rate of injection into the electricity transmission network. The Region stated that it was not an act tariff, thus falling under its jurisdiction. The decree, attacked by the energy regulator before the Belgium Constitutional Court, was canceled by the latter in a ruling dated July 12, 2012, because it is an act of pricing, under the only federal competence.
FRENCH
En Belgique, la Région flamande avait adopté le décret du 23 décembre 2010 pour exempter les producteurs d'électricité ayant pour source une énergie renouvelable du payement dû au titre de l'injection de l'électricité dans le réseau de distribution. La Région posait qu'il ne s'agit pas d'un acte de tarification, et que cela relevait donc de sa compétence régionnale. Ce décret, attaché par le Régulateur de l'Energie devant la Cour Constitutionnelle de Belgique, a été annulé par celle-ci dans une décision en date du 12 juillet 2012, parce qu'il s'agit bien d'un acte touchant à la tarification, pour laquelle seul des organes fédéraux sont compétents.
On July 23, 2010 was published the awaited European-wide stress test, a mechanism designed by regulators to restore trust in markets through the mean of transparency. This paper examines the effect of trust on market from an economic perspective as well as from a sociological one. The paper demonstrated how trust, because it aims at achieving transparency which is Regulation’s number one tool, is not only necessary to economic growth but also participates to fulfilling regulatory objectives, such as market stability, risk prevention and consumer protection. Indeed, because Regulation is a mechanism aiming at preventing market failures, it needs as many tools, such as sociological ones (e.g. incentives) it may use to achieve such aim. The paper suggests that transparency is a tool for Regulation since it acts as a communicating vessel between regulatory objectives (microprudential) and supervisory ones (macroprudential), which both contribute to Regulation’s broader objective: the stability of a system.
FRENCH
Article: la régulation par la confiance: l'exemple des stress tests
Le 23 juillet 2010 a été publié le très attendu stress test à l'échelle européenne, un mécanisme conçu par les régulateurs pour restaurer la confiance dans les marchés par la transparence. Cet article examine les effets de la confiance sur les marchés dans une perspective économique et sociologique. L'article démontre en quoi la confiance, parce qu'elle a pour but d'installer la transparence, premier objectif de la Régulation, n'est pas seulement nécessaire à la croissance économique, mais participe également à l'accomplissement d'objectifs régulatoires, comme la stabilité du marché, la prévention du risque et la protection du consommateur. En effet, parce que la Régulation est un mécanisme visant à empêcher les défaillances de marché, elle a besoin d'autant d'instruments, y compris sociologiques (p.ex. les incitations), dont elle peut avoir usage pour atteindre cet objectif. L'article suggère que la transparence est un outil pour la Regulation puisqu'elle joue le rôle de transmetteur entre des objectifs régulatoires (micro-prudentiels) et des objectifs de supervision (macro-prudentiels), qui tous deux contriibuent à l'objectif plus large de la Régulation: la stabilité d'un système.
GERMAN
Artikel: Durch Vertrauern regulieren: das Beispiel den Stress Tests
Am 23. Juli 2010 wurden die erwarteten Ergebnisse den europaweiten Stress Tests bekanntgegeben. Diese Tests wurden von den Regulierungsbehörden dazu erfasst, um das Vertrauern auf Märkten durch Transparenz wiederherzustellen. Dieser Artikel erforscht die Auswirkung von Vertrauern auf Märkten auf einer ökonomischen und soziologischen Perspektive. Er zeigt, inwieweit Vertrauern, das den ersten Ziel der Regulierung, die Transparenz, einsetzen soll, nicht nur notwendig für die Wachstum ist, sondern auch für die Durchsetzung von Regulierungsziele, wie Marktstabilität, Riskverhütung, und Verbraucherschutz. Zwar ist Regulierung ein Mechanismus, das darauf zielt, Marktversagen zu vermeiden, sie braucht so viele Instrumente, einschliesslich soziologische Instrumente (z.B. Anreize), die sie brauchen könnte. Der Artikel deutet an, dass Transparenz ein Instrument der Regulierunh ist, da sie die Übertragung von Regulierungsziele (mikroprudentiel) und Überwachungsziele (makroprudentiel) erlaubt, was zum breiten Ziel der Regulierung beiträgt, und zwar die Systemstabiliserung.
SPANISH
La regulación a base de confianza: el ejemplo del estudio del estrés
El 23 de julio del 2010 fue publicado el muy esperado estudio del estrés, que se llevó a cabo a través de toda Europa, lo cual es un mecanismo diseñado por reguladores para restaurar la confianza en los mercados utilizando el valor medio de la transparencia. Este informe examina el efecto de la confianza sobre el marcado desde una perspectiva económica al igual que desde una perspectiva sociológica. El informe demuestra que la confianza, precisamente porque su objetivo es la transparencia que es el instrumento primordial de la Regulación, no sólo es necesaria para el crecimiento económico, sino que también contribuye a la realización de los objetivos regulatorios, como la estabilidad del mercado, la prevención del riesgo y la protección al consumidor. Por lo tanto, ya que la Regulación es un mecanismo cuyo objetivo es prevenir los fallos del mercado, necesita de la mayor cantidad de instrumentos posibles, como instrumentos sociológicos (por ejemplo, los incentivos), para cumplir con su meta. El informe sugiere que la transparencia es un instrumento para la Regulación ya que actúa como una nave comunicativa entre los objetivos regulatorios (microprudencial) y los objetivos de supervisión (macroprudencial), que juntos contribuyen al objetivo más amplio de la Regulación: la estabilidad del sistema.
ITALIAN
Articolo: Regolazione attraverso la fiducia: l’esempio degli stress test
Il 23 luglio 2010 é stato pubblicato il tanto atteso stress test a livello europeo, un meccanismo ideato dai regolatori al fine di rassicurare i mercati attraversola trasparenza. Tale studio esamina gli effetti della fiducia sul mercato da un punto di vista economico e sociologico. Lo studio dimostra come la fiducia, puntando a raggiungere una maggiore trasparenza, meccanismo primario della regolazione finanziaria, non é solamente necessaria per la crescita economica ma contribuisce inoltre a raggiungere gli obiettivi dei regolatori come la stabilità del mercato, la prevenzione del rischio e la protezione dei consumatori. Inoltre, poiché la regolazione é un meccanismo che vuole evitare i mancati funzionamenti del mercato, sono necessari per raggiungere tale scopo diversi strumenti, tra cui quelli sociologici (ad esempio gli incentivi). Questo studio suggerisce che la trasparenza é uno strumento di regolazione dal momento in cui costituisce il vaso comunicante tra gli obiettivi della regolazione (micropudenziale) e quelli della supervisione (macroprudenziale). Entrambi questi obiettivi contribuiscono al più ampio obiettivo della regolazione: la stabilità di un sistema.
In The Journal of Regulation the summaries’ translation are done by the Editors and not by the authors
ENGLISH:
Nowadays, it’s necessary to define, initially, the framework of an impact survey. An impact survey is an analysis estimating the economic consequences of a bill (in Europe or in the US) in order to limit, reduce or compensate for negative impacts. It requires the prior adoption of the text.
ITALIAN
Nei giorni nostri, è necessario definire, inizialmente, la struttura di una valutazione d’impatto. Una valutazione d’impatto è uno studio che cerca di fare una stima delle conseguenze economiche dell’adozione di una legge (in Europa o negli Stati Uniti) in modo tale da limitare, ridurre o compensare le sue conseguenze negative. Tuttavia questo richiede l’adozione preliminare del testo.
In Cameroon, the electricity sector is organized around a public operator, the Aes-Sonel, which the State conceded the transmission and distribution of electricity. The “Agence de Régulation du Secteur de l’Energie – ARSEL ( Cameroons Regulatory Agency Electricity Sector ) is responsible for ensuring the proper functioning of the system, quality of service and consumer protection. As in other African countries for the moment the country suffers from a lack of electrification planning and a lack of access to electricity, a significant portion of the population.
However, the regulator has commissioned a survey from June 4 to August 16, 2012. He was released on September 5 which he says the study shows that the operator doesn’t provide public service obligations correctly towards consumers. The operator responds by saying that on the one hand the study is not conclusive and that other conditions, external to him, do not bring electricity to everyone but it’s not its fault.
It is often argued that energy because it is a matter of sovereignty and because it is rooted in the territory, returns to the State. But it is resolutely towards Europe that Michel Derdevet pulls the whole system.
Probably by conviction, by will of a strong Europe and because there has economic power only when propped on energy. However, an energy system that is up by networks as in energy, we never doubted the convergence between the container and the content, meaning that the energy source is irrelevant whitout being carried, whitout being 'provided to users.
This construction of the networks is political and it is in terms of "mesh" that the report Michel Derdevet just submitted to the President of the Republic, François Hollande, presents a European project. In a way, it is not "revolutionary", as it is to finally fulfill the will of those who conceived Europe in 1945 through the coal, steel and energy, to a common Europe from which built the industry, not only for the reconstruction of Europe but for its economic dynamism and its common security policy.
In this, the European network of the transportation of electricity is essential. Yet it is to be done because the legislation of the European Union rather liberalized energy markets whitout building Europe of energy, leaving remaining national specificities. The result is what Michel Derdevet rightly called "inertia".
He therefore proposes the establishment of an "European industrial project." In this context, Michel Derdevet requires better definition of "model of norms and regulation", aiming in particular the structure of tariffs that include or not the R & D according to the Member States, claiming the alignment of the tasks of network operators and a price guarantee for users, which would facilitate investment. He stressed that national regulatory differences hinder the development of smart grids (and therefore the European market). Without a convergence of regulations, interoperability is not optimal, as it would allow Europe to be a major global player in energy.
Michel Derdevet therefore advocates regulation that goes to both a stronger European articulation, but at the same time which must be more "decentralized", for users to make better use of new uses of energy through the action of regulators they are close.
It is true that we are very far off ...
This is why the author asks what one favors "regulatory convergence". This is not only to harmonize rules but also to redirect them to detach the competitive prism to direct them to the long-term financing.
It is true that Europe's energy, without which a single industrial space can hardly be, can not actually do if the regulation does not resolutely takes over the principle of competition, competition remaining in the moment of exchange, while the Regulation is in the long term and what to take to designate as "industrial policy" which is nothing but a form of expression of the Political.
So what Michel Derdevet request, what ever that finally the arrival of a political Europe, the need for it finds its place in the global competition.
On 6 June 2012, the European Commission has extended the authorization given to France, Belgium and Luxembourg to bring their State guaranty to Dexia Bank SA and DLC. Further, the Commission agreed to raise the ceiling of the guaranty, joint but non several, of EUR 15 billion which brings the ceiling allowed to EUR 55 billion. But the permission is only until September 30. This might coincide with the time where the Commission will take a position on the plan of "orderly resolution" of this systemic bank. It justifies its flexibility itself in its exemption from the prohibition of State aids, by the fact that it is a systemic bank and that a resolution plan will be submitted soon, but it raises in advance competition problems.This justifies all the more draft texts on the mechanisms which must be specific to the systemic failing financial institutions.
